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As for your question, from the description you quote
below, I would presume this issue to be outside the
FIPS-certified part of OpenSSL and thus affecting
anyone using version 0.9.8q or older with or without
the FIPS module.  Upgrading to the latest 0.9.8-series
release (at least 0.9.8s for this particular issue) in
combination with the existing FIPS-certified
"FIPS-canister" is probably the appropriate response.

On 1/25/2012 4:04 PM, Gerald L Collins wrote:
Hello all,
I've been tasked to look at some security issues for our OpenSSL implementation. We are currently at FIPS 1.2.2 and openssl 0.9.8k. Most of the issues I was asked to look at were no issue for us, but the below item I'm less certain about. Since we are FIPS does this have any chance of affecting us? We do use the SSLv23_server method in the call of SSL_CTX_new.



Uninitialized SSL 3.0 Padding - (CVE-2011-4576):
OpenSSL prior to 1.0.0f and 0.9.8s failed to clear the bytes used as block
cipher padding in SSL 3.0 records. This affects both clients and servers
that accept SSL 3.0 handshakes: those that call SSL_CTX_new with
SSLv3_{server|client}_method or SSLv23_{server|client}_method. It does not
affect TLS. As a result, in each record, up to 15 bytes of uninitialized
memory may be sent, encrypted, to the SSL peer. This could include sensitive contents of previously freed memory. However, in practice, most deployments do not use SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS and therefore have a single write buffer
per connection. That write buffer is partially filled with non-sensitive,
handshake data at the beginning of the connection and, thereafter, only
records which are longer any any previously sent record leak any
non-encrypted data. This, combined with the small number of bytes leaked per
record, serves to limit to severity of this issue.


Thanks,
Jerry

Gerald Collins
Senior Member Technical Staff, Programmer / Analyst
CSC

8 Executive Drive, Suite 300, Fairview Heights, IL 62208 North American Public Sector | p: +1-618-632-9252 x410 | | gcoll...@csc.com | www.csc.com <www.csc.com>



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