On Wed, Dec 17, 2008, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
>
> Technically, "one input" + cipher("one key") does end up with one
> output. However, because the one-to-one correspondence means that if
> someone figures out the plaintext for a ciphertext, anytime that
> ciphertext comes up they know what the plaintext is. The PKCS
> describe a means of mitigating this so-called "dictionary attack" (the
> ciphertext goes into the dictionary, and the plaintext is the
> ciphertext's definition), by allowing permutations of the data in a
> standard way such that the permutations can be identified and removed
> as part of the decryption process.
>
As I recall there are some additional attacks on the RSA algorithm whereby if
one can determine a certain proportion of the plaintext it is possible to
recover the whole plaintext.
Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. Email, S/MIME and PGP keys: see homepage
OpenSSL project core developer and freelance consultant.
Homepage: http://www.drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk
______________________________________________________________________
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mailing List openssl-users@openssl.org
Automated List Manager majord...@openssl.org
