On 11/23/2015 11:42 AM, Morgan Fainberg wrote:
Hi everyone,
This email is being written in the context of Keystone more than any
other project but I strongly believe that other projects could benefit
from a similar evaluation of the policy.
Most projects have a policy that prevents the following scenario (it
is a social policy not enforced by code):
* Employee from Company A writes code
* Other Employee from Company A reviews code
* Third Employee from Company A reviews and approves code.
This policy has a lot of history as to why it was implemented. I am
not going to dive into the depths of this history as that is the past
and we should be looking forward. This type of policy is an actively
distrustful policy. With exception of a few potentially bad actors
(again, not going to point anyone out here), most of the folks in the
community who have been given core status on a project are trusted to
make good decisions about code and code quality. I would hope that
any/all of the Cores would also standup to their management chain if
they were asked to "just push code through" if they didn't sincerely
think it was a positive addition to the code base.
Now within Keystone, we have a fair amount of diversity of core
reviewers, but we each have our specialities and in some cases
(notably KeystoneAuth and even KeystoneClient) getting the required
diversity of reviews has significantly slowed/stagnated a number of
reviews.
What I would like us to do is to move to a trustful policy. I can
confidently say that company affiliation means very little to me when
I was PTL and nominating someone for core. We should explore making a
change to a trustful model, and allow for cores (regardless of company
affiliation) review/approve code. I say this since we have clear steps
to correct any abuses of this policy change.
With all that said, here is the proposal I would like to set forth:
1. Code reviews still need 2x Core Reviewers (no change)
2. Code can be developed by a member of the same company as both core
reviewers (and approvers).
3. If the trust that is being given via this new policy is violated,
the code can [if needed], be reverted (we are using git here) and the
actors in question can lose core status (PTL discretion) and the
policy can be changed back to the "distrustful" model described above.
I hope that everyone weighs what it means within the community to
start moving to a trusting-of-our-peers model. I think this would be a
net win and I'm willing to bet that it will remove noticeable
roadblocks [and even make it easier to have an organization work
towards stability fixes when they have the resources dedicated to it].
Thanks for your time reading this.
So, having been one of the initial architects of said policy, I'd like
to reiterate what I felt at the time. The policy is in place as much to
protect the individual contributors as the project. If I was put in a
position where I had to review and approve a coworkers code changes, it
is is easier for me to push back on a belligerent manager to say "this
violates project policy."
But, even this is a more paranoid rationale than I feel now. Each of us
has a perspective based on our customer base. People make decisions
based on what they feel to be right, but right for a public cloud
provider and right for an Enterprise Software vendor will be different.
Getting a change reviewed by someone outside your organization is for
perspective. Treat it as a brake against group think.
I know and trust all of the current Keystone core very well. I have no
expectation that any of them would violate the policy, even given the
looser interpretation.
Regards,
--Morgan
PTL Emeritus, Keystone
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