Thanks Jakob. But still, it is not clear to me.
If server random is not present, a malicious user can copy all the messages
from client and can replay them multiple times leading to DoS attack. But
even if client random is not present, I believe, attacker cannot replay
messages from server side as client is going to choose the
pre-master-secret. i.e attacker cannot replay any encrypted record as he
will not be able to decrypt the pre-master-secret encrypted by server's
public key and so, cannot generate the session key.

Am I still missing something trivial?

Thanks,
Thulasi.

On 5 February 2013 21:21, Jakob Bohm <jb-open...@wisemo.com> wrote:

> On 2/5/2013 12:05 PM, Thulasi wrote:
>
>> Hello all,
>>
>> ** This is not regarding OpenSSL software but about the protocol in
>> general.
>>
>> I am trying to understand the use of 32 byte(4 byte data + 28 byte rand)
>> client random which is part of Client Hello. I understand that Server
>> Random is required to avoid replay attacks by making server to
>> dynamically contribute in the derivation of session keys along with
>> Pre-master-secret chosen by Client, but what additional security is
>> derived from Client Random?
>>
>>  The same benefits, but seen from the other end.
>
> Server random protects the server from being attacked with replays of
> client packets, amongst other benefits.
>
> Client random protects the client from being attacked with replays of
> server packets, amongst other benefits.
>
> Simple, really.
>
>
> Enjoy
>
> Jakob
> --
> Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  http://www.wisemo.com
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