The ssh-keygen would take a long time to generate the entropy of a key The following commits have fixed the issue. https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd1d7bcb69994d81662e709b0ad838880b943870 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d2f6e66d2837bff1f5f7636bb2118e3a45c9df61
Signed-off-by: Haitao Liu <haitao....@windriver.com> --- ...-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch | 271 ++++++++++++++++++ ...-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch | 185 ++++++++++++ .../openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 458 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aed0e1a5c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0001-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch @@ -0,0 +1,271 @@ +From a940dfa152707ba82f3efc2c147f6313c28f7662 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: slontis <shane.lon...@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 12:01:34 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Improve FIPS RSA keygen performance. + +FIPS 186-4 has 5 different algorithms for key generation, +and all of them rely on testing GCD(a,n) == 1 many times. + +Cachegrind was showing that during a RSA keygen operation, +the function BN_gcd() was taking a considerable percentage +of the total cycles. + +The default provider uses multiprime keygen, which seemed to +be much faster. This is because it uses BN_mod_inverse() +instead. + +For a 4096 bit key, the entropy of a key that was taking a +long time to generate was recorded and fed back into subsequent +runs. Roughly 40% of the cycle time was BN_gcd() with most of the +remainder in the prime testing. Changing to use the inverse +resulted in the cycle count being 96% in the prime testing. + +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pa...@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <to...@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19578) + +(cherry picked from commit dd1d7bcb69994d81662e709b0ad838880b943870) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd1d7bcb69994d81662e709b0ad838880b943870] + +Signed-off-by: Haitao Liu <haitao....@windriver.com> +--- + crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- + doc/man3/BN_cmp.pod | 14 +++++++++++++- + include/openssl/bn.h | 1 + + test/bntest.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + util/libcrypto.num | 1 + + 6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c +index cd0b015..879a84b 100644 +--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c ++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c +@@ -534,6 +534,37 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, + return rv; + } + ++/* ++ * The numbers a and b are coprime if the only positive integer that is a ++ * divisor of both of them is 1. ++ * i.e. gcd(a,b) = 1. ++ * ++ * Coprimes have the property: b has a multiplicative inverse modulo a ++ * i.e there is some value x such that bx = 1 (mod a). ++ * ++ * Testing the modulo inverse is currently much faster than the constant ++ * time version of BN_gcd(). ++ */ ++int BN_are_coprime(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) ++{ ++ int ret = 0; ++ BIGNUM *tmp; ++ ++ BN_CTX_start(ctx); ++ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ++ if (tmp == NULL) ++ goto end; ++ ++ ERR_set_mark(); ++ BN_set_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); ++ ret = (BN_mod_inverse(tmp, a, b, ctx) != NULL); ++ /* Clear any errors (an error is returned if there is no inverse) */ ++ ERR_pop_to_mark(); ++end: ++ BN_CTX_end(ctx); ++ return ret; ++} ++ + /*- + * This function is based on the constant-time GCD work by Bernstein and Yang: + * https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/266 +diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c +index 62d8685..55efaf2 100644 +--- a/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c ++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c +@@ -286,14 +286,20 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin, + goto err; + } + ++ /* ++ * (Step 1) GCD(2r1, r2) = 1. ++ * Note: This algorithm was doing a gcd(2r1, r2)=1 test before doing an ++ * mod_inverse(2r1, r2) which are effectively the same operation. ++ * (The algorithm assumed that the gcd test would be faster). Since the ++ * mod_inverse is currently faster than calling the constant time ++ * BN_gcd(), the call to BN_gcd() has been omitted. The inverse result ++ * is used further down. ++ */ + if (!(BN_lshift1(r1x2, r1) +- /* (Step 1) GCD(2r1, r2) = 1 */ +- && BN_gcd(tmp, r1x2, r2, ctx) +- && BN_is_one(tmp) ++ && (BN_mod_inverse(tmp, r1x2, r2, ctx) != NULL) + /* (Step 2) R = ((r2^-1 mod 2r1) * r2) - ((2r1^-1 mod r2)*2r1) */ +- && BN_mod_inverse(R, r2, r1x2, ctx) ++ && (BN_mod_inverse(R, r2, r1x2, ctx) != NULL) + && BN_mul(R, R, r2, ctx) /* R = (r2^-1 mod 2r1) * r2 */ +- && BN_mod_inverse(tmp, r1x2, r2, ctx) + && BN_mul(tmp, tmp, r1x2, ctx) /* tmp = (2r1^-1 mod r2)*2r1 */ + && BN_sub(R, R, tmp) + /* Calculate 2r1r2 */ +@@ -305,7 +311,8 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin, + + /* + * In FIPS 186-4 imax was set to 5 * nlen/2. +- * Analysis by Allen Roginsky (See https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/fips/186/4/final/documents/comments-received-fips186-4-december-2015.pdf ++ * Analysis by Allen Roginsky ++ * (See https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/fips/186/4/final/documents/comments-received-fips186-4-december-2015.pdf + * page 68) indicates this has a 1 in 2 million chance of failure. + * The number has been updated to 20 * nlen/2 as used in + * FIPS186-5 Appendix B.9 Step 9. +@@ -337,10 +344,9 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin, + + /* (Step 7) If GCD(Y-1) == 1 & Y is probably prime then return Y */ + if (BN_copy(y1, Y) == NULL +- || !BN_sub_word(y1, 1) +- || !BN_gcd(tmp, y1, e, ctx)) ++ || !BN_sub_word(y1, 1)) + goto err; +- if (BN_is_one(tmp)) { ++ if (BN_are_coprime(y1, e, ctx)) { + int rv = BN_check_prime(Y, ctx, cb); + + if (rv > 0) +diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_cmp.pod b/doc/man3/BN_cmp.pod +index f302818..e9ddf8f 100644 +--- a/doc/man3/BN_cmp.pod ++++ b/doc/man3/BN_cmp.pod +@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ + + =head1 NAME + +-BN_cmp, BN_ucmp, BN_is_zero, BN_is_one, BN_is_word, BN_abs_is_word, BN_is_odd - BIGNUM comparison and test functions ++BN_cmp, BN_ucmp, BN_is_zero, BN_is_one, BN_is_word, BN_abs_is_word, BN_is_odd, BN_are_coprime ++- BIGNUM comparison and test functions + + =head1 SYNOPSIS + +@@ -17,6 +18,8 @@ BN_cmp, BN_ucmp, BN_is_zero, BN_is_one, BN_is_word, BN_abs_is_word, BN_is_odd - + int BN_abs_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w); + int BN_is_odd(const BIGNUM *a); + ++ int BN_are_coprime(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); ++ + =head1 DESCRIPTION + + BN_cmp() compares the numbers I<a> and I<b>. BN_ucmp() compares their +@@ -26,6 +29,10 @@ BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), BN_is_word() and BN_abs_is_word() test if + I<a> equals 0, 1, I<w>, or E<verbar>I<w>E<verbar> respectively. + BN_is_odd() tests if I<a> is odd. + ++BN_are_coprime() determines if B<a> and B<b> are coprime. ++B<ctx> is used internally for storing temporary variables. ++The values of B<a> and B<b> and B<ctx> must not be NULL. ++ + =head1 RETURN VALUES + + BN_cmp() returns -1 if I<a> E<lt> I<b>, 0 if I<a> == I<b> and 1 if +@@ -35,11 +42,16 @@ of I<a> and I<b>. + BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one() BN_is_word(), BN_abs_is_word() and + BN_is_odd() return 1 if the condition is true, 0 otherwise. + ++BN_are_coprime() returns 1 if the B<BIGNUM>'s are coprime, otherwise it ++returns 0. ++ + =head1 HISTORY + + Prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0, BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), BN_is_word(), + BN_abs_is_word() and BN_is_odd() were macros. + ++The function BN_are_coprime() was added in OpenSSL 3.1. ++ + =head1 COPYRIGHT + + Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +diff --git a/include/openssl/bn.h b/include/openssl/bn.h +index ecd7f01..73895a5 100644 +--- a/include/openssl/bn.h ++++ b/include/openssl/bn.h +@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /* returns + * -2 for + * error */ ++int BN_are_coprime(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret, + const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx); + BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret, +diff --git a/test/bntest.c b/test/bntest.c +index c5894c1..eec6222 100644 +--- a/test/bntest.c ++++ b/test/bntest.c +@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ typedef struct mpitest_st { + + static const int NUM0 = 100; /* number of tests */ + static const int NUM1 = 50; /* additional tests for some functions */ ++static const int NUM_PRIME_TESTS = 20; + static BN_CTX *ctx; + + /* +@@ -2573,6 +2574,25 @@ static int test_ctx_consttime_flag(void) + return st; + } + ++static int test_coprime(void) ++{ ++ BIGNUM *a = NULL, *b = NULL; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ ret = TEST_ptr(a = BN_new()) ++ && TEST_ptr(b = BN_new()) ++ && TEST_true(BN_set_word(a, 66)) ++ && TEST_true(BN_set_word(b, 99)) ++ && TEST_int_eq(BN_are_coprime(a, b, ctx), 0) ++ && TEST_int_eq(BN_are_coprime(b, a, ctx), 0) ++ && TEST_true(BN_set_word(a, 67)) ++ && TEST_int_eq(BN_are_coprime(a, b, ctx), 1) ++ && TEST_int_eq(BN_are_coprime(b, a, ctx), 1); ++ BN_free(a); ++ BN_free(b); ++ return ret; ++} ++ + static int test_gcd_prime(void) + { + BIGNUM *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *gcd = NULL; +@@ -2585,11 +2605,12 @@ static int test_gcd_prime(void) + + if (!TEST_true(BN_generate_prime_ex(a, 1024, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL))) + goto err; +- for (i = 0; i < NUM0; i++) { ++ for (i = 0; i < NUM_PRIME_TESTS; i++) { + if (!TEST_true(BN_generate_prime_ex(b, 1024, 0, + NULL, NULL, NULL)) + || !TEST_true(BN_gcd(gcd, a, b, ctx)) +- || !TEST_true(BN_is_one(gcd))) ++ || !TEST_true(BN_is_one(gcd)) ++ || !TEST_true(BN_are_coprime(a, b, ctx))) + goto err; + } + +@@ -3066,6 +3087,7 @@ int setup_tests(void) + ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_is_prime, (int)OSSL_NELEM(primes)); + ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_not_prime, (int)OSSL_NELEM(not_primes)); + ADD_TEST(test_gcd_prime); ++ ADD_TEST(test_coprime); + ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_mod_exp, (int)OSSL_NELEM(ModExpTests)); + ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_mod_exp_consttime, (int)OSSL_NELEM(ModExpTests)); + ADD_TEST(test_mod_exp2_mont); +diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num +index 0f6f30b..a1d1ed9 100644 +--- a/util/libcrypto.num ++++ b/util/libcrypto.num +@@ -5429,3 +5429,4 @@ OPENSSL_strcasecmp 5556 3_0_3 EXIST::FUNCTION: + OPENSSL_strncasecmp 5557 3_0_3 EXIST::FUNCTION: + OSSL_CMP_CTX_reset_geninfo_ITAVs 5558 3_0_8 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMP + OSSL_CMP_MSG_update_recipNonce 5559 3_0_9 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMP ++BN_are_coprime 5560 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION: +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1a6b601f65 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +From dfb8e0e716a1fd060eb13402d85cc46c8f64f929 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: slontis <shane.lon...@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 13:20:55 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Improve FIPS RSA keygen performance. + +Reduce the Miller Rabin counts to the values specified by FIPS 186-5. +The old code was using a fixed value of 64. + +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pa...@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <to...@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19579) + +(cherry picked from commit d2f6e66d2837bff1f5f7636bb2118e3a45c9df61) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d2f6e66d2837bff1f5f7636bb2118e3a45c9df61] + +Signed-off-by: Haitao Liu <haitao....@windriver.com> +--- + crypto/bn/bn_prime.c | 11 ++++++++ + crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + include/crypto/bn.h | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c +index ddd31a0..79776f1 100644 +--- a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c ++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c +@@ -252,6 +252,17 @@ int ossl_bn_check_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx, + return bn_is_prime_int(w, checks, ctx, do_trial_division, cb); + } + ++/* ++ * Use this only for key generation. ++ * It always uses trial division. The number of checks ++ * (MR rounds) passed in is used without being clamped to a minimum value. ++ */ ++int ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx, ++ BN_GENCB *cb) ++{ ++ return bn_is_prime_int(w, checks, ctx, 1, cb); ++} ++ + int BN_check_prime(const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) + { + return ossl_bn_check_prime(p, 0, ctx, 1, cb); +diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c +index 55efaf2..c3466df 100644 +--- a/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c ++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c +@@ -48,6 +48,34 @@ const BIGNUM ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2 = { + BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA + }; + ++/* ++ * Refer to FIPS 186-5 Table B.1 for minimum rounds of Miller Rabin ++ * required for generation of RSA aux primes (p1, p2, q1 and q2). ++ */ ++static int bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_MR_rounds(int nbits) ++{ ++ if (nbits >= 4096) ++ return 44; ++ if (nbits >= 3072) ++ return 41; ++ if (nbits >= 2048) ++ return 38; ++ return 0; /* Error */ ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Refer to FIPS 186-5 Table B.1 for minimum rounds of Miller Rabin ++ * required for generation of RSA primes (p and q) ++ */ ++static int bn_rsa_fips186_5_prime_MR_rounds(int nbits) ++{ ++ if (nbits >= 3072) ++ return 4; ++ if (nbits >= 2048) ++ return 5; ++ return 0; /* Error */ ++} ++ + /* + * FIPS 186-5 Table A.1. "Min length of auxiliary primes p1, p2, q1, q2". + * (FIPS 186-5 has an entry for >= 4096 bits). +@@ -97,11 +125,13 @@ static int bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_max_sum_size_for_prob_primes(int nbits) + * Xp1 The passed in starting point to find a probably prime. + * p1 The returned probable prime (first odd integer >= Xp1) + * ctx A BN_CTX object. ++ * rounds The number of Miller Rabin rounds + * cb An optional BIGNUM callback. + * Returns: 1 on success otherwise it returns 0. + */ + static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(const BIGNUM *Xp1, + BIGNUM *p1, BN_CTX *ctx, ++ int rounds, + BN_GENCB *cb) + { + int ret = 0; +@@ -117,7 +147,7 @@ static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(const BIGNUM *Xp1, + i++; + BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i); + /* MR test with trial division */ +- tmp = BN_check_prime(p1, ctx, cb); ++ tmp = ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(p1, rounds, ctx, cb); + if (tmp > 0) + break; + if (tmp < 0) +@@ -160,7 +190,7 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout, + { + int ret = 0; + BIGNUM *p1i = NULL, *p2i = NULL, *Xp1i = NULL, *Xp2i = NULL; +- int bitlen; ++ int bitlen, rounds; + + if (p == NULL || Xpout == NULL) + return 0; +@@ -177,6 +207,7 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout, + bitlen = bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_min_size(nlen); + if (bitlen == 0) + goto err; ++ rounds = bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_MR_rounds(nlen); + + /* (Steps 4.1/5.1): Randomly generate Xp1 if it is not passed in */ + if (Xp1 == NULL) { +@@ -194,8 +225,8 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout, + } + + /* (Steps 4.2/5.2) - find first auxiliary probable primes */ +- if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp1i, p1i, ctx, cb) +- || !bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp2i, p2i, ctx, cb)) ++ if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp1i, p1i, ctx, rounds, cb) ++ || !bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp2i, p2i, ctx, rounds, cb)) + goto err; + /* (Table B.1) auxiliary prime Max length check */ + if ((BN_num_bits(p1i) + BN_num_bits(p2i)) >= +@@ -243,11 +274,11 @@ err: + */ + int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin, + const BIGNUM *r1, const BIGNUM *r2, +- int nlen, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, +- BN_GENCB *cb) ++ int nlen, const BIGNUM *e, ++ BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb) + { + int ret = 0; +- int i, imax; ++ int i, imax, rounds; + int bits = nlen >> 1; + BIGNUM *tmp, *R, *r1r2x2, *y1, *r1x2; + BIGNUM *base, *range; +@@ -317,6 +348,7 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin, + * The number has been updated to 20 * nlen/2 as used in + * FIPS186-5 Appendix B.9 Step 9. + */ ++ rounds = bn_rsa_fips186_5_prime_MR_rounds(nlen); + imax = 20 * bits; /* max = 20/2 * nbits */ + for (;;) { + if (Xin == NULL) { +@@ -346,8 +378,9 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin, + if (BN_copy(y1, Y) == NULL + || !BN_sub_word(y1, 1)) + goto err; ++ + if (BN_are_coprime(y1, e, ctx)) { +- int rv = BN_check_prime(Y, ctx, cb); ++ int rv = ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(Y, rounds, ctx, cb); + + if (rv > 0) + goto end; +diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h +index fd1c09d..00544d9 100644 +--- a/include/crypto/bn.h ++++ b/include/crypto/bn.h +@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, + + int ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int iterations, BN_CTX *ctx, + BN_GENCB *cb, int enhanced, int *status); ++int ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx, ++ BN_GENCB *cb); + + const BIGNUM *ossl_bn_get0_small_factors(void); + +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb index 5e43fdc2de..5b09493ccd 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \ file://afalg.patch \ file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \ + file://0001-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch \ + file://0002-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \ -- 2.25.1
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