Hello, 
The openssl foundation writes here: 

https://www.openssl.org/support/acknowledgments.html 

"Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors 
we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous."" 

and here: 

https://www.openssl.org/support/consulting.html[https://www.openssl.org/support/consulting.html]
 

"Does your company use the OpenSSL toolkit and need some help porting it to a 
new platform? Do you need a new feature added? Are you developing new 
cryptographic functionality for your product? 

To every secret service, this must sound like music in their ears. 

They can potentially  anonymously donate, and even hire the programmers to get 
"features" into openssl, similar to the situation with RSA. 

Please note that you as developers might not notice it, when you are hired to 
program a backdoor. It may be as simple as a client approaches you, asking you 
to "implement all Nist standards", and without thinking anything bad, you are 
putting something like Dual_EC into your library, thereby putting in a backdoor 
without noticing it yourself. 

If you want to know how great the interest of intelligence agencies is to 
manipulate encryption hardware, see this translated article from DER SPIEGEL: 

http://cryptome.org/jya/cryptoa2.htm[http://cryptome.org/jya/cryptoa2.htm] 

where it is revealed that the german secret service BND turned out to 
successfully own the majority of the shares of a major cryptographic hardware 
manufacturer and instructed the company how to manipulate their devices that 
BND could listen. 

The interest of the nsa in weakening crypto software is documented here in this 
New York Times article: 

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html?_r=0[http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html?_r=0]
 


So I think the openssl foundation should take some measures that perhaps may 
help to scare intelligence agencies away from openssl in the future. 


Could the openssl foundation add official rules that 
a) it is not accepting money from intelligence agencies or companies that work 
for intelligence agencies and that, if it turned out, a given money comes from 
intelligence agencies or a contractor of them, the openssl foundation will 
return the money, and that this applies even to all earlier donations. 

b) that developers of openssl are not allowed to do contracting work for 
intelligence agencies and companies working for intelligence agencies, and that 
if it turned out a developer had such contracts, he may no longer work for 
openssl, and that this applies also for earlier contracts of the openssl 
developers. 

c) that the names of all companies who hire openssl developers must be 
published in the open on the openssl homepage, and that this applies also for 
the companies who hired openssl developers earlier 

d) that the companies who make donations to openssl will be published in the 
open on the openssl homepage and that this applies also for the companies who 
donated to openssl earlier.

e) and that donnations above a certain value, or a person donating very often 
is named publicly on the openssl website. 


If you incorporate these rules ito the openssl foundation, it may help to scare 
intelligence agencies away from openssl, since these agencies hate nothing more 
than publicity. Is it possible for the openssl foundation to do this? 

And by the way: 
Is there a book or something where one can learn the programming of openssl? I 
know a bit C++ and C and would be interested to look closer at the sourcecode. 
But I see that it is very large. Is there something that makes the entry in 
openssl programming easier? 

Best Wishes, 
Benjamin 
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