Reviewer: Russ Housley Review result: Not Ready I reviewed this document as part of the Security Directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors. Document authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other IETF Last Call comments.
Document: draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-18 Reviewer: Russ Housley Review Date: 2025-03-08 IETF LC End Date: 2025-03-27 IESG Telechat date: Unknown Summary: Not Ready Major Concerns: Section 3.3: The text requires support for "mutual authentication". I assume that this means that it MUST be supported, but it does not have to be used. However, the next section say: "Each peer MUST validate the certificate path of the remote peer, ...". This seems to be in conflict. It requires the use of both server certificates and client certificates. Section 3.3: The text says: "... full certificate-based TLS authentication ...". I do not know what that means. Please clarify. Section 3.3: With the removal of the reference to [RFC8773], how is the requirement for certificates accomplished while also using external PSKs? I am unaware of any other way to do so. Further, Section 3.5 describes PSK authentication as an alternative to certificate-based authentication. These sections are in conflict. Section 3.3: The text allows the use of [RFC7250] must be used in the context of [RFC8446]. How is the requirement for certificates accomplished with raw public keys? I am unaware of any way to do so. Minor Concerns: None Nits: Section 3.3: s/Certificate based mutual/certificate-based mutual/ _______________________________________________ OPSAWG mailing list -- opsawg@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to opsawg-le...@ietf.org
