From: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com>

Artifex Ghostscript through 10.01.2 mishandles permission validation for
pipe devices (with the %pipe% prefix or the | pipe character prefix).

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36664

Upstream commits:
https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=4ceaf92815302863a8c86fcfcf2347e0118dd3a5
https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e65eeae225c7d02d447de5abaf4a8e6d234fcea
https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commitdiff;h=fb342fdb60391073a69147cb71af1ac416a81099

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com>
---
 .../ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-1.patch        | 145 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-2.patch        |  60 ++++++++
 .../ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-pre1.patch     |  62 ++++++++
 .../ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb           |   3 +
 4 files changed, 270 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 
meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-1.patch
 create mode 100644 
meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-2.patch
 create mode 100644 
meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-pre1.patch

diff --git 
a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-1.patch 
b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3bbe958eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+From 5e65eeae225c7d02d447de5abaf4a8e6d234fcea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Liddell <chris.lidd...@artifex.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 10:23:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 706761: Don't "reduce" %pipe% file names for permission 
validation
+
+For regular file names, we try to simplfy relative paths before we use them.
+
+Because the %pipe% device can, effectively, accept command line calls, we
+shouldn't be simplifying that string, because the command line syntax can end
+up confusing the path simplifying code. That can result in permitting a pipe
+command which does not match what was originally permitted.
+
+Special case "%pipe" in the validation code so we always deal with the entire
+string.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport 
[https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=505eab7782b429017eb434b2b95120855f2b0e3c]
+CVE: CVE-2023-36664
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com>
+---
+ base/gpmisc.c   | 31 +++++++++++++++++++--------
+ base/gslibctx.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/base/gpmisc.c b/base/gpmisc.c
+index c4fffae..09ac6b3 100644
+--- a/base/gpmisc.c
++++ b/base/gpmisc.c
+@@ -1046,16 +1046,29 @@ gp_validate_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem,
+              && !memcmp(path + cdirstrl, dirsepstr, dirsepstrl)) {
+           prefix_len = 0;
+     }
+-    rlen = len+1;
+-    bufferfull = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem->thread_safe_memory, rlen + 
prefix_len, "gp_validate_path");
+-    if (bufferfull == NULL)
+-        return gs_error_VMerror;
+-
+-    buffer = bufferfull + prefix_len;
+-    if (gp_file_name_reduce(path, (uint)len, buffer, &rlen) != 
gp_combine_success)
+-        return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
+-    buffer[rlen] = 0;
+ 
++    /* "%pipe%" do not follow the normal rules for path definitions, so we
++       don't "reduce" them to avoid unexpected results
++     */
++    if (len > 5 && memcmp(path, "%pipe", 5) != 0) {
++      bufferfull = buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem->thread_safe_memory, 
len + 1, "gp_validate_path");
++      if (buffer == NULL)
++          return gs_error_VMerror;
++      memcpy(buffer, path, len);
++      buffer[len] = 0;
++      rlen = len;
++    }
++    else {
++      rlen = len+1;
++      bufferfull = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem->thread_safe_memory, rlen + 
prefix_len, "gp_validate_path");
++      if (bufferfull == NULL)
++          return gs_error_VMerror;
++
++      buffer = bufferfull + prefix_len;
++      if (gp_file_name_reduce(path, (uint)len, buffer, &rlen) != 
gp_combine_success)
++          return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
++      buffer[rlen] = 0;
++    }
+     while (1) {
+         switch (mode[0])
+         {
+diff --git a/base/gslibctx.c b/base/gslibctx.c
+index 20c5eee..355c0e3 100644
+--- a/base/gslibctx.c
++++ b/base/gslibctx.c
+@@ -719,14 +719,28 @@ gs_add_control_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem, 
gs_path_control_t type, const ch
+             return gs_error_rangecheck;
+     }
+ 
+-    rlen = len+1;
+-    buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(core->memory, rlen, "gp_validate_path");
+-    if (buffer == NULL)
+-        return gs_error_VMerror;
++    /* "%pipe%" do not follow the normal rules for path definitions, so we
++       don't "reduce" them to avoid unexpected results
++     */
++    if (len > 5 && memcmp(path, "%pipe", 5) != 0) {
++      buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(core->memory, len + 1, 
"gs_add_control_path_len");
++      if (buffer == NULL)
++          return gs_error_VMerror;
++      memcpy(buffer, path, len);
++      buffer[len] = 0;
++      rlen = len;
++    }
++    else {
++      rlen = len + 1;
+ 
+-    if (gp_file_name_reduce(path, (uint)len, buffer, &rlen) != 
gp_combine_success)
+-        return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
+-    buffer[rlen] = 0;
++      buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(core->memory, rlen, 
"gs_add_control_path_len");
++      if (buffer == NULL)
++          return gs_error_VMerror;
++
++      if (gp_file_name_reduce(path, (uint)len, buffer, &rlen) != 
gp_combine_success)
++          return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
++      buffer[rlen] = 0;
++    }
+ 
+     n = control->num;
+     for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+@@ -802,14 +816,28 @@ gs_remove_control_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem, 
gs_path_control_t type, const
+             return gs_error_rangecheck;
+     }
+ 
+-    rlen = len+1;
+-    buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(core->memory, rlen, "gp_validate_path");
+-    if (buffer == NULL)
+-        return gs_error_VMerror;
++    /* "%pipe%" do not follow the normal rules for path definitions, so we
++       don't "reduce" them to avoid unexpected results
++     */
++    if (len > 5 && memcmp(path, "%pipe", 5) != 0) {
++      buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(core->memory, len + 1, 
"gs_remove_control_path_len");
++      if (buffer == NULL)
++          return gs_error_VMerror;
++      memcpy(buffer, path, len);
++      buffer[len] = 0;
++      rlen = len;
++    }
++    else {
++      rlen = len+1;
+ 
+-    if (gp_file_name_reduce(path, (uint)len, buffer, &rlen) != 
gp_combine_success)
+-        return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
+-    buffer[rlen] = 0;
++      buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(core->memory, rlen, 
"gs_remove_control_path_len");
++      if (buffer == NULL)
++          return gs_error_VMerror;
++
++      if (gp_file_name_reduce(path, (uint)len, buffer, &rlen) != 
gp_combine_success)
++          return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
++      buffer[rlen] = 0;
++    }
+ 
+     n = control->num;
+     for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git 
a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-2.patch 
b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e8c42f1deb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From fb342fdb60391073a69147cb71af1ac416a81099 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Liddell <chris.lidd...@artifex.com>
+Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 09:08:12 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 706778: 706761 revisit
+
+Two problems with the original commit. The first a silly typo inverting the
+logic of a test.
+
+The second was forgetting that we actually actually validate two candidate
+strings for pipe devices. One with the expected "%pipe%" prefix, the other
+using the pipe character prefix: "|".
+
+This addresses both those.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport 
[https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=fb342fdb60391073a69147cb71af1ac416a81099]
+CVE: CVE-2023-36664
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com>
+---
+ base/gpmisc.c   | 2 +-
+ base/gslibctx.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/base/gpmisc.c b/base/gpmisc.c
+index 09ac6b3..01d449f 100644
+--- a/base/gpmisc.c
++++ b/base/gpmisc.c
+@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ gp_validate_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem,
+     /* "%pipe%" do not follow the normal rules for path definitions, so we
+        don't "reduce" them to avoid unexpected results
+      */
+-    if (len > 5 && memcmp(path, "%pipe", 5) != 0) {
++    if (path[0] == '|' || (len > 5 && memcmp(path, "%pipe", 5) == 0)) {
+       bufferfull = buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem->thread_safe_memory, 
len + 1, "gp_validate_path");
+       if (buffer == NULL)
+           return gs_error_VMerror;
+diff --git a/base/gslibctx.c b/base/gslibctx.c
+index 355c0e3..d8f74a3 100644
+--- a/base/gslibctx.c
++++ b/base/gslibctx.c
+@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ gs_add_control_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem, 
gs_path_control_t type, const ch
+     /* "%pipe%" do not follow the normal rules for path definitions, so we
+        don't "reduce" them to avoid unexpected results
+      */
+-    if (len > 5 && memcmp(path, "%pipe", 5) != 0) {
++    if (path[0] == '|' || (len > 5 && memcmp(path, "%pipe", 5) == 0)) {
+       buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(core->memory, len + 1, 
"gs_add_control_path_len");
+       if (buffer == NULL)
+           return gs_error_VMerror;
+@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ gs_remove_control_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem, 
gs_path_control_t type, const
+     /* "%pipe%" do not follow the normal rules for path definitions, so we
+        don't "reduce" them to avoid unexpected results
+      */
+-    if (len > 5 && memcmp(path, "%pipe", 5) != 0) {
++    if (path[0] == '|' || (len > 5 && memcmp(path, "%pipe", 5) == 0)) {
+       buffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(core->memory, len + 1, 
"gs_remove_control_path_len");
+       if (buffer == NULL)
+           return gs_error_VMerror;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git 
a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-pre1.patch 
b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-pre1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..662736bb3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2023-36664-pre1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 4ceaf92815302863a8c86fcfcf2347e0118dd3a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ray Johnston <ray.johns...@artifex.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 13:10:04 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix gp_file allocations to use thread_safe_memory.
+
+The gpmisc.c does allocations for gp_file objects and buffers used by
+gp_fprintf, as well as gp_validate_path_len. The helgrind run with
+-dBGPrint -dNumRenderingThreads=4 and PCL input showed up the gp_fprintf
+problem since the clist rendering would call gp_fprintf using the same
+allocator (PCL's chunk allocator which is non_gc_memory). The chunk
+allocator is intentionally not thread safe (for performance).
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport 
[https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=4ceaf92815302863a8c86fcfcf2347e0118dd3a5]
+CVE: CVE-2023-36664 #Dependency Patch1
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com>
+---
+ base/gpmisc.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/base/gpmisc.c b/base/gpmisc.c
+index 34cd71f..c4fffae 100644
+--- a/base/gpmisc.c
++++ b/base/gpmisc.c
+@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ generic_pwrite(gp_file *f, size_t count, gs_offset_t 
offset, const void *buf)
+ 
+ gp_file *gp_file_alloc(gs_memory_t *mem, const gp_file_ops_t *prototype, 
size_t size, const char *cname)
+ {
+-    gp_file *file = (gp_file *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem->non_gc_memory, size, cname 
? cname : "gp_file");
++    gp_file *file = (gp_file *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem->thread_safe_memory, size, 
cname ? cname : "gp_file");
+     if (file == NULL)
+         return NULL;
+ 
+@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ gp_file *gp_file_alloc(gs_memory_t *mem, const 
gp_file_ops_t *prototype, size_t
+         memset(((char *)file)+sizeof(*prototype),
+                0,
+                size - sizeof(*prototype));
+-    file->memory = mem->non_gc_memory;
++    file->memory = mem->thread_safe_memory;
+ 
+     return file;
+ }
+@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ gp_validate_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem,
+           prefix_len = 0;
+     }
+     rlen = len+1;
+-    bufferfull = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem->non_gc_memory, rlen + 
prefix_len, "gp_validate_path");
++    bufferfull = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem->thread_safe_memory, rlen + 
prefix_len, "gp_validate_path");
+     if (bufferfull == NULL)
+         return gs_error_VMerror;
+ 
+@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ gp_validate_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem,
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    gs_free_object(mem->non_gc_memory, bufferfull, "gp_validate_path");
++    gs_free_object(mem->thread_safe_memory, bufferfull, "gp_validate_path");
+ #ifdef EACCES
+     if (code == gs_error_invalidfileaccess)
+         errno = EACCES;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb 
b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb
index 37e9ed8e84..0a2f9f5046 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ SRC_URI_BASE = 
"https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/ghostpdl-downloads/releases/d
                 file://CVE-2021-3781_3.patch \
                 file://CVE-2023-28879.patch \
                 
file://0001-Bug-706897-Copy-pcx-buffer-overrun-fix-from-devices-.patch \
+                file://CVE-2023-36664-pre1.patch \
+                file://CVE-2023-36664-1.patch \
+                file://CVE-2023-36664-2.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI = "${SRC_URI_BASE} \
-- 
2.25.1

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