Am 13.09.2015 um 22:04 schrieb Daniel Dickinson:
I do think allowing to choose to disable the banner is a minor
benefit, however, as
Anyway It's a bad behavior to disclose detailed version information
without login. SOHO Routers are not as often upgraded as normal PCs - so
why make it easier for an attacker to just lookup how he can enter that
specific version.
Especially as sometimes the attacker can be inside the network as he got
legally the SSID/Password but he should not be able to access ,e.g., DSL
login data on the system or beeing able to reconfigure it. Just think of
routers in Hotels etc.
I don't agree that this is fully the classical "security by obscurity"
(like with MAC filters).
I've said, there are much more effective means of preventing
accidential exposure, and quite frankly if the user is *choosing* to
open the web interface I think an warning and disabling the banner if
the user foolishly insists on opening the interface despite the
warning is more useful thank disabling the banner by default.
If you're going to argue it prevents against internal threats than I
would argue that if your internal network is hostile enough that you
need to worry about attacks on openwrt from your internal network AND
you're not skilled enough to limit access to LuCI (or better, build an
image without LuCI and just use SSH) to the specific trusted hosts
(preferably by combination of MAC address and IP address) in the
firewall, or (better) to use a 'management' VPN or VLAN that only
trusted hosts can get on, then you're in a lot more trouble than
eliminating the banner for LuCI will solve.
Regards,
Daniel
On 2015-09-13 10:21 AM, MauritsVB wrote:
At the moment the OpenWRT www login screen provides *very* detailed
version information before anyone has even entered a password. It
displays not just “15.05” or “Chaos Calmer” but even the exact git
version on the banner.
While it’s not advised to open this login screen to the world, fact
is that it does happen intentionally or accidentally. Just a Google
search for “Powered by LuCI Master (git-“ will provide many
accessible OpenWRT login screens, including exact version information.
As soon as someone discovers a vulnerability in a OpenWRT version all
an attacker needs to do is perform a Google search to find many
installations with versions that are vulnerable (even if a patch is
already available).
In the interest of hardening the default OpenWRT install, can I
suggest that by default OpenWRT doesn’t disclose the version (not
even 15.05 or “Chaos Calmer”) on the login screen? For extra safety I
would even suggest to leave “OpenWRT” off the login screen, the only
people who should use this screen already know it’s running OpenWRT.
Any thoughts?
Maurits
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