On 31.03.2021 19:48, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
On Mar 31, 2021, at 1:43 PM, Michael Wojcik <michael.woj...@microfocus.com> 
wrote:

As far as I can see, neither PKIX (RFC 5280) nor the CA/BF Baseline Requirements say 
anything about the practice, though I may have missed something. I had a vague memory 
that some standard or "best practice" guideline somewhere said the server 
should send the chain up to but not including the root, but I don't know what that might 
have been.
Inclusion of the self-signed root is harmless.

do some admins this really?

I have more often the problem, that just the end SSL certificate is sent,
and without the intermediate certificate any validation is impossible;
in such case I download the intermediate just to complete the chain;

The only case that
I know of where this is actually necessary is with DANE-TA(2) when
the TLSA RRset has a hash of the trusted root cert or public key.

this case is history, there doesn't exist any user agent, which has implemented this;



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