I looked into the python to C options and haven't found anything promising
yet.
I tried Cython, and RPython, on a trivial hello world app, but git similar
startup times to standard python.
The one thing that did work was adding a '-S' when starting python.
-S Disable the import of the module site and the site-dependent
manipulations of sys.path that it entails.
I am not sure if we can do that for rootwrap.
jogo@dev:~/tmp/pypy-2.2.1-src$ time ./tmp-c
hello world
real 0m0.021s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.020s
jogo@dev:~/tmp/pypy-2.2.1-src$ time ./tmp-c
hello world
real 0m0.021s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.020s
jogo@dev:~/tmp/pypy-2.2.1-src$ time python -S ./tmp.py
hello world
real 0m0.010s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.008s
jogo@dev:~/tmp/pypy-2.2.1-src$ time python -S ./tmp.py
hello world
real 0m0.010s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.008s
On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 3:26 PM, Miguel Angel Ajo Pelayo <
mangel...@redhat.com> wrote:
> Hi Carl, thank you, good idea.
>
> I started reviewing it, but I will do it more carefully tomorrow morning.
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> > All,
> >
> > I was writing down a summary of all of this and decided to just do it
> > on an etherpad. Will you help me capture the big picture there? I'd
> > like to come up with some actions this week to try to address at least
> > part of the problem before Icehouse releases.
> >
> > https://etherpad.openstack.org/p/neutron-agent-exec-performance
> >
> > Carl
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 5:26 AM, Miguel Angel Ajo <majop...@redhat.com>
> > wrote:
> > > Hi Yuri & Stephen, thanks a lot for the clarification.
> > >
> > > I'm not familiar with unix domain sockets at low level, but , I wonder
> > > if authentication could be achieved just with permissions (only users
> in
> > > group "neutron" or group "rootwrap" accessing this service.
> > >
> > > I find it an interesting alternative, to the other proposed solutions,
> but
> > > there are some challenges associated with this solution, which could
> make
> > > it
> > > more complicated:
> > >
> > > 1) Access control, file system permission based or token based,
> > >
> > > 2) stdout/stderr/return encapsulation/forwarding to the caller,
> > > if we have a simple/fast RPC mechanism we can use, it's a matter
> > > of serializing a dictionary.
> > >
> > > 3) client side implementation for 1 + 2.
> > >
> > > 4) It would need to accept new domain socket connections in green
> threads
> > > to
> > > avoid spawning a new process to handle a new connection.
> > >
> > > The advantages:
> > > * we wouldn't need to break the only-python-rule.
> > > * we don't need to rewrite/translate rootwrap.
> > >
> > > The disadvantages:
> > > * it needs changes on the client side (neutron + other projects),
> > >
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > > Miguel Ángel.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On 03/08/2014 07:09 AM, Yuriy Taraday wrote:
> > >>
> > >> On Fri, Mar 7, 2014 at 5:41 PM, Stephen Gran
> > >> <stephen.g...@theguardian.com <mailto:stephen.g...@theguardian.com>>
> > >> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Hi,
> > >>
> > >> Given that Yuriy says explicitly 'unix socket', I dont think he
> > >> means 'MQ' when he says 'RPC'. I think he just means a daemon
> > >> listening on a unix socket for execution requests. This seems
> like
> > >> a reasonably sensible idea to me.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Yes, you're right.
> > >>
> > >> On 07/03/14 12:52, Miguel Angel Ajo wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> I thought of this option, but didn't consider it, as It's
> somehow
> > >> risky to expose an RPC end executing priviledged (even
> filtered)
> > >> commands.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> subprocess module have some means to do RPC securely over UNIX
> sockets.
> > >> I does this by passing some token along with messages. It should be
> > >> secure because with UNIX sockets we don't need anything stronger since
> > >> MITM attacks are not possible.
> > >>
> > >> If I'm not wrong, once you have credentials for messaging,
> you can
> > >> send messages to any end, even filtered, I somehow see this
> as a
> > >> higher
> > >> risk option.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> As Stephen noted, I'm not talking about using MQ for RPC. Just some
> > >> local UNIX socket with very simple RPC over it.
> > >>
> > >> And btw, if we add RPC in the middle, it's possible that all
> those
> > >> system call delays increase, or don't decrease all it'll be
> > >> desirable.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Every call to rootwrap would require the following.
> > >>
> > >> Client side:
> > >> - new client socket;
> > >> - one message sent;
> > >> - one message received.
> > >>
> > >> Server side:
> > >> - accepting new connection;
> > >> - one message received;
> > >> - one fork-exec;
> > >> - one message sent.
> > >>
> > >> This looks like way simpler than passing through sudo and rootwrap
> that
> > >> requires three exec's and whole lot of configuration files opened and
> > >> parsed.
> > >>
> > >> --
> > >>
> > >> Kind regards, Yuriy.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> OpenStack-dev mailing list
> > >> OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org
> > >> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
> > >>
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
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> > > OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org
> > > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
> >
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> > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
> >
>
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