Thomas,

Thank you.  You stated my concerns much better then I did.



Please respond to openssl-users@openssl.org
Sent by:        owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org
To:     openssl-users@openssl.org
cc:      (bcc: Dan Mitton/YD/RWDOE)
Subject:        Re: Interesting article
LSN: Not Relevant
User Filed as: Not a Record

Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> The fact that root certificates are NEVER trusted, under X.509, unless
> they're already in the client store (or are added as a specific
> security exception).  These are a special class of certificates called
> "trust anchors" (technically, the trust anchor is the public key; the
> certificate is the thing that holds metadata, including the
> subjectKeyIdentifier, which is used in certificates signed by it to
> uniquely identify the signing key).
> 
> (You get root CAs from places like Microsoft, Mozilla, Apple, Opera,
> and your OS distribution vendor.)
> 
> The reason why it's very difficult to forge a certificate from a root
> CA is due to the mathematics behind asymmetric cryptography.  Please
> see a book called "Applied Cryptography 2nd Edition", by Schneier, for
> a very good introduction to the concept and a discussion of how
> unlikely it is.
> 
> -Kyle H

I'm pretty sure Dan is asking if it is possible to recreate the private 
key that generated the public key that is already in the certificate 
store (i.e. something you already trust).  Everyone here seems to be 
assuming that he meant creating a new root CA.

Issuers re-issue signed keys every year for "security purposes", but if 
*I* were some ridiculously-brilliant hacker with unlimited processing 
resources and I were targeting a key to break, I would skip that and go 
for the Big Enchilada:  A key already in the trusted certificate store 
on every user's machine and in every major browser.  With a duplicate 
private key (e.g. Verisign's CA _private_ key), I could theoretically 
generate any key for any domain I want to intercept/monitor transactions 
for.  The additional benefit that most CAs in the certificate store are 
good until 2038 instead of a single year only helps further the benefit 
of targeting such a key.

Probably impossible.

-- 
Thomas Hruska
Shining Light Productions

Home of BMP2AVI, Nuclear Vision, ProtoNova, and Win32 OpenSSL.
http://www.slproweb.com/


______________________________________________________________________
OpenSSL Project                                 http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mailing List                    openssl-users@openssl.org
Automated List Manager                           majord...@openssl.org


______________________________________________________________________
OpenSSL Project                                 http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mailing List                    openssl-users@openssl.org
Automated List Manager                           majord...@openssl.org

Reply via email to