Am 22.06.20 um 14:43 schrieb Steffan Karger:
> Hi,
> 
> On 22-06-2020 14:29, David Sommerseth wrote:
>> On 22/06/2020 14:21, Arne Schwabe wrote:
>>>
>>>>  PrivateTmp=true
>>>>  WorkingDirectory=/etc/openvpn/server
>>>> -ExecStart=@sbindir@/openvpn --status %t/openvpn-server/status-%i.log 
>>>> --status-version 2 --suppress-timestamps --config %i.conf
>>>> +ExecStart=@sbindir@/openvpn --status %t/openvpn-server/status-%i.log 
>>>> --status-version 2 --suppress-timestamps --cipher AES-256-GCM 
>>>> --ncp-ciphers AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM:AES-256-CBC:AES-128-CBC:BF-CBC 
>>>> --config %i.conf
>>>>  CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_IPC_LOCK CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 
>>>> CAP_NET_RAW CAP_SETGID CAP_SETUID CAP_SYS_CHROOT CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 
>>>> CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
>>>>  LimitNPROC=10
>>>>  DeviceAllow=/dev/null rw
>>>>
>>>
>>> NACK.
>>>
>>> Setting ncp-cipher to include BF-CBC by default allows BF-CBC in configs
>>> that did not allow it before. Basically any config that had something
>>> other than cipher BF-CBC and no ncp-ciphers in it will now allow clients
>>> with BF-CBC to connect. I don't want force users to set ncp-cipher to a
>>> sane value since the systemd unit file doesn't.
>>
>> That will break existing configs on the next upgrade.  Do we want do do that?
>>
>> I'm fine with removing BF-CBC, but it is scheduled for removal in OpenVPN 
>> 2.6.
> 
> I think Arne has a very good point that it's kinda weird to "degrade"
> the NCP defaults.
> 
> Making AES-256-GCM the default cipher for TLS-based connections (GCM
> won't work with static key configs) does not imply *removing* BF-CBC
> support. Maybe these should be the steps:
> 
> 2.4: Use to AES-256-GCM when available (basically what NCP did)
> 2.5: Switch to AES-256-GCM as the default cipher (but allow overriding)
> 2.6: Remove support for small block ciphers all together
> 
> Yes, this will probably break some (less secure) setups and make some
> people angry. But at some point people need to move on. We've been
> throwing warnings at them for a while now.

I had a different suggestion in the channel:

- Deprecate ncp-disable. Reason: Was a good debug switch when introduced
should not be necessary anymore.

- Introduce ncp-fallback-cipher for compatibility with ncp-disable/old
versions
    - needs to be a cipher from ncp-ciphers list
    - Eventually default the first cipher from ncp-ciphers list
    - in 2.5 default to --cipher if --cipher is set and automatically
add cipher to ncp-ciphers and set ncp-fallback-cipher.

    - If cipher is not set
        a) warn about that cipher will be ignored in p2mp mode and if BF-CBC is
still needed (e.g. peer 2.3 or older) that ncp-fallback-cipher should be set
        b) same a) but do it automatically for the user+warn


This allows us to eventually get rid of --cipher while providing still a
smooth transaction.

Arne

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