They are backport patches, and verified that the patches are in the source.
Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.y...@windriver.com> --- .../bind/bind/bind-9.8.1-CVE-2012-5166.patch | 119 ----------------- .../bind/bind/bind-CVE-2011-4313.patch | 89 ------------ .../bind/bind/bind-CVE-2012-1667.patch | 92 ------------- .../bind/bind/bind-CVE-2013-2266.patch | 41 ------ .../bind/bind/bind-Fix-CVE-2012-4244.patch | 141 -------------------- 5 files changed, 482 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-9.8.1-CVE-2012-5166.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2011-4313.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2012-1667.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2013-2266.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-Fix-CVE-2012-4244.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-9.8.1-CVE-2012-5166.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-9.8.1-CVE-2012-5166.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0abb475..0000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-9.8.1-CVE-2012-5166.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,119 +0,0 @@ -bind_Fix_for_CVE-2012-5166 - -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Reference:http://launchpadlibrarian.net/119212498/bind9_1%3A9.7.3.dfsOBg --1ubuntu2.6_1%3A9.7.3.dfsg-1ubuntu2.7.diff.gz - -ISC BIND 9.x before 9.7.6-P4, 9.8.x before 9.8.3-P4, 9.9.x before -9.9.1-P4, and 9.4-ESV and 9.6-ESV before 9.6-ESV-R7-P4 allows -remote attackers to cause a denial of service (named daemon hang) -via unspecified combinations of resource records. - -http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-5166 - -Signed-off-by: yanjun.zhu <yanjun....@windriver.com> -diff -urpN a/bin/named/query.c b/bin/named/query.c ---- a/bin/named/query.c 2012-10-22 13:24:27.000000000 +0800 -+++ b/bin/named/query.c 2012-10-22 13:17:04.000000000 +0800 -@@ -1137,13 +1137,6 @@ query_isduplicate(ns_client_t *client, d - mname = NULL; - } - -- /* -- * If the dns_name_t we're looking up is already in the message, -- * we don't want to trigger the caller's name replacement logic. -- */ -- if (name == mname) -- mname = NULL; -- - *mnamep = mname; - - CTRACE("query_isduplicate: false: done"); -@@ -1341,6 +1334,7 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_ - if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(rdataset) && - !query_isduplicate(client, fname, type, &mname)) { - if (mname != NULL) { -+ INSIST(mname != fname); - query_releasename(client, &fname); - fname = mname; - } else -@@ -1401,11 +1395,13 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_ - mname = NULL; - if (!query_isduplicate(client, fname, - dns_rdatatype_a, &mname)) { -- if (mname != NULL) { -- query_releasename(client, &fname); -- fname = mname; -- } else -- need_addname = ISC_TRUE; -+ if (mname != fname) { -+ if (mname != NULL) { -+ query_releasename(client, &fname); -+ fname = mname; -+ } else -+ need_addname = ISC_TRUE; -+ } - ISC_LIST_APPEND(fname->list, rdataset, link); - added_something = ISC_TRUE; - if (sigrdataset != NULL && -@@ -1444,11 +1440,13 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_ - mname = NULL; - if (!query_isduplicate(client, fname, - dns_rdatatype_aaaa, &mname)) { -- if (mname != NULL) { -- query_releasename(client, &fname); -- fname = mname; -- } else -- need_addname = ISC_TRUE; -+ if (mname != fname) { -+ if (mname != NULL) { -+ query_releasename(client, &fname); -+ fname = mname; -+ } else -+ need_addname = ISC_TRUE; -+ } - ISC_LIST_APPEND(fname->list, rdataset, link); - added_something = ISC_TRUE; - if (sigrdataset != NULL && -@@ -1960,22 +1958,24 @@ query_addadditional2(void *arg, dns_name - crdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_aaaa) { - if (!query_isduplicate(client, fname, crdataset->type, - &mname)) { -- if (mname != NULL) { -- /* -- * A different type of this name is -- * already stored in the additional -- * section. We'll reuse the name. -- * Note that this should happen at most -- * once. Otherwise, fname->link could -- * leak below. -- */ -- INSIST(mname0 == NULL); -- -- query_releasename(client, &fname); -- fname = mname; -- mname0 = mname; -- } else -- need_addname = ISC_TRUE; -+ if (mname != fname) { -+ if (mname != NULL) { -+ /* -+ * A different type of this name is -+ * already stored in the additional -+ * section. We'll reuse the name. -+ * Note that this should happen at most -+ * once. Otherwise, fname->link could -+ * leak below. -+ */ -+ INSIST(mname0 == NULL); -+ -+ query_releasename(client, &fname); -+ fname = mname; -+ mname0 = mname; -+ } else -+ need_addname = ISC_TRUE; -+ } - ISC_LIST_UNLINK(cfname.list, crdataset, link); - ISC_LIST_APPEND(fname->list, crdataset, link); - added_something = ISC_TRUE; diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2011-4313.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2011-4313.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 19d8df1..0000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2011-4313.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -The patch to fix CVE-2011-4313 - -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Reference: https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-4313.html - -query.c in ISC BIND 9.0.x through 9.6.x, 9.4-ESV through 9.4-ESV-R5, 9.6-ESV -through 9.6-ESV-R5, 9.7.0 through 9.7.4, 9.8.0 through 9.8.1, and 9.9.0a1 -through 9.9.0b1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service -(assertion failure and named exit) via unknown vectors related to recursive DNS -queries, error logging, and the caching of an invalid record by the resolver. - -Signed-off-by Ming Liu <ming....@windriver.com> ---- - bin/named/query.c | 19 ++++++++----------- - lib/dns/rbtdb.c | 4 ++-- - 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) - ---- a/bin/named/query.c -+++ b/bin/named/query.c -@@ -1393,11 +1393,9 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_ - goto addname; - if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) { - dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset); -- /* -- * Negative cache entries don't have sigrdatasets. -- */ -- INSIST(sigrdataset == NULL || -- ! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset)); -+ if (sigrdataset != NULL && -+ dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset)) -+ dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset); - } - if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - mname = NULL; -@@ -1438,8 +1436,9 @@ query_addadditional(void *arg, dns_name_ - goto addname; - if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) { - dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset); -- INSIST(sigrdataset == NULL || -- ! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset)); -+ if (sigrdataset != NULL && -+ dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset)) -+ dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset); - } - if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - mname = NULL; -@@ -1889,10 +1888,8 @@ query_addadditional2(void *arg, dns_name - goto setcache; - if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) { - dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset); -- /* -- * Negative cache entries don't have sigrdatasets. -- */ -- INSIST(! dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset)); -+ if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset)) -+ dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset); - } - if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - /* Remember the result as a cache */ ---- a/lib/dns/rbtdb.c -+++ b/lib/dns/rbtdb.c -@@ -5053,7 +5053,7 @@ cache_find(dns_db_t *db, dns_name_t *nam - rdataset); - if (need_headerupdate(found, search.now)) - update = found; -- if (foundsig != NULL) { -+ if (!NEGATIVE(found) && foundsig != NULL) { - bind_rdataset(search.rbtdb, node, foundsig, search.now, - sigrdataset); - if (need_headerupdate(foundsig, search.now)) -@@ -5596,7 +5596,7 @@ zone_findrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbno - } - if (found != NULL) { - bind_rdataset(rbtdb, rbtnode, found, now, rdataset); -- if (foundsig != NULL) -+ if (!NEGATIVE(found) && foundsig != NULL) - bind_rdataset(rbtdb, rbtnode, foundsig, now, - sigrdataset); - } -@@ -5685,7 +5685,7 @@ cache_findrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbn - } - if (found != NULL) { - bind_rdataset(rbtdb, rbtnode, found, now, rdataset); -- if (foundsig != NULL) -+ if (!NEGATIVE(found) && foundsig != NULL) - bind_rdataset(rbtdb, rbtnode, foundsig, now, - sigrdataset); - } diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2012-1667.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2012-1667.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c441eab..0000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2012-1667.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -bind CVE-2012-1667 - -Upstream-Status: Backport - -ISC BIND 9.x before 9.7.6-P1, 9.8.x before 9.8.3-P1, 9.9.x before 9.9.1-P1, -and 9.4-ESV and 9.6-ESV before 9.6-ESV-R7-P1 does not properly handle resource -records with a zero-length RDATA section, which allows remote DNS servers to -cause a denial of service (daemon crash or data corruption) or obtain -sensitive information from process memory via a crafted record. - -http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-1667 - -The cve patch comes from bind97-9.7.0-10.P2.el5_8.1.src.rpm package. - -Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.w...@windriver.com> ---- - lib/dns/rdata.c | 8 ++++---- - lib/dns/rdataslab.c | 11 ++++++++--- - 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/dns/rdata.c b/lib/dns/rdata.c -index 063b1f6..9337a80 100644 ---- a/lib/dns/rdata.c -+++ b/lib/dns/rdata.c -@@ -325,8 +325,8 @@ dns_rdata_compare(const dns_rdata_t *rdata1, const dns_rdata_t *rdata2) { - - REQUIRE(rdata1 != NULL); - REQUIRE(rdata2 != NULL); -- REQUIRE(rdata1->data != NULL); -- REQUIRE(rdata2->data != NULL); -+ REQUIRE(rdata1->length == 0 || rdata1->data != NULL); -+ REQUIRE(rdata2->length == 0 || rdata2->data != NULL); - REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata1)); - REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata2)); - -@@ -356,8 +356,8 @@ dns_rdata_casecompare(const dns_rdata_t *rdata1, const dns_rdata_t *rdata2) { - - REQUIRE(rdata1 != NULL); - REQUIRE(rdata2 != NULL); -- REQUIRE(rdata1->data != NULL); -- REQUIRE(rdata2->data != NULL); -+ REQUIRE(rdata1->length == 0 || rdata1->data != NULL); -+ REQUIRE(rdata2->length == 0 || rdata2->data != NULL); - REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata1)); - REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata2)); - -diff --git a/lib/dns/rdataslab.c b/lib/dns/rdataslab.c -index a41f16f..ed13b30 100644 ---- a/lib/dns/rdataslab.c -+++ b/lib/dns/rdataslab.c -@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ isc_result_t - dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx, - isc_region_t *region, unsigned int reservelen) - { -+ /* -+ * Use &removed as a sentinal pointer for duplicate -+ * rdata as rdata.data == NULL is valid. -+ */ -+ static unsigned char removed; - struct xrdata *x; - unsigned char *rawbuf; - #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED -@@ -168,6 +173,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx, - INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); - dns_rdata_init(&x[i].rdata); - dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &x[i].rdata); -+ INSIST(x[i].rdata.data != &removed); - #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED - x[i].order = i; - #endif -@@ -200,8 +206,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx, - */ - for (i = 1; i < nalloc; i++) { - if (compare_rdata(&x[i-1].rdata, &x[i].rdata) == 0) { -- x[i-1].rdata.data = NULL; -- x[i-1].rdata.length = 0; -+ x[i-1].rdata.data = &removed; - #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED - /* - * Preserve the least order so A, B, A -> A, B -@@ -291,7 +296,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx, - #endif - - for (i = 0; i < nalloc; i++) { -- if (x[i].rdata.data == NULL) -+ if (x[i].rdata.data == &removed) - continue; - #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED - offsettable[x[i].order] = rawbuf - offsetbase; --- -1.7.0.5 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2013-2266.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2013-2266.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7ec6deb..0000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-CVE-2013-2266.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -bind: fix for CVE-2013-2266 - -Upstream-Status: Backport - -libdns in ISC BIND 9.7.x and 9.8.x before 9.8.4-P2, 9.8.5 before 9.8.5b2, -9.9.x before 9.9.2-P2, and 9.9.3 before 9.9.3b2 on UNIX platforms allows -remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a -crafted regular expression, as demonstrated by a memory-exhaustion attack -against a machine running a named process. - -http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-2266 - -Signed-off-by Ming Liu <ming....@windriver.com> ---- - config.h.in | 3 --- - configure.in | 2 +- - 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) - ---- a/config.h.in -+++ b/config.h.in -@@ -277,9 +277,6 @@ int sigwait(const unsigned int *set, int - /* Define if your OpenSSL version supports GOST. */ - #undef HAVE_OPENSSL_GOST - --/* Define to 1 if you have the <regex.h> header file. */ --#undef HAVE_REGEX_H -- - /* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */ - #undef HAVE_SETEGID - ---- a/configure.in -+++ b/configure.in -@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ esac - - AC_HEADER_STDC - --AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h regex.h sys/time.h unistd.h sys/sockio.h sys/select.h sys/param.h sys/sysctl.h net/if6.h,,, -+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h sys/time.h unistd.h sys/sockio.h sys/select.h sys/param.h sys/sysctl.h net/if6.h,,, - [$ac_includes_default - #ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H - # include <sys/param.h> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-Fix-CVE-2012-4244.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-Fix-CVE-2012-4244.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5dd6f69..0000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-Fix-CVE-2012-4244.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,141 +0,0 @@ -bind_Fix_for_CVE-2012-4244 - -Upstream-Status: Backport - -Reference:https://bugzilla.novell.com/attachment.cgi?id=505661&action=edit - -ISC BIND 9.x before 9.7.6-P3, 9.8.x before 9.8.3-P3, 9.9.x before 9.9.1-P3, - and 9.4-ESV and 9.6-ESV before 9.6-ESV-R7-P3 allows remote attackers to -cause a denial of service (assertion failure and named daemon exit) via -a query for a long resource record. - -Signed-off-by: yanjun.zhu <yanjun....@windriver.com> - -diff -urpN a/lib/dns/include/dns/rdata.h b/lib/dns/include/dns/rdata.h ---- a/lib/dns/include/dns/rdata.h 2012-10-08 12:19:42.000000000 +0800 -+++ b/lib/dns/include/dns/rdata.h 2012-10-08 11:26:43.000000000 +0800 -@@ -147,6 +147,17 @@ struct dns_rdata { - (((rdata)->flags & ~(DNS_RDATA_UPDATE|DNS_RDATA_OFFLINE)) == 0) - - /* -+ * The maximum length of a RDATA that can be sent on the wire. -+ * Max packet size (65535) less header (12), less name (1), type (2), -+ * class (2), ttl(4), length (2). -+ * -+ * None of the defined types that support name compression can exceed -+ * this and all new types are to be sent uncompressed. -+ */ -+ -+#define DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH 65512U -+ -+/* - * Flags affecting rdata formatting style. Flags 0xFFFF0000 - * are used by masterfile-level formatting and defined elsewhere. - * See additional comments at dns_rdata_tofmttext(). -diff -urpN a/lib/dns/master.c b/lib/dns/master.c ---- a/lib/dns/master.c 2012-10-08 12:19:42.000000000 +0800 -+++ b/lib/dns/master.c 2012-10-08 11:27:06.000000000 +0800 -@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ - /*% - * max message size - header - root - type - class - ttl - rdlen - */ --#define MINTSIZ (65535 - 12 - 1 - 2 - 2 - 4 - 2) -+#define MINTSIZ DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH - /*% - * Size for tokens in the presentation format, - * The largest tokens are the base64 blocks in KEY and CERT records, -diff -urpN a/lib/dns/rdata.c b/lib/dns/rdata.c ---- a/lib/dns/rdata.c 2012-10-08 12:19:42.000000000 +0800 -+++ b/lib/dns/rdata.c 2012-10-08 11:27:27.000000000 +0800 -@@ -425,6 +425,7 @@ dns_rdata_fromwire(dns_rdata_t *rdata, d - isc_buffer_t st; - isc_boolean_t use_default = ISC_FALSE; - isc_uint32_t activelength; -+ size_t length; - - REQUIRE(dctx != NULL); - if (rdata != NULL) { -@@ -455,6 +456,14 @@ dns_rdata_fromwire(dns_rdata_t *rdata, d - } - - /* -+ * Reject any rdata that expands out to more than DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH -+ * as we cannot transmit it. -+ */ -+ length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) - isc_buffer_usedlength(&st); -+ if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS && length > DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH) -+ result = DNS_R_FORMERR; -+ -+ /* - * We should have consumed all of our buffer. - */ - if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS && !buffer_empty(source)) -@@ -462,8 +471,7 @@ dns_rdata_fromwire(dns_rdata_t *rdata, d - - if (rdata != NULL && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - region.base = isc_buffer_used(&st); -- region.length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) - -- isc_buffer_usedlength(&st); -+ region.length = length; - dns_rdata_fromregion(rdata, rdclass, type, ®ion); - } - -@@ -598,6 +606,7 @@ dns_rdata_fromtext(dns_rdata_t *rdata, d - unsigned long line; - void (*callback)(dns_rdatacallbacks_t *, const char *, ...); - isc_result_t tresult; -+ size_t length; - - REQUIRE(origin == NULL || dns_name_isabsolute(origin) == ISC_TRUE); - if (rdata != NULL) { -@@ -670,10 +679,13 @@ dns_rdata_fromtext(dns_rdata_t *rdata, d - } - } while (1); - -+ length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) - isc_buffer_usedlength(&st); -+ if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS && length > DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH) -+ result = ISC_R_NOSPACE; -+ - if (rdata != NULL && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - region.base = isc_buffer_used(&st); -- region.length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) - -- isc_buffer_usedlength(&st); -+ region.length = length; - dns_rdata_fromregion(rdata, rdclass, type, ®ion); - } - if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { -@@ -781,6 +793,7 @@ dns_rdata_fromstruct(dns_rdata_t *rdata, - isc_buffer_t st; - isc_region_t region; - isc_boolean_t use_default = ISC_FALSE; -+ size_t length; - - REQUIRE(source != NULL); - if (rdata != NULL) { -@@ -795,10 +808,13 @@ dns_rdata_fromstruct(dns_rdata_t *rdata, - if (use_default) - (void)NULL; - -+ length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) - isc_buffer_usedlength(&st); -+ if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS && length > DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH) -+ result = ISC_R_NOSPACE; -+ - if (rdata != NULL && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - region.base = isc_buffer_used(&st); -- region.length = isc_buffer_usedlength(target) - -- isc_buffer_usedlength(&st); -+ region.length = length; - dns_rdata_fromregion(rdata, rdclass, type, ®ion); - } - if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) -diff -urpN a/lib/dns/rdataslab.c b/lib/dns/rdataslab.c ---- a/lib/dns/rdataslab.c 2012-10-08 12:19:42.000000000 +0800 -+++ b/lib/dns/rdataslab.c 2012-10-08 11:27:54.000000000 +0800 -@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_ - length = x[i].rdata.length; - if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig) - length++; -+ INSIST(length <= 0xffff); - *rawbuf++ = (length & 0xff00) >> 8; - *rawbuf++ = (length & 0x00ff); - #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED -- 1.7.9.5 -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list Openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
