On Thu, Aug 12, 1999 at 07:54:22AM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

>> This is not secure.  The master secret is derived from data
>> transmitted in clear and the premaster secret, which is just the
>> result of the DH exchange, which *can* be influenced by an attacker in
>> a way such that the client and server agree on its value and the
>> attacker knows it too.

> Really?  How are you guys calculating themaster secret from the DH
> exchange?

For non-anonymous DH, the DH share of the server is signed, which
avoids man-in-the-middle attacks and assures that you can just use the
result of the DH exchange as a secret value without special care.  For
anonymous DH, no authentication is planned anyway, so the protocol
does not bother to prevent small-subgroup attacks.

> IPSEC IKE does an anonymous DH exchange, and then the DH shared keyis
> authenticated under the DH exchange using Certificates (or Kerberos, if
> you're Microsoft).

If draft-ieft-ipsec-ike-01.txt is the relevant specification for this,
your description is inaccurate:

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
     I-digest = prf(SKEYID, g^i | g^r | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | ID_i1_b)

     R-digest = prf(SKEYID, g^r | g^i | CKY-R | CKY-I | SAi_b | ID_r1_b)

   For authentication with digital signatures, I and R are digitally
   signed and the resulting signature is passed as a SIG payload during
   the exchange. For authentication with pre-shared keys and both types
   of public key encryption I and R are passed as a HASH payload during
   the exchange.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

I.e. not the shared key derived from the DH shares (g^ir) is used
authenticated, but the individual shares (g^i and g^r) are.

>                     This kind of thing *can* work, if you're using
> normal DH, which is what I thought TLS was using.

It could work without authentication for the two shares, but you'd
need some extra parameters (order of g in (Z/pZ)*) and extra
computation to avoid attacks.
______________________________________________________________________
OpenSSL Project                                 http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mailing List                    [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Automated List Manager                           [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Reply via email to