On 31/12/2015 18:12, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
On Thu, Dec 31, 2015 at 04:56:08PM +0000, Gareth Williams wrote:I now try to cross-certify by adding another Root CA (Example Root CA) and use that to sign the original Gareth Williams Policy CA certificate signing request, then add this new certificate to the chain.crt file: Gareth Williams Root CA Example Root CA | | Gareth Williams Policy CA Gareth Williams Policy CA | | +----------------+------------------+ | Gareth Williams Issuing CA | office.garethwilliams.me.ukYou're not supposed to create two different untrusted intermediate certificates, include both and hope for a good outcome. OpenSSL does not try all possible untrusted intermediates at every depth in the chain, that has exponential cost in the chain depth.
I believe it would be at worst linear in the number of offered/loaded certificates, and in practice limited to much less by the number of certificates actually having multiple candidates. The other X509 libraries in common use (such as NSS) seem to cope just fine, and have presumably managed to arrange their search algorithms to not be subject to remote denial of service via combinatorial explosion.
The alternate chain is built only when (by default) not doing "trusted first", and drops one of the previously selected untrusted certificates at a time (from the top of the chain) and looks for a match in the *trust* store. This never looks at alternative untrusted certificates. Cross-sign a roots, not an intermediates, and include the cross-signed root in the trust store. Then if a user happens to include the root CA in the chain that is not trusted but the trust store contains a cross-signed intermediate, you win.
And how would the code cope with a root that was cross signed by two other roots, and was not itself on the trust list? Wouldn't that be indistinguishable from the OP's test scenario? Enjoy Jakob -- Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded _______________________________________________ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
