The FIPS validation process is... odd.  And not at all conducive to the
open-source development model.

There is no available OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v1.2.  Until it passes
validation, anyway, at which point the openssl-fips-1.2.0.tar.gz file will
be made available.  I don't think the source is actually even in the public
CVS.  (I would like to see a preview version that I can at least link things
that use the API against, even if everything's stubbed out. :P)

I do have to ask, though: is this one going to compile properly on
Intel-based Macs?  1.1 and 1.1.1 didn't.

-Kyle H

On Nov 29, 2007 5:22 PM, Brendan Simon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Where can I find information about OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v1.2 ???
> Where can this be downloaded from? CVS only? Or are there tarballs
> somewhere?
>
> Where does FIPS related development/discussion take place? Just the
> users mailing list?
>
> Is there a spot on the website dedicated to FIPS related information? I
> can't find anything?
>
> Cheers, Brendan.
>
>
> Steve Marquess wrote:
> >
> > A significant flaw in the PRNG implementation for the OpenSSL FIPS
> > Object Module v1.1.1 (certificate #733,
> > _http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm#733
> _)
> > has been reported by Geoff Lowe of Secure Computing Corporation. Due
> > to a coding error in the FIPS self-test the auto-seeding never takes
> > place. That means that the PRNG key and seed used correspond to the
> > last self-test. The FIPS PRNG gets additional seed data only from
> > date-time information, so the generated random data is far more
> > predictable than it should be, especially for the first few calls
> > (CVE-2007-5502).
> >
> > Note that this PRNG bug is only present in the v1.1.1 implementation
> > and not in the regular OpenSSL product or in the OpenSSL FIPS Object
> > Module v1.2 now undergoing validation testing. Only those applications
> > using v1.1.1 of the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module which enter FIPS mode
> > are affected. Applications which do not enter FIPS mode or which use
> > any other version of OpenSSL are not affected.
> >
> > Bugs like this in open source software are routinely found and
> > corrected with a patch and/or updated source distribution. In this
> > case two separate patches have been developed by Dr Stephen Henson
> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>:
> >
> > http://www.openssl.org/news/patch-CVE-2007-5502-1.txt
> >
> > (the simplest direct fix) and:
> >
> > http://www.openssl.org/news/patch-CVE-2007-5502-2.txt
> >
> > (a workaround which avoids touching the PRNG code directly). However,
> > for FIPS 140-2 validated software no changes are permitted without
> > prior CMVP approval so neither of these patches can be applied to the
> > v1.1.1 distribution for the purposes of producing a validated module.
> >
> > We have supplied the information needed for a "letter change" update
> > request based on the latter of these two patches to the CMT Laboratory
> > for their submission to the CMVP. Once (and if) approved the new
> > distribution containing this patch will be posted as
> > http://openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-1.1.2.tar.gz to replace the
> > current distribution at
> > _http://openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-1.1.1.tar.gz_.
> >
> > Note that in addition to this real-world vulnerability there is a
> > separate problem in this same PRNG implementation concerning the FIPS
> > 140-2 continuous self-test, about which we have received multiple
> > reports. The resolution of that problem hinges on interpretation of
> > FIPS 140-2 scripture and we're still working on crafting a fix
> > consistent with the conflicting opinions we've received.
> >
> > At this point I have no estimate as to when the change letter(s), for
> > either or both fixes, will be approved. From the perspective of those
> > who must deal with events on "Internet time" the CMVP process is
> > glacially slow. In the absence of any realistic expectation of quick
> > results in that regard OSSI has chosen to make this announcement now
> > in the hope of minimizing the disruption for the many products and
> > "private label" validations known to use or be derived from the v1.1.1
> > validation and currently undergoing FIPS 140-2 validation.
> >
> > -Steve M.
> >
> > --
> > Steve Marquess
> > Open Source Software Institute
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> >
>
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