On 06.12.21 21:44, Jacob Champion wrote:
I think reusing a zero IV will potentially leak more information than
just equality, depending on the cipher in use. You may be interested in
synthetic IVs and nonce-misuse resistance (e.g. [1]), since they seem
like they would match this use case exactly. (But I'm not a
cryptographer.)
I'm aware of this and plan to make use of SIV. The current
implementation is just an example.
Have you given any thought to AEAD? As a client I'd like to be able to
tie an encrypted value to other column (or external) data. For example,
AEAD could be used to prevent a DBA from copying the (encrypted) value
of my credit card column into their account's row to use it.
I don't know how that is supposed to work. When the value is encrypted
for insertion, the client may know things like table name or column
name, so it can tie it to those. But it doesn't know what row it will
go in, so you can't prevent the value from being copied into another
row. You would need some permanent logical row ID for this, I think.
For this scenario, the deterministic encryption mode is perhaps not the
right one.
This is not targeting PostgreSQL 15. But I'd appreciate some feedback
on the direction.
What kinds of attacks are you hoping to prevent (and not prevent)?
The point is to prevent admins from getting at plaintext data. The
scenario you show is an interesting one but I think it's not meant to be
addressed by this. If admins can alter the database to their advantage,
they could perhaps increase their account balance, create discount
codes, etc. also.
If this is a problem, then perhaps a better approach would be to store
parts of the data in a separate database with separate admins.
