Holger Reif wrote:
> 
> During the last days a second key called "NSAKEY" was
> discovered. That key is bad protected and can easily
> modified. Thus everybody can sign the own crypto provider
> and place the public signing key instead of the original
> NSAKEY.
> 

Maybe the US authorities will forcibly ask MS to make this harder to do:
and the next MS "upgrade" will change this. Various MSIE updates and
security fixes have a habit of silently updating things like this.

Netscape for example could be fortified at one point by just changing a
few obvious ASCII strings from "no" to "yes". Whether they were "asked"
to change this I don't know but later versions need less obvious binary
patching too.

> 
> So my questions are:
> 1.) Is it worth implementing a crypto provider based on
>     OpenSSL and ship it with a key replacement during install?


Maybe. Depends on what it would do, if it handles SSL then I'd say yes
but it might not work for very long.

Also the MS enhanced CSPs are freely available from various sites
outside the US anyway: anyone know if these can be legally used?

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.   http://www.drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk/
Personal Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Senior crypto engineer, Celo Communications: http://www.celocom.com/
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Business Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP key: via homepage.


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