On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 10:14:12AM -0400, Victor Duchovni wrote:
> And then knowing that attackers never choose these keys, users start
> using these keys because attakers avoid them, and then attackers start
> checking these first again, ... This way lies madness. Fix your premise
> and don't change it in flight.

Agreed.

Let's assume that users tend to pick the password "password" when
given a choice.

Now adversaries try the most common password, namely "password", first.

Security conscious admins ban the word "password" as a password.
Yes, this does reduce the keyspace a tiny bit.

Do adversaries generally stop trying the password "password"?  Not generally.

For every security-conscious admin or user, there are 99 who are not.

For every cutting-edge security expert, there are 99 bottom-feeders
who will only get this information years later.

I still hear of people trying to tftp /etc/passwd.

I think that people will still be trying to brute-force their way in
with these keys for ten years.

I would ban the use of these keys to gain entry to anything, much like
security-conscious admins ban easily-guessed passwords.

Only the key space here is much, much larger than typical 8-character
passwords, so this loss will be unnoticeable.

I personally don't like the idea of generating keys that people will
try, or using a weak/known key with small probability, but in this
case I think it's so small that simply scanning for and banning such
keys is good enough.

I was hoping someone would release a tool to search for them in the
authorized_keys files on any OS (e.g. my OpenBSD box), but AFAIK,
nobody has.

I certainly don't want a kluge to the RNG...
-- 
Crypto ergo sum.  https://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/
Truth does not fear scrutiny or competition, only lies do.
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