Well, make that hard choice: do you want to have your software fail
when an up-to-date CRL is not available, or do you want to make your
software susceptible to a denial-of-service attack on the CRL distro
process?

Same question if your OCSP request fails without prejudice.  If you
go ahead and trust the certificate anyway, all the adverary has to do
is jam your OCSP request.  If you don't trust the certificate, then
minor and temporary failures in the OCSP process become very visible.

These are the kind of hard questions (of the form "how much are you
REALLY willing to pay for security?") that the horrible old men who
task us cannot be bothered to consider.  In this case, the cost is
not of money but instead is of inconvenience due to non-robustness
with respect to minor network failings.

As usual: the level of security required should be commeasurate with
the value of the asset to be protected.

Joseph Bruni wrote:

Gotcha. So it would be safe to assume that almost nobody uses CRLs since none of the software I use that does SSL seems to worry about the presence (or lack) of a CRL. Wonderful. That really inspires confidence.

I'll just bump the nextUpdate field out and make sure that the CA is keeping the CRL up-to-date.


On Dec 29, 2003, at 7:19 PM, Dr. Stephen Henson wrote:


The reason this is often done is that if you allow an expired CRL to be used
then someone could use a revoked certificate that hadn't been revoked in the
expired CRL but has been revoked in the current one.


Steve.


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