Thanks for the quick response Rich!
Just a quick follow on.
Per RFC6960 for OCSP, there are 3 options:
All definitive response messages SHALL be digitally signed. The key
used to sign the response MUST belong to one of the following:
- the CA who issued the certificate in question
- a Trusted Responder whose public key is trusted by the requestor
- a CA Designated Responder (Authorized Responder, defined in
Section 4.2.2.2<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6960#section-4.2.2.2>) who
holds a specially marked certificate issued
directly by the CA, indicating that the responder may issue OCSP
responses for that CA
I’m seeing the self-signed and/or even a separate PKI root or hierarchy that is
designated to sign responses as the 2nd option above which is essentially an
‘out of band’ trust that is configured on the requestor ahead of time. Are you
saying option 2 from the RFC is not supported within OpenSSL and would require
changes? Or am I misinterpreting option 2 above.
Lastly, I assuming my understanding is correct, I was thinking
X509_check_trust() allows for communicating this ‘out of band’ trust to OpenSSL
for validation of OCSP responses, is this not what this trust setting is for?
Thanks,
Animesh
From: "Salz, Rich" <rs...@akamai.com>
Date: Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 12:39 PM
To: "anipa...@cisco.com" <anipa...@cisco.com>, "openssl-users@openssl.org"
<openssl-users@openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-users] OCSP response signed by self-signed trusted
responder validation
The responder isn’t supposed to be self-signed. It’s supposed to be signed by
the CA issuing the certs. That way you know that the CA “trusts” the responder.
Now, having said that, what you want to do is reasonable – think of it as “out
of band” trust. You will probably have to modify the source to support it,
however.
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