Damian, in general when there is incorrect data on any of Red Hat's CVE
pages the best place to request a fix is secal...@redhat.com.

In this case we are paying attention to this mailing list and have
incorporated some suggestions. I can help address any remaining cleanups.

Has OpenSSH ever considered becoming a CNA?

~Nick

On Tue, Jul 9, 2024 at 4:51 PM Solar Designer <so...@openwall.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Jul 09, 2024 at 09:52:58AM +1000, Damien Miller wrote:
> > On Mon, 8 Jul 2024, Solar Designer wrote:
> > > Today is the coordinated release date to publicly disclose a related
> > > issue I found during review of Qualys' findings, with further analysis
> > > by Qualys.  My summary is:
> > >
> > > CVE-2024-6409: OpenSSH: Possible remote code execution in privsep child
> > > due to a race condition in signal handling
> >
> > As an aside, who wrote the text of
> > https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-6409 ?
>
> I don't know for sure, but I guess someone from Red Hat did since the
> CVE was assigned by them as a CNA.  Also, the description is the same as
> what's in Red Hat Bugzilla.
>
> > It's disappointing that this CVE states that this is a vulnerability
> > in OpenSSH sshd, and fails to make clear that this only affects Redhat
> > versions and users of their downstream patch.
>
> This was in the title, just not in the description.  And now I see I did
> it the other way around in my oss-security posting - should have been
> more careful to include this information in both the suggested title and
> in the description - sorry about that.  Meanwhile, looks like the
> CVE-2024-6409 record has been updated today, perhaps in response to your
> message, and now says Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 also in the description.
>
> > This follows another critical failure to properly issue CVEs for OpenSSH:
> > CVE-2024-6387 only lists CPEs for Redhat systems as affected (see the
> > JSON dump of the entry: https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2024-6387 )
>
> The current revision (also updated today) starts with:
>
>       "affected": [
>         {
>           "repo": "https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git";,
>           "versions": [
>             {
>               "status": "affected",
>               "version": "8.5p1",
>               "versionType": "custom",
>               "lessThanOrEqual": "9.7p1"
>             }
>           ],
>           "packageName": "OpenSSH",
>           "collectionURL": "https://www.openssh.com/";,
>           "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
>         },
>
> and only then proceeds to give CPEs for Red Hat products.
>
> > This means that anyone using automation that consumes CVEs for detecting
> > vulnerabilities will be left exposed.
>
> Does the above look good enough now, or should there also be a CPE for
> upstream OpenSSH?
>
> > Moreover, the explanatory text for CVE-2024-6387 is also extremely
> lacking.
> > It fails to explain the consequence of the vulnerability (unauth RCE) and
> > just talks about mechanism.
>
> This is still the case, and this CVE was also assigned by Red Hat (in
> response to requests by Qualys and me in the distros list discussion),
> and the description is also the same as in Red Hat Bugzilla, so should
> probably be first improved in a database Red Hat uses internally.
>
> > I don't know if it's in anyone on this list's ability to get these
> > fixed, but IMO they are serious failures of the CVE process that make
> > it near-useless for consumers of this information.
>
> Apparently, someone in here noticed and started making edits.
>
> Alexander
>
>

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