As it appears commit 767e4c56becbfeea525e4695a810593f373883cd "Log
serial number of revoked certificate" hasn't survive refactoring
of CRL handling.
In most of situations admin of OpenVPN server needs to know which
particular certificate is used by client.
In the case when certificate is valid, environment variable can be
used for that but once it is revoked, no user scripts are invoked
so there is no way to get serial number, only subject is logged.
Let's log certificate serial in case it is revoked and additionally
log certificate depth & subject in crl-verify "dir" mode for better
consistency with crl file (non-dir) mode.
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Grishenko <themi...@yandex-team.ru>
---
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 7 ++++---
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c | 5 +++--
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c | 5 +++--
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
index 844bc57d..07745514 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ cleanup:
* check peer cert against CRL directory
*/
static result_t
-verify_check_crl_dir(const char *crl_dir, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert)
+verify_check_crl_dir(const char *crl_dir, int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t
*cert, char *subject)
{
result_t ret = FAILURE;
char fn[256];
@@ -616,7 +616,8 @@ verify_check_crl_dir(const char *crl_dir,
openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert)
fd = platform_open(fn, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd >= 0)
{
- msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY CRL: certificate serial number %s is
revoked", serial);
+ msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY CRL: depth=%d, %s, serial=%s is revoked",
+ cert_depth, subject, serial);
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -758,7 +759,7 @@ verify_cert(struct tls_session *session,
openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_dep
{
if (opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR)
{
- if (SUCCESS != verify_check_crl_dir(opt->crl_file, cert))
+ if (SUCCESS != verify_check_crl_dir(opt->crl_file, cert_depth,
cert, subject))
{
goto cleanup;
}
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
index fd31bbbd..e9982e41 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ verify_callback(void *session_obj, mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
int cert_depth,
int ret = 0;
char errstr[512] = { 0 };
char *subject = x509_get_subject(cert, &gc);
+ char *serial = backend_x509_get_serial(cert, &gc);
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(errstr, sizeof(errstr)-1, "",
*flags);
if (ret <= 0 && !openvpn_snprintf(errstr, sizeof(errstr),
@@ -82,8 +83,8 @@ verify_callback(void *session_obj, mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
int cert_depth,
if (subject)
{
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, subject=%s: %s",
- cert_depth, subject, errstr);
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, subject=%s, serial=%s:
%s",
+ cert_depth, subject, serial ? serial : "", errstr);
}
else
{
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
index ff14db23..20095cf7 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
/* get the X509 name */
char *subject = x509_get_subject(current_cert, &gc);
+ char *serial = backend_x509_get_serial(current_cert, &gc);
if (!subject)
{
@@ -89,10 +90,10 @@ verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
/* Remote site specified a certificate, but it's not correct */
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, error=%s: %s",
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, error=%s: %s, serial=%s",
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx)),
- subject);
+ subject, serial ? serial : "");
ERR_clear_error();
--
2.17.1
_______________________________________________
Openvpn-devel mailing list
Openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel
