This patch came from Slackware and address a change in crypt()'s handling
of an invalid seed, which in the past returned an encrypted string and now
returns a NULL.
[YOCTO #4097] related to tinylogin segfault
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <s...@linux.intel.com>
---
.../files/slackware_fix_for_glib-2.17_crypt.patch | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow_4.1.4.3.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
create mode 100644
meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/slackware_fix_for_glib-2.17_crypt.patch
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/slackware_fix_for_glib-2.17_crypt.patch
b/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/slackware_fix_for_glib-2.17_crypt.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cd45af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/slackware_fix_for_glib-2.17_crypt.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+
+This patch is from Slackware, I tried to find the actual
+author to add that attribution. The comment below is the
+best summary, I will not repeat it here.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from slackware
+
+Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <s...@linux.intel.com>
+
+Index: shadow-4.1.4.3/lib/encrypt.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.1.4.3.orig/lib/encrypt.c
++++ shadow-4.1.4.3/lib/encrypt.c
+@@ -45,15 +45,40 @@ char *pw_encrypt (const char *clear, con
+ static char cipher[128];
+ char *cp;
+
+- cp = crypt (clear, salt);
+- if (!cp) {
+- /*
+- * Single Unix Spec: crypt() may return a null pointer,
+- * and set errno to indicate an error. The caller doesn't
+- * expect us to return NULL, so...
+- */
+- perror ("crypt");
+- exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ cp = crypt (clear, salt);
++ if (!cp) {
++ /*
++ * In glibc-2.17 and newer, crypt() will return NULL if
++ * it was called using an invalid salt format. Previous
++ * versions of glibc would go ahead and compute a DES hash
++ * using the invalid salt. The salt value in this case was
++ * always '!'. We might arrive at this place if either the
++ * user does not exist, or if the hash in /etc/shadow doesn't
++ * have the proper magic for one of the supported hash
++ * formats (for example, if the account was locked using
++ * "passwd -l". To handle this situation, we will recompute
++ * the hash using a hardcoded salt as was previously done
++ * by glibc. The hash returned by the old glibc function
++ * always began with "!!", which would ensure that it could
++ * never match an otherwise valid hash in /etc/shadow that
++ * was disabled with a "!" at the beginning (since the second
++ * character would never be "!" as well), so we will also
++ * prepend the resulting hash with "!!". Finally, in case
++ * crypt() failed for some other reason we will check to see
++ * if we still get NULL from crypt even with the valid salt
++ * and will fail if that's the case.
++ */
++
++ /* Recalculate hash using a hardcoded, valid SHA512 salt: */
++ cp = crypt (clear, "$6$8IIcy/1EPOk/");
++
++ if (!cp) {
++ perror ("crypt");
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ } else {
++ sprintf (cipher, "!!%s", cp);
++ return cipher;
++ }
+ }
+
+ /* The GNU crypt does not return NULL if the algorithm is not
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow_4.1.4.3.bb
b/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow_4.1.4.3.bb
index 8226a6e..caf24c0 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow_4.1.4.3.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow_4.1.4.3.bb
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI =
"http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/releases/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://shadow-4.1.4.2-su_no_sanitize_env.patch \
file://shadow-update-pam-conf.patch \
file://shadow_fix_for_automake-1.12.patch \
+ file://slackware_fix_for_glib-2.17_crypt.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b8608d8294ac88974f27b20f991c0e79"
--
1.8.0.2
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