Hi Mingzhe,

As the main author of the DOTS telemetry spec, I’m enthusiast to this proposal 
and would like to see more details/practicalities. I have two logistic-related 
comments:


  *   Did you checked with SAVNET WG?
  *   Also, it seems to me this was presented in dispatch-all IETF#119. The 
reaction was positive as I recall but was there any follow-up with the sec ADs 
as:

==
Dispatch outcome: To a BOF; maybe related topics not just this draft.
==

Thank you.

Cheers,
Med

On Oct 18, 2024, at 12:39 AM, 邢铭哲 
<xingmz=40zgclab.edu...@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:xingmz=40zgclab.edu...@dmarc.ietf.org>>
 wrote:


Dear OPSAWG Experts,


We have submitted a draft titled "SAV-based Anti-DDoS Architecture" 
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cui-savnet-anti-ddos/), which focuses 
on enhancing security operations to defend against DDoS attacks using a SAV-D 
controller. The draft is motivated by the observation that spoofed IP addresses 
can lead to severe DDoS attacks. While Source Address Validation (SAV) schemes 
are an effective means of mitigating such attacks, the limited deployment of 
SAV devices impairs their overall performance.

In this context, we propose the SAV-D architecture to leverage information from 
both SAV and non-SAV devices. This approach improves detection accuracy and 
incentivizes broader deployment of SAV devices. Specifically, the architecture 
allows SAV honeypots, legacy routers, and victim defense systems to interact 
with the SAV-D controller, retrieving comprehensive threat intelligence to 
inform defense strategies. Furthermore, the SAV honeypots report malicious 
packet information to the SAV-D controller, enabling data analysis and the 
creation of global threat intelligence. The SAV-D controller can also provide 
comprehensive attack situation awareness, helping operators manage their 
networks more effectively. Our draft introduces the overall architecture of the 
SAV-D controller, the interaction with devices, the data transmission protocol, 
workflow, deployment strategies, and examples of connections.

Based on SAV-D, we have set up a small-scale experimental environment and 
validated the effectiveness of the framework against reflective DDoS attacks. 
The details can be found in the paper(SAV-D: Defending DDoS with Incremental 
Deployment of SAV ).

This draft offers a practical operational solution for defending against 
spoofed IP DDoS attacks while utilizing existing SAV devices, legacy routers, 
and victim defense mechanisms. We submit this to OPSAWG and look forward to 
your valuable feedback to improve the draft.



Best regards,
Mingzhe
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