> From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org On Behalf Of Charles Mills
> Sent: Friday, November 21, 2014 12:30

> Thanks. I guess I may have to open a problem with IBM. The IBM
> documentation
> clearly lists a number of "cipher suites" (at they call them) that use
SHA1
> (including the one we (IBM+OpenSSL) default to as being FIPS 140-2
> compliant.
> 
"cipher suite(s)" is the official term in the TLS standards,
mostly two words but sometimes hyphenated or run together,
so not surprisingly most implementations use it or a variant.
The "SHA" at the end a suite name defined before TLS1.2 
is actually SHA1 used within HMAC for integrity check.
(HMAC is a generic MAC-from-hash construction.)
The new suites defined in or after TLS1.2 use SHA256 or SHA384 
for HMAC, or are authenticated-encryption with *no* HMAC,
although they still vary the hash used in the PRF for key derivation.

> GSK appears to only support SHA1 and MD5, and MD4 is pretty clearly not
> FIP 140-2 compliant.
> 
(That's a typo. SSL/TLS never used MD4, or MD2. It did use RC4 and RC2.)

Not quite, the picture is more nuanced. Although if you *can* 
go to TLS1.2 and a SHA256 or SHA384 suite that is Best Practice.

800-131A (Jan 2011) "codified" in 800-57 part1 rev3 (July 2013)
prohibits SHA1 *for signature and hash-only* (which are assumed 
subject to collision attack) after 2013. It is still allowed for HMAC 
and some other uses that protect against collision. (Even after 2030 
when 3TDEA, SHA-224, IFC&FFC 2048, and ECC 224 are scheduled 
to go away, although they may well re-think before then.)

In particular, draft 800-52 rev1 (Jan 2013) allows the TLS1.0&1.1
PRF (key derivation) with SHA1-xor-MD5; MD5 is not Approved 
at all but this construction doesn't rely on it and SHA1 *for KDF* 
is okay. However TLS1.0 is disallowed for another reason.

Similarly in non-FIPS situations the two (HMAC-)MD5 suites 
that are not SSLv2-only and not export-weakened are still  
mostly considered acceptable, though at the same time 
certs *signed* with MD5 are not, and certs signed with SHA1 
won't be within a year or two. Not that this really matters,
since you practically always have a better option.




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