Hi, On 29/01/2021 11:47, Arne Schwabe wrote: > Without this OpenVPN will later segfault on a FIPS enabled system due > to the algorithm available but not allowed. > > Patch V2: Use (!func) instead (func != 1) > > Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <a...@rfc2549.org> > --- > src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c > index c60d4a54..e124a7b6 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c > +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c > @@ -954,7 +954,10 @@ md_ctx_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *kt) > ASSERT(NULL != ctx && NULL != kt); > > EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx); > - EVP_DigestInit(ctx, kt); > + if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, kt)) > + { > + crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "EVP_DigestInit failed"); > + } > } > > void > @@ -1011,7 +1014,10 @@ hmac_ctx_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, int > key_len, > ASSERT(NULL != kt && NULL != ctx); > > HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx); > - HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, key_len, kt, NULL); > + if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, key_len, kt, NULL)) > + { > + crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "HMAC_Init_ex failed"); > + } > > /* make sure we used a big enough key */ > ASSERT(HMAC_size(ctx) <= key_len); > @@ -1032,7 +1038,10 @@ hmac_ctx_size(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) > void > hmac_ctx_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx) > { > - HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); > + if(!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) > + { > + crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "HMAC_Init_ex failed"); > + } > }
I saw that you missed this case earlier, but I thought that this call cannot really fail. Assuming it can fail under certain conditions, wouldn't the M_FATAL somewhat become a DoS on the server side? Regards, -- Antonio Quartulli _______________________________________________ Openvpn-devel mailing list Openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel