Hi Antonio,
Thanks for the review!
On 15-06-18 09:03, Antonio Quartulli wrote:
> On 08/12/17 20:07, Steffan Karger wrote:
>> Needed for tls-crypt-v2, but isolated enough to be reviewed as a separate
>> patch.
>>
>> The encode API allocates memory, because it fits our typical gc-oriented
>> code pattern and the caller does not have to do multiple calls or
>> calculations to determine the required destination buffer size.
>>
>> The decode API does not allocate memory, because the required destination
>> buffer is always smaller than the input buffer (so is easy to manage by
>> the caller) and does not force the caller to use the heap.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.kar...@fox-it.com>
>> ---
>> src/openvpn/crypto_backend.h | 30 +++++++++++
>> src/openvpn/crypto_mbedtls.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile.am | 16 +++++-
>> tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_crypto.c | 92
>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 5 files changed, 293 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> create mode 100644 tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_crypto.c
>>
>> diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto_backend.h b/src/openvpn/crypto_backend.h
>> index 567fd9b..83e14c8 100644
>> --- a/src/openvpn/crypto_backend.h
>> +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto_backend.h
>> @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
>> #include "crypto_mbedtls.h"
>> #endif
>> #include "basic.h"
>> +#include "buffer.h"
>>
>> /* TLS uses a tag of 128 bytes, let's do the same for OpenVPN */
>> #define OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH 16
>> @@ -105,6 +106,35 @@ void show_available_digests(void);
>>
>> void show_available_engines(void);
>>
>> +/**
>> + * Encode binary data as PEM
>> + *
>> + * @param name The name to use in the PEM header/footer
>> + * @param dst Destination buffer for PEM-encoded data. Must be a
>> valid
>> + * pointer to an uninitialized buffer structure. Iff this
>> + * function returns true, the buffer will contain memory
>> + * allocated through the supplied gc.
>
> minor: I see the current style is inconsistent wrt having a '.' at the
> end of each doxygen line. Maybe we should decide what to do and stick to
> that ;P But does not need to be changed in this patch of course.
You sound just like my colleague who's pointing out the missing dots in
my doxygen :') Any preference from your side? I think ending each line
with a dot is best, because that looks best in the generated docs.
>> + * @param src Source buffer
>> + * @param gc The garbage collector to use when allocating memory for
>> + * dst.
>> + *
>> + * @return true iff PEM encode succeeded.
>> + */
>> +bool crypto_pem_encode(const char *name, struct buffer *dst,
>> + const struct buffer *src, struct gc_arena *gc);
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * Decode a PEM buffer to binary data
>> + *
>> + * @param name The name expected in the PEM header/footer
>> + * @param dst Destination buffer for decoded data
>> + * @param src Source buffer (PEM data)
>> + *
>> + * @return true iff PEM decode succeeded.
>> + */
>> +bool crypto_pem_decode(const char *name, struct buffer *dst,
>> + const struct buffer *src);
>> +
>> /*
>> *
>> * Random number functions, used in cases where we want
>> diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto_mbedtls.c b/src/openvpn/crypto_mbedtls.c
>> index 8fa03da..1e86854 100644
>> --- a/src/openvpn/crypto_mbedtls.c
>> +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto_mbedtls.c
>> @@ -44,11 +44,13 @@
>> #include "otime.h"
>> #include "misc.h"
>>
>> +#include <mbedtls/base64.h>
>> #include <mbedtls/des.h>
>> #include <mbedtls/error.h>
>> #include <mbedtls/md5.h>
>> #include <mbedtls/cipher.h>
>> #include <mbedtls/havege.h>
>> +#include <mbedtls/pem.h>
>>
>> #include <mbedtls/entropy.h>
>>
>> @@ -229,6 +231,78 @@ show_available_engines(void)
>> "available\n");
>> }
>>
>> +bool
>> +crypto_pem_encode(const char *name, struct buffer *dst,
>> + const struct buffer *src, struct gc_arena *gc)
>> +{
>> + /* 1000 chars is the PEM line length limit (+1 for tailing NUL) */
>> + char header[1000+1] = { 0 };
>> + char footer[1000+1] = { 0 };
>> +
>> + if (!openvpn_snprintf(header, sizeof(header), "-----BEGIN %s-----\n",
>> name))
>> + {
>> + return false;
>> + }
>> + if (!openvpn_snprintf(footer, sizeof(footer), "-----END %s-----\n",
>> name))
>> + {
>> + return false;
>> + }
>> +
>> + size_t out_len = 0;
>> + if (MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL !=
>> + mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(header, footer, BPTR(src), BLEN(src),
>> + NULL, 0, &out_len))
>> + {
>> + return false;
>> + }
>> +
>> + *dst = alloc_buf_gc(out_len, gc);
>> + if (!mbed_ok(mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(header, footer, BPTR(src),
>> BLEN(src),
>> + BPTR(dst), BCAP(dst), &out_len))
>> + || !buf_inc_len(dst, out_len))
>
> Isn't in the spec of this function to keep the buffer uninitialized when
> returning false?
> Not a big deal because the buffer area was allocated via gc so it can't
> be leaked.
>
> Don't you think that if buf_inc_len() fails (can this really happen?)
> the buffer should better be reset?
This should really never happen according to the function specification
by mbed TLS, but I'd rather check anyway. We might catch a bug from
their side, or better detect an API change.
But yeah, I'll add a CLEAR(*dst) here.
>> + {
>> + return false;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return true;
>> +}
>> +
>> +bool
>> +crypto_pem_decode(const char *name, struct buffer *dst,
>> + const struct buffer *src)
>> +{
>> + /* 1000 chars is the PEM line length limit (+1 for tailing NUL) */
>> + char header[1000+1] = { 0 };
>> + char footer[1000+1] = { 0 };
>> +
>> + if (*(BLAST(src)) != '\0')
>> + {
>> + msg(M_WARN, "PEM decode error: source buffer not null-terminated");
>> + return false;
>> + }
>> + if (!openvpn_snprintf(header, sizeof(header), "-----BEGIN %s-----",
>> name))
>> + {
>> + return false;
>> + }
>> + if (!openvpn_snprintf(footer, sizeof(footer), "-----END %s-----", name))
>> + {
>> + return false;
>> + }
>> +
>> + size_t use_len = 0;
>> + mbedtls_pem_context ctx = { 0 };
>> + bool ret = mbed_ok(mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&ctx, header, footer,
>> BPTR(src),
>> + NULL, 0, &use_len));
>> + if (ret && !buf_write(dst, ctx.buf, ctx.buflen))
>> + {
>> + ret = false;
>> + msg(M_WARN, "PEM decode error: destination buffer too small");
>> + }
>> +
>> + mbedtls_pem_free(&ctx);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> *
>> * Random number functions, used in cases where we want
>> diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c
>> index 20a519e..49d3aeb 100644
>> --- a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c
>> +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c
>> @@ -387,6 +387,88 @@ show_available_engines(void)
>> #endif
>> }
>>
>> +
>> +bool
>> +crypto_pem_encode(const char *name, struct buffer *dst,
>> + const struct buffer *src, struct gc_arena *gc)
>> +{
>> + bool ret = false;
>> + BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
>
> can we assume bio is always initialized with non-NULL here?
Don't think so. Will fix.
>> + if (!PEM_write_bio(bio, name, "", BPTR(src), BLEN(src)))
>> + {
>> + ret = false;
>> + goto cleanup;
>> + }
>> +
>> + BUF_MEM *bptr;
>> + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &bptr);
>> +
>> + *dst = alloc_buf_gc(bptr->length, gc);
>> + ASSERT(buf_write(dst, bptr->data, bptr->length));
>
> why using an ASSERT() here and none in the mbedtls counterpart?
>
> If there is no special reason I (personally) think that these helper
> functions should not use ASSERT() (unless something really bad is
> happening).
> Or do you think that a failure here indicates a general memory problem?
Because in the mbedtls part, mbed my change the "outlen" value. While
here, we create a buffer of bptr->length bytes and then write
bptr->length bytes to it. If that fails, our entire logic (or
executable integrity) is broken. It's our code only, and it can not fail.
>> +
>> + ret = true;
>> +cleanup:
>> + if (!BIO_free(bio))
>> + {
>> + ret = false;;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +bool
>> +crypto_pem_decode(const char *name, struct buffer *dst,
>> + const struct buffer *src)
>> +{
>> + bool ret = false;
>> + BIO *bio;
>> +
>> + if (!(bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *)BPTR(src), BLEN(src))))
>> + {
>> + crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "Cannot open memory BIO for PEM decode");
>
>> + }
>> +
>> + char *name_read = NULL;
>> + char *header_read = NULL;
>> + uint8_t *data_read = NULL;
>> + long data_read_len = 0;
>> + if (!PEM_read_bio(bio, &name_read, &header_read, &data_read,
>> + &data_read_len))
>> + {
>> + dmsg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "%s: PEM decode failed", __func__);
>> + goto cleanup;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (strcmp(name, name_read))
>> + {
>> + dmsg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS,
>> + "%s: unexpected PEM name (got '%s', expected '%s')",
>> + __func__, name_read, name);
>> + goto cleanup;
>> + }
>> +
>> + uint8_t *dst_data = buf_write_alloc(dst, data_read_len);
>> + if (!dst_data)
>> + {
>> + dmsg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "%s: dst too small (%i, needs %li)", __func__,
>> + BCAP(dst), data_read_len);
>> + goto cleanup;
>> + }
>> + memcpy(dst_data, data_read, data_read_len);
>> +
>> + ret = true;
>> +cleanup:
>> + OPENSSL_free(name_read);
>> + OPENSSL_free(header_read);
>> + OPENSSL_free(data_read);
>> + if (!BIO_free(bio))
>> + {
>> + ret = false;;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> *
>> * Random number functions, used in cases where we want
>> diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile.am
>> b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile.am
>> index 23d758b..d100c21 100644
>> --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile.am
>> +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile.am
>> @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ if HAVE_LD_WRAP_SUPPORT
>> check_PROGRAMS += argv_testdriver buffer_testdriver
>> endif
>>
>> -check_PROGRAMS += packet_id_testdriver tls_crypt_testdriver
>> +check_PROGRAMS += crypto_testdriver packet_id_testdriver
>> tls_crypt_testdriver
>>
>> TESTS = $(check_PROGRAMS)
>>
>> @@ -29,6 +29,20 @@ buffer_testdriver_SOURCES = test_buffer.c mock_msg.c \
>> $(openvpn_srcdir)/buffer.c \
>> $(openvpn_srcdir)/platform.c
>>
>> +crypto_testdriver_CFLAGS = @TEST_CFLAGS@ \
>> + -I$(openvpn_includedir) -I$(compat_srcdir) -I$(openvpn_srcdir) \
>> + $(OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS)
>> +crypto_testdriver_LDFLAGS = @TEST_LDFLAGS@ \
>> + $(OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_LIBS)
>> +crypto_testdriver_SOURCES = test_crypto.c mock_msg.c \
>> + $(openvpn_srcdir)/buffer.c \
>> + $(openvpn_srcdir)/crypto.c \
>> + $(openvpn_srcdir)/crypto_mbedtls.c \
>> + $(openvpn_srcdir)/crypto_openssl.c \
>> + $(openvpn_srcdir)/otime.c \
>> + $(openvpn_srcdir)/packet_id.c \
>> + $(openvpn_srcdir)/platform.c
>> +
>> packet_id_testdriver_CFLAGS = @TEST_CFLAGS@ \
>> -I$(openvpn_includedir) -I$(compat_srcdir) -I$(openvpn_srcdir) \
>> $(OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS)
>> diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_crypto.c
>> b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_crypto.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..62d5b3f
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_crypto.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
>> +/*
>> + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks
>> + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based
>> + * session authentication and key exchange,
>> + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and
>> + * packet compression.
>> + *
>> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Fox Crypto B.V. <open...@fox-it.com>
>> + *
>
> this should be updated, time flies :)
Will do.
>> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
>> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
>> + * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
>> + *
>> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
>> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
>> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
>> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
>> + *
>> + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
>> + * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
>> + * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
>> +#include "config.h"
>> +#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
>> +#include "config-msvc.h"
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +#include "syshead.h"
>> +
>> +#include <stdio.h>
>> +#include <unistd.h>
>> +#include <stdlib.h>
>> +#include <stdarg.h>
>> +#include <string.h>
>> +#include <setjmp.h>
>> +#include <cmocka.h>
>> +
>> +#include "crypto.h"
>> +
>> +#include "mock_msg.h"
>> +
>> +int script_security = 0; /* Avoid including misc.c */
>
> I tried commenting it and I don't see any warning. Which include chain
> should lead to its declaration?
Ah, this is no longer the case, probably because either I messed up or
7/10 is already applied. Either way, I'll remove it.
>> +
>> +static const char testtext[] = "Dummy text to test PEM encoding";
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * Check that packet replays are accepted when CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID is set.
>> This
>> + * is used for the first control channel packet that arrives, because we
>> don't
>> + * know the packet ID yet.
>> + */
>
> Is the comment above a copy/paste incident? or there is something hidden
> in this unit test?
Woops, definitely a pasto.
>> +static void
>> +crypto_pem_encode_decode_loopback(void **state) {
>> + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
>> + struct buffer src_buf;
>> + buf_set_read(&src_buf, (void *)testtext, sizeof(testtext));
>> +
>> + uint8_t dec[sizeof(testtext)];
>> + struct buffer dec_buf;
>> + buf_set_write(&dec_buf, dec, sizeof(dec));
>> +
>> + struct buffer pem_buf;
>> +
>> + assert_true(crypto_pem_encode("TESTKEYNAME", &pem_buf, &src_buf, &gc));
>> +
>> + /* Wrong key name */
>> + assert_false(crypto_pem_decode("WRONGNAME", &dec_buf, &pem_buf));
>> +
>> + assert_true(crypto_pem_decode("TESTKEYNAME", &dec_buf, &pem_buf));
>> +
>
> As a final check, wouldn't it be meaningful to compare the content of
> dec_buf with src_buf to ensure that we properly obtained the original
> char array?
Yes, will do.
> Another question: do we have any way to verify that pem_buf contains
> well-formatted PEM data after pem_encode()?
> I am asking because if both encode and decode become no-op (because of
> some bug) we won't be able to realize that.
>
> However, I am not sure we have an easy way to check that..maybe you
> could use some SSL function that would normally load PEM data?
That is a bit annoying to test indeed. How about I just verify that
this is encoding is not a no-op by adding a check that pem_buf is larger
that src_buf?
As for correct PEM en/decoding, I expect that the crypto lib has tested
that.
>> + gc_free(&gc);
>> +}
>> +
>> +int
>> +main(void) {
>> + const struct CMUnitTest tests[] = {
>> + cmocka_unit_test(crypto_pem_encode_decode_loopback),
>> + };
>> +
>> +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL)
>> + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
>> +#endif
>> +
>> + int ret = cmocka_run_group_tests_name("crypto tests", tests, NULL,
>> NULL);
>> +
>> +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL)
>> + EVP_cleanup();
>> +#endif
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>>
>
> Cheers,
Thanks!
-Steffan
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
_______________________________________________
Openvpn-devel mailing list
Openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel
