On 26 September 2017 at 02:36, Kyle Hamilton <aerow...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 9:32 AM, Richard Moore <richmoor...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > It's also worth pointing out that CAs are banned from running OCSP > servers over HTTPS anyway and it isn't needed since the responses are > already signed - http is fine. > > That argument fails when you consider that some people want the > details of who they're talking to or asking about to be confidential, > not merely authentic. > > That doesn't change the fact it's banned. > I'm a believer in the idea that SNI and the Certificate messages > should happen under an ephemeral DH or ephemeral ECDH cover. Others > fear-monger to say "maybe they shouldn't". > > There are a lot of other things that would also need addressing to make it secret /who/ you're talking to. It's not something https guarantees right now. If you'd like it to that would be a whole other discussion. > (Also, for completeness, the argument that "CAs are banned from > running OCSP servers over HTTPS anyway" is a straw man at best -- not > every CA is created or intends to be a member of or subject to the > mandates of the CA Security Council, formerly known as the CA/Browser > Forum. And every attempt to encode policy into technical standards, > The CA Security Council and CA/Browser Forum are unrelated organisations. Regards Rich. > attempting to prohibit certain actions for whatever misguided > administrative reasons, is subject to being bypassed by people who > understand the various parts and how to glue them all together.) > To be fair, the OCSP responder certificate may or may not be > revoked... but honestly, if you're asking the OCSP responder for the > status of its own certificate you're opening yourself up to a > subordination/subversion attack anyway. OCSP responders should have > very short-lived certificates, to minimize the temporal subordination > attack surface. >
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