I'm sending the patch again. Now it should be correctly diffed against version 2.1.

Configuration is done with standard http-proxy command in config file, with 'ntlm2' setting for auth method, for. ex.:
http-proxy 192.168.0.1 8080 stdin ntlm2

Username to proxy can be passed among with auth. domain name, for ex.
DOMAIN\username

Please give me some feedback about testing or about any problems with ntlm.

Miroslav Zajic
Nextsoft s.r.o.



diff -Naur openvpn-2.1/ntlm.c openvpn-NTLMv2-2.1/ntlm.c
--- openvpn-2.1/ntlm.c    2008-01-13 21:25:52.915264000 +0100
+++ openvpn-NTLMv2-2.1/ntlm.c    2008-01-15 11:25:00.077161600 +0100
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 *
 *  Copyright (C) 2004 William Preston
 *
+ * *NTLMv2 support and domain name parsing by Miroslav Zajic, Nextsoft s.r.o.*
+ *
 *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 *  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
@@ -41,146 +43,332 @@

#include "memdbg.h"

+
+
static void
create_des_keys(const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *key)
{
-  key[0] = hash[0];
-  key[1] = ((hash[0]&1)<<7)|(hash[1]>>1);
-  key[2] = ((hash[1]&3)<<6)|(hash[2]>>2);
-  key[3] = ((hash[2]&7)<<5)|(hash[3]>>3);
-  key[4] = ((hash[3]&15)<<4)|(hash[4]>>4);
-  key[5] = ((hash[4]&31)<<3)|(hash[5]>>5);
-  key[6] = ((hash[5]&63)<<2)|(hash[6]>>6);
-  key[7] = ((hash[6]&127)<<1);
-  des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock *)key);
+    key[0] = hash[0];
+    key[1] = ((hash[0]&1)<<7)|(hash[1]>>1);
+    key[2] = ((hash[1]&3)<<6)|(hash[2]>>2);
+    key[3] = ((hash[2]&7)<<5)|(hash[3]>>3);
+    key[4] = ((hash[3]&15)<<4)|(hash[4]>>4);
+    key[5] = ((hash[4]&31)<<3)|(hash[5]>>5);
+    key[6] = ((hash[5]&63)<<2)|(hash[6]>>6);
+    key[7] = ((hash[6]&127)<<1);
+    des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock *)key);
}

+
static void
gen_md4_hash (const char* data, int data_len, char *result)
{
-  /* result is 16 byte md4 hash */
+    /* result is 16 byte md4 hash */
+
+    MD4_CTX c;
+    char md[16];
+
+    MD4_Init (&c);
+    MD4_Update (&c, data, data_len);
+    MD4_Final ((unsigned char *)md, &c);
+
+    memcpy (result, md, 16);
+}
+
+
+static void
+gen_hmac_md5 (const char* data, int data_len, const char* key, int key_len,char *result)
+{
+    unsigned int len;
+
+    HMAC_CTX c;
+    HMAC_Init (&c, key, key_len, EVP_md5());
+    HMAC_Update (&c, data, data_len);
+    HMAC_Final (&c, result, &len);
+    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+}
+
+
+static void
+gen_timestamp (unsigned char *timestamp)
+{
+    /* Copies 8 bytes long timestamp into "timestamp" buffer.
+ * Timestamp is Little-endian, 64-bit signed value representing the number of tenths of a microsecond since January 1, 1601.
+     */
+
+    unsigned char bufA[8]; /* Buffer for 64-bit computing */
+    unsigned char bufB[8]; /* Second buffer  */
+    int a, b, c, tmp, tmp2, carry;
+
+ /* set 64-bit buffer A with current time (seconds since 00:00:00 1.1.1970) */
+    *(unsigned int *)bufA =     (unsigned int)time(NULL);
+    *(unsigned int *)&bufA[4] = (unsigned int)0;
+
+ /* 64-bit adition of 0x02B6109100 (seconds between 00:00:00 1.1.1601 and 00:00:00 1.1.1970) */
+    *(unsigned int *)bufB =     (unsigned int)0xB6109100;
+    *(unsigned int *)&bufB[4] = (unsigned int)0x00000002;
+
+    carry=0;
+    for (a=0; a<8; a++){ /* lame adition */
+        tmp = (unsigned int)bufA[a] + (unsigned int)bufB[a] + carry;
+        bufA[a] = tmp & 0xFF;
+        carry = (tmp & 0xFF00) >> 8;
+    }
+ + /* 64-bit multiply by 10000000 = 0x989680 (converting seconds to tenths of microseconds) */
+    *(unsigned int *)bufB =           (unsigned int)0x00989680;
+    *(unsigned int *)&bufB[4] =       (unsigned int)0x00000000;
+    *(unsigned int *)timestamp =      (unsigned int)0x00000000;
+    *(unsigned int *)&timestamp[4] =  (unsigned int)0x00000000;
+
+    for (a=0; a<8; a++){ /* lame multiply */
+        for (b=0; b<8; b++){
+            tmp = (unsigned int)bufA[a] * (unsigned int)bufB[b];
+            carry=0;
+            for (c=b; (c<8-a) && (c < b + 3); c++){
+ tmp2 = ((tmp & (0xFF << ((c-b) * 8))) >> ((c-b) * 8)) + (unsigned int)timestamp[a+c] + carry;
+                timestamp[a+c] = tmp2 & 0xFF;
+                carry = (tmp2 & 0xFF00) >> 8;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+

-  MD4_CTX c;
-  char md[16];
+static void
+gen_nonce (unsigned char *nonce)
+{
+    /* Generates 8 random bytes to be used as client nonce */
+    int i;
+
+    for(i=0;i<8;i++);
+        nonce[i] = (unsigned char)random();
+}

-  MD4_Init (&c);
-  MD4_Update (&c, data, data_len);
-  MD4_Final ((unsigned char *)md, &c);

-  memcpy (result, md, 16);
+unsigned char *my_strupr(unsigned char *str)
+{
+    /* converts string to uppercase in place */
+
+    unsigned char *tmp;
+    tmp = str;
+    do
+    {
+        if (*str >= 'a' && *str <= 'z')
+            *str -= 32;
+    }
+    while (*(++str));
+    return tmp;
}

+
static int
unicodize (char *dst, const char *src)
{
-  /* not really unicode... */
-  int i = 0;
-  do
-    {
-      dst[i++] = *src;
-      dst[i++] = 0;
-    }
-  while (*src++);
+    /* not really unicode... */
+    int i = 0;
+    do
+        {
+            dst[i++] = *src;
+            dst[i++] = 0;
+        }
+    while (*src++);

-  return i;
+    return i;
}

+
+static void
+add_security_buffer(int sb_offset, void *data, int length, unsigned char *msg_buf, int *msg_bufpos)
+{
+ /* Adds security buffer data to a message and sets security buffer's offset and length */
+    msg_buf[sb_offset] = (unsigned char)length;
+    msg_buf[sb_offset + 2] = msg_buf[sb_offset];
+    msg_buf[sb_offset + 4] = *msg_bufpos;
+    memcpy(&msg_buf[*msg_bufpos], data, msg_buf[sb_offset]);
+    *msg_bufpos += length;
+}
+
+
+
+
+
const char *
ntlm_phase_1 (const struct http_proxy_info *p, struct gc_arena *gc)
{
-  struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (96, gc);
-  /* try a minimal NTLM handshake
-   *
-   * http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html
-   *
-   * This message contains only the NTLMSSP signature,
-   * the NTLM message type,
-   * and the minimal set of flags (Negotiate NTLM and Negotiate OEM).
-   *
-   */
-  buf_printf (&out, "%s", "TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAAgIAAA==");
-  return (BSTR (&out));
+    struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (96, gc);
+    /* try a minimal NTLM handshake
+     *
+     * http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html
+     *
+     * This message contains only the NTLMSSP signature,
+     * the NTLM message type,
+     * and the minimal set of flags (Negotiate NTLM and Negotiate OEM).
+     *
+     */
+    buf_printf (&out, "%s", "TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAAgIAAA==");
+    return (BSTR (&out));
}

+
const char *
ntlm_phase_3 (const struct http_proxy_info *p, const char *phase_2, struct gc_arena *gc)
{
-  char pwbuf[sizeof (p->up.password) * 2]; /* for unicode password */
-  char buf2[128]; /* decoded reply from proxy */
-  char phase3[146];
-
-  char md4_hash[21];
-  char challenge[8], response[24];
-  int i, ret_val, buflen;
-  des_cblock key1, key2, key3;
-  des_key_schedule sched1, sched2, sched3;
-
-  /* try a minimal NTLM handshake
-   *
-   * http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html
-   *
-   */
-  ASSERT (strlen (p->up.username) > 0);
-  ASSERT (strlen (p->up.password) > 0);
-
-  /* fill 1st 16 bytes with md4 hash, disregard terminating null */
-  gen_md4_hash (pwbuf, unicodize (pwbuf, p->up.password) - 2, md4_hash);
-
-  /* pad to 21 bytes */
-  memset (md4_hash + 16, 0, 5);
-
-  ret_val = base64_decode( phase_2, (void *)buf2);
-  /* we can be sure that phase_2 is less than 128
-   * therefore buf2 needs to be (3/4 * 128) */
-
-  /* extract the challenge from bytes 24-31 */
-  for (i=0; i<8; i++)
-  {
-    challenge[i] = buf2[i+24];
-  }
-
-  create_des_keys ((unsigned char *)md4_hash, key1);
-  des_set_key_unchecked ((des_cblock *)key1, sched1);
- des_ecb_encrypt ((des_cblock *)challenge, (des_cblock *)response, sched1, DES_ENCRYPT);
-
-  create_des_keys ((unsigned char *)&(md4_hash[7]), key2);
-  des_set_key_unchecked ((des_cblock *)key2, sched2);
- des_ecb_encrypt ((des_cblock *)challenge, (des_cblock *)&(response[8]), sched2, DES_ENCRYPT);
-
-  create_des_keys ((unsigned char *)&(md4_hash[14]), key3);
-  des_set_key_unchecked ((des_cblock *)key3, sched3);
- des_ecb_encrypt ((des_cblock *)challenge, (des_cblock *)&(response[16]), sched3, DES_ENCRYPT);
-
-  /* clear reply */
-  memset (phase3, 0, sizeof (phase3));
-
-  strcpy (phase3, "NTLMSSP\0");
-  phase3[8] = 3; /* type 3 */
-
-  buflen = 0x58 + strlen (p->up.username);
-  if (buflen > (int) sizeof (phase3))
-    buflen = sizeof (phase3);
-
-  phase3[0x10] = buflen; /* lm not used */
-  phase3[0x20] = buflen; /* default domain (i.e. proxy's domain) */
-  phase3[0x30] = buflen; /* no workstation name supplied */
-  phase3[0x38] = buflen; /* no session key */
-
-  phase3[0x14] = 24; /* ntlm response is 24 bytes long */
-  phase3[0x16] = phase3[0x14];
-  phase3[0x18] = 0x40; /* ntlm offset */
-  memcpy (&(phase3[0x40]), response, 24);
-
-
-  phase3[0x24] = strlen (p->up.username); /* username in ascii */
-  phase3[0x26] = phase3[0x24];
-  phase3[0x28] = 0x58;
-  strncpy (&(phase3[0x58]), p->up.username, sizeof (phase3) - 0x58);
-
-  phase3[0x3c] = 0x02; /* negotiate oem */
-  phase3[0x3d] = 0x02; /* negotiate ntlm */
+    /* NTLM handshake
+     *
+     * http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html
+     *
+     */
+ + char pwbuf[sizeof (p->up.password) * 2]; /* for unicode password */
+    char buf2[128]; /* decoded reply from proxy */
+    unsigned char phase3[464];
+
+    char md4_hash[21];
+    char challenge[8], ntlm_response[24];
+    int i, ret_val;
+    des_cblock key1, key2, key3;
+    des_key_schedule sched1, sched2, sched3;
+
+    char ntlmv2_response[144];
+    char userdomain_u[256]; /* for uppercase unicode username and domain */
+    char userdomain[128];   /* the same as previous but ascii */
+    char ntlmv2_hash[16];
+    char ntlmv2_hmacmd5[16];
+ char *ntlmv2_blob = ntlmv2_response + 16; /* inside ntlmv2_response, length: 128 */
+    int ntlmv2_blob_size=0;
+ int phase3_bufpos = 0x40; /* offset to next security buffer data to be added */
+    int len;
+
+    char domain[128];
+    char username[128];
+    char *separator;
+
+    bool ntlmv2_enabled = (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2);
+
+
+    ASSERT (strlen (p->up.username) > 0);
+    ASSERT (strlen (p->up.password) > 0);
+ + /* username parsing */
+    separator = strchr(p->up.username, '\\');
+    if (separator == NULL) {
+        strncpy(username, p->up.username, sizeof(username)-1);
+        username[sizeof(username)-1]=0;
+        domain[0]=0;
+    } else {
+        strncpy(username, separator+1, sizeof(username)-1);
+        username[sizeof(username)-1]=0;
+        len = separator - p->up.username;
+        if (len > sizeof(domain) - 1) len = sizeof(domain) - 1;
+        strncpy(domain, p->up.username,  len);
+        domain[len]=0;
+    }
+
+
+    /* fill 1st 16 bytes with md4 hash, disregard terminating null */
+    gen_md4_hash (pwbuf, unicodize (pwbuf, p->up.password) - 2, md4_hash);
+
+    /* pad to 21 bytes */
+    memset (md4_hash + 16, 0, 5);
+
+    ret_val = base64_decode( phase_2, (void *)buf2);
+    /* we can be sure that phase_2 is less than 128
+     * therefore buf2 needs to be (3/4 * 128) */
+
+    /* extract the challenge from bytes 24-31 */
+    for (i=0; i<8; i++)
+    {
+        challenge[i] = buf2[i+24];
+    }
+
+    if (ntlmv2_enabled){ /* Generate NTLMv2 response */
+ + /* NTLMv2 hash */
+        my_strupr(strcpy(userdomain, username));
+        if (strlen(username) + strlen(domain) < sizeof(userdomain))
+ strcat(userdomain, domain); + unicodize (userdomain_u, userdomain); + gen_hmac_md5(userdomain_u, 2 * strlen(userdomain), md4_hash, 16, ntlmv2_hash);
+
+        /* NTLMv2 Blob */
+ memset(ntlmv2_blob, 0, 128); /* Clear blob buffer */
+        ntlmv2_blob[0x00]=1;                        /* Signature */
+        ntlmv2_blob[0x01]=1;                        /* Signature */
+        ntlmv2_blob[0x04]=0;                        /* Reserved */
+        gen_timestamp(&ntlmv2_blob[0x08]);          /* 64-bit Timestamp */
+ gen_nonce(&ntlmv2_blob[0x10]); /* 64-bit Client Nonce */ + ntlmv2_blob[0x18]=0; /* Unknown, zero should work */
+
+        /* Add target information block to the blob */
+        unsigned short tib_len;
+ if (( *((long *)&buf2[0x14]) & 0x00800000) == 0x00800000){ /* Check for Target Information block */ + tib_len = *((unsigned short *)&buf2[0x28]); /* Get Target Information block size */
+            if (tib_len > 96) tib_len = 96;
+ char *tib_ptr = buf2 + buf2[0x2c]; /* Get Target Information block pointer */ + memcpy(&ntlmv2_blob[0x1c], tib_ptr, tib_len); /* Copy Target Information block into the blob */
+        } else {
+            tib_len = 0;
+        }
+
+ ntlmv2_blob[0x1c + tib_len] = 0; /* Unknown, zero works */
+
+        /* Get blob length */
+        ntlmv2_blob_size = 0x20 + tib_len;
+
+        /* Add challenge from message 2 */
+        memcpy(&ntlmv2_response[8], challenge, 8);
+
+        /* hmac-md5 */
+ gen_hmac_md5(&ntlmv2_response[8], ntlmv2_blob_size + 8, ntlmv2_hash, 16, ntlmv2_hmacmd5); + + /* Add hmac-md5 result to the blob */ + memcpy(ntlmv2_response, ntlmv2_hmacmd5, 16); /* Note: This overwrites challenge previously written at ntlmv2_response[8..15] */ + + } else { /* Generate NTLM response */
+
+        create_des_keys ((unsigned char *)md4_hash, key1);
+        des_set_key_unchecked ((des_cblock *)key1, sched1);
+ des_ecb_encrypt ((des_cblock *)challenge, (des_cblock *)ntlm_response, sched1, DES_ENCRYPT);
+
+        create_des_keys ((unsigned char *)&(md4_hash[7]), key2);
+        des_set_key_unchecked ((des_cblock *)key2, sched2);
+ des_ecb_encrypt ((des_cblock *)challenge, (des_cblock *)&(ntlm_response[8]), sched2, DES_ENCRYPT);
+
+        create_des_keys ((unsigned char *)&(md4_hash[14]), key3);
+        des_set_key_unchecked ((des_cblock *)key3, sched3);
+ des_ecb_encrypt ((des_cblock *)challenge, (des_cblock *)&(ntlm_response[16]), sched3, DES_ENCRYPT);
+    }
+ + + memset (phase3, 0, sizeof (phase3)); /* clear reply */
+
+    strcpy (phase3, "NTLMSSP\0"); /* signature */
+    phase3[8] = 3; /* type 3 */
+
+    if (ntlmv2_enabled){ /* NTLMv2 response */
+ add_security_buffer(0x14, ntlmv2_response, ntlmv2_blob_size + 16, phase3, &phase3_bufpos);
+    }else{ /* NTLM response */
+ add_security_buffer(0x14, ntlm_response, 24, phase3, &phase3_bufpos);
+    }
+ + /* username in ascii */ + add_security_buffer(0x24, username, strlen (username), phase3, &phase3_bufpos);
+
+ /* Set domain. If <domain> is empty, default domain will be used (i.e. proxy's domain) */ + add_security_buffer(0x1c, domain, strlen (domain), phase3, &phase3_bufpos); + +
+    /* other security buffers will be empty */
+    phase3[0x10] = phase3_bufpos; /* lm not used */
+    phase3[0x30] = phase3_bufpos; /* no workstation name supplied */
+    phase3[0x38] = phase3_bufpos; /* no session key */
+ + /* flags */
+    phase3[0x3c] = 0x02; /* negotiate oem */
+    phase3[0x3d] = 0x02; /* negotiate ntlm */

- return ((const char *)make_base64_string2 ((unsigned char *)phase3, buflen, gc)); + return ((const char *)make_base64_string2 ((unsigned char *)phase3, phase3_bufpos, gc));
}

#else
diff -Naur openvpn-2.1/proxy.c openvpn-NTLMv2-2.1/proxy.c
--- openvpn-2.1/proxy.c    2008-01-13 21:25:52.945307200 +0100
+++ openvpn-NTLMv2-2.1/proxy.c    2008-01-15 11:46:12.737156800 +0100
@@ -294,19 +294,21 @@
    p->auth_method = HTTP_AUTH_BASIC;
      else if (!strcmp (o->auth_method_string, "ntlm"))
    p->auth_method = HTTP_AUTH_NTLM;
+      else if (!strcmp (o->auth_method_string, "ntlm2"))
+    p->auth_method = HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2;
      else
- msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: unknown HTTP authentication method: '%s' -- only the 'none', 'basic', or 'ntlm' methods are currently supported", + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: unknown HTTP authentication method: '%s' -- only the 'none', 'basic', 'ntlm', or 'ntlm2' methods are currently supported",
         o->auth_method_string);
    }

-  /* only basic and NTLM authentication supported so far */
- if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_BASIC || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM)
+  /* only basic and NTLM/NTLMv2 authentication supported so far */
+ if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_BASIC || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2)
    {
      get_user_pass_http (p, true);
    }

#if !NTLM
-  if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM)
+ if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2) msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry, this version of " PACKAGE_NAME " was built without NTLM Proxy support.");
#endif

@@ -374,6 +376,12 @@

#if NTLM
    case HTTP_AUTH_NTLM:
+    case HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2:
+      /* keep-alive connection */
+      openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive");
+      if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf))
+    goto error;
+
      openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: NTLM %s",
            ntlm_phase_1 (p, &gc));
      msg (D_PROXY, "Attempting NTLM Proxy-Authorization phase 1");
@@ -411,7 +419,7 @@
      msg (D_PROXY, "Proxy requires authentication");

      /* check for NTLM */
-      if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM)
+ if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2)
        {
#if NTLM
          /* look for the phase 2 response */
@@ -456,6 +464,12 @@
          if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf))
            goto error;

+          /* keep-alive connection */
+ openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive");
+          if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf))
+            goto error;
+
+ /* send HOST etc, */
          openvpn_sleep (1);
          openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Host: %s", host);
diff -Naur openvpn-2.1/proxy.h openvpn-NTLMv2-2.1/proxy.h
--- openvpn-2.1/proxy.h    2008-01-13 21:25:52.975350400 +0100
+++ openvpn-NTLMv2-2.1/proxy.h    2008-01-15 11:25:00.097190400 +0100
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#define HTTP_AUTH_BASIC 1
#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM  2
#define HTTP_AUTH_N     3
+#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2 4

struct http_proxy_options {
  const char *server;


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