This stems a bit further than just reduction in noise in the logs. Think of this from a case of security (with centralized logging or lower privileged users able to read log files). If we aren’t putting passwords into these log files, we shouldn’t be putting tokens in. The major functional different between a token and a password is that the token has a fixed life span. Barring running over the TTL of the token, the token grants all rights and privileges that user has (some exceptions, such as trusts), even allowing for a rescope of token to another project/tenant. In this light, tokens are only marginally less exposure than a password in a log file.
I firmly believe that we should avoid putting information that conveys authorization (e.g. username/password or bearer token id) in the logs. — Morgan Fainberg From: Sean Dague s...@dague.net Reply: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org Date: June 11, 2014 at 12:02:20 To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org Subject: [openstack-dev] masking X-Auth-Token in debug output - proposed consistency We've had a few reviews recently going around to mask out X-Auth-Token from the python clients in the debug output. Currently there are a mix of ways this is done. In glanceclient (straight stricken) X-Auth-Token: *** The neutronclient proposal - https://review.openstack.org/#/c/93866/9/neutronclient/client.py is to use 'REDACTED' There is a novaclient patch in the gate that uses SHA1(<sha1oftoken>) - https://review.openstack.org/#/c/98443/ Morgan was working on keystone.session patch - https://review.openstack.org/#/c/98443/ after some back and forth we landed on {SHA1}<sha1oftoken> because that's actually LDAP standard for such things, and SHA1(...) looks too much like a function. I think that should probably be our final solution here. Why SHA1? While we want to get rid of the token from the logs, for both security and size reasons (5 - 10% of the logs in a gate run by bytes are actually keystone tokens), it's actually sometimes important to understand that *the same* token was used between 2 requests, or that 2 different tokens were used. This is especially try with expiration times defaulting to 1 hr, and the fact that sometimes we have tests take longer than that (so we need to debug that we didn't rotate tokens when we should have). Because the keystone token is long (going north of 4k), and variable data length, and with different site data, these values should not be susceptible to a generic rainbow attack, so a single SHA1 seems sufficient. If there are objections to that, we can field something else there. It also has the advantage of being "batteries included" with all our supported versions of python. I'm hoping we can just ACK this approach, and get folks to start moving patches through the clients to clean this all up. If you have concerns, please bring them up now. -Sean -- Sean Dague http://dague.net _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
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