Also, there is no crypto-board.
Erwann ABALEA wrote:
> No. A MITM attack can also occur even if you're using a crypto
> accelerator. The only way this attack cannot occur is if you ask for
> client authentication.
>
> - the sniffer generates a self-signed certificate with the same name as
> your server cert (www.secure.site)
> - the browser wants to connect to your site (www.secure.site), but
> instead connects to the sniffer (sniff.evil.domain)
> - the sniffer negociates the SSL session with the browser, by presenting
> the newly generated self-signed cert
> - the browser gets a warning claiming that the cert is invalid
> - the attack goes there: the user only clicks OK because he doesn't know
> anything about PKI
> - the sniffer then establishes a SSL session with your server, using your
> crypto accelerator if you want. In this exact case, the sniffer only
> acts as a valid customer browser, so this connection is perfectly
> valid.
> - the sniffer then routes all the data between the beowser and the
> server, but all this data is cleartext in it's own address space, and
> ciphered between (browser, sniffer) and (sniffer, server).
>
> So your cryptoboard cannot do anything against a dumb user being sniffed.
>
> Again: the attack has nothing to do with the server, or the cryptoboard
> the server might have.
>
> On Tue, 19 Dec 2000, Thomas Nichols wrote:
>
> > Quite the contrary. There is no method available for an MIIM to replace the SSL
> > cert as it can only reside where it is and is linked to private IP servers behind
> > the accelerator.
> > Erwann ABALEA wrote:
> >
> > > On Tue, 19 Dec 2000, Thomas Nichols wrote:
> > >
> > > > The best method is to not have the SSL certificate and key on the server to
> > > > begin with. I use a non-ip based ssl accelerator.
> > >
> > > This not a protection against this attack.
> > >
> > > This attack doesn't steal the private key of the host, it only relies on
> > > the "dumbness" of the users, which only clicks "OK" when a warning pops up
> > > (considering that the user doesn't know anything about PKI).
> > >
> > > This attack is not against SSL, or SSH, but only against the users.
>
> --
> Erwann ABALEA
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> RSA PGP Key ID: 0x2D0EABD5
> ------
> Against stupidity, the Gods themselves, contend in vain!
>
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