On Sun, Oct 3, 2010 at 18:30, Alan T DeKok <al...@freeradius.org> wrote: > Tom Lane wrote: >> Hm ... seems to me that is a network security problem, not our problem. >> Who's to say one of the spoofed packets won't pass verification? > > The packets are signed with a shared key. Passing verification means > either the attacker knows the key, or the attacker has broken MD5 in > ways that are currently unknown. > >> If you want to change it, I won't stand in the way, but I have real >> doubts about both the credibility of this threat and the usefulness >> of the proposed fix. > > The credibility of the threat is high. Anyone can trivially send a > packet which will cause authentication to fail. This is a DoS attack.
I don't agree about how high it is - unless I misunderstand the wording. You still need to have unfiltered access to the network that the database server is on (unlikely) and you need to guess/bruteforce the port (using bruteforce not really hard, but likely to be detected by an IDS pretty quickly) It is definitely an opportunity for a DoS attack though, so it should be fixed. I find your suggested patches kind of hard to read posted inline that way - any chance you can repost as attachment or publish it as a git repository I can fetch from? -- Magnus Hagander Me: http://www.hagander.net/ Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/ -- Sent via pgsql-bugs mailing list (pgsql-bugs@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-bugs
