From: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> The PKCS#11 feature in ssh-agent in OpenSSH before 9.3p2 has an insufficiently trustworthy search path, leading to remote code execution if an agent is forwarded to an attacker-controlled system. (Code in /usr/lib is not necessarily safe for loading into ssh-agent.) NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-10009.
References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38408 Upstream patches: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/dee22129, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/099cdf59, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/29ef8a04, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/892506b1, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/0c111eb8, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/52a03e9f, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1fe16fd6, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e0e8bee8, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8afaa7d7, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1a4b9275, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/4c1e3ce8, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1f2731f5. Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <st...@sakoman.com> --- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-01.patch | 189 ++++++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-02.patch | 581 ++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-03.patch | 171 ++++++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-04.patch | 34 + .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-05.patch | 194 ++++++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-06.patch | 73 +++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-07.patch | 125 ++++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-08.patch | 315 ++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-09.patch | 38 ++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-10.patch | 39 ++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-11.patch | 307 +++++++++ .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-12.patch | 120 ++++ .../openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb | 12 + 13 files changed, 2198 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-02.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-03.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-04.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-05.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-06.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-07.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-08.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-09.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-10.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-11.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-12.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-01.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-01.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c899056337 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-01.patch @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +From f6213e03887237714eb5bcfc9089c707069f87c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Damien Miller <d...@mindrot.org> +Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2021 16:35:49 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH 01/12] make OPENSSL_HAS_ECC checks more thorough + +ok dtucker + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/dee22129bbc61e25b1003adfa2bc584c5406ef2d] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-pkcs11-client.c | 16 ++++++++-------- + ssh-pkcs11.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c +index 8a0ffef..41114c7 100644 +--- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c +@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + return (ret); + } + +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + static ECDSA_SIG * + ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, + const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec) +@@ -220,12 +220,12 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, + sshbuf_free(msg); + return (ret); + } +-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + + static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa; +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + static EC_KEY_METHOD *helper_ecdsa; +-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + + /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ + static void +@@ -233,10 +233,10 @@ wrap_key(struct sshkey *k) + { + if (k->type == KEY_RSA) + RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper_rsa); +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA) + EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper_ecdsa); +-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + else + fatal("%s: unknown key type", __func__); + } +@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void) + if (helper_rsa != NULL) + return (0); + +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, + unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL; + if (helper_ecdsa != NULL) +@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void) + return (-1); + EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(helper_ecdsa, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL); + EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign); +-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + + if ((helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL) + fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__); +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c +index a302c79..b56a41b 100644 +--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c +@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key { + + int pkcs11_interactive = 0; + +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + static void + ossl_error(const char *msg) + { +@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ ossl_error(const char *msg) + error("%s: libcrypto error: %.100s", __func__, + ERR_error_string(e, NULL)); + } +-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + + int + pkcs11_init(int interactive) +@@ -190,10 +190,10 @@ pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) + + static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method; + static int rsa_idx = 0; +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method; + static int ec_key_idx = 0; +-#endif ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + + /* release a wrapped object */ + static void +@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, + return (0); + } + +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ + static ECDSA_SIG * + ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, +@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, + + return (0); + } +-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + + /* remove trailing spaces */ + static void +@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key) + return (0); + } + +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + static struct sshkey * + pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) +@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ fail: + + return (key); + } +-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + + static struct sshkey * + pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, +@@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + #endif + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + int i; +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + int nid; + #endif + const u_char *cp; +@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + key->type = KEY_RSA; + key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; + rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */ +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp) == NULL) { + error("invalid x509; no ec key"); +@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + key->type = KEY_ECDSA; + key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; + ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */ +-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + } else { + error("unknown certificate key type"); + goto out; +@@ -1237,11 +1237,11 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + case CKK_RSA: + key = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); + break; +-#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) + case CKK_ECDSA: + key = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj); + break; +-#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + default: + /* XXX print key type? */ + key = NULL; +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-02.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-02.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..25ba921869 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-02.patch @@ -0,0 +1,581 @@ +From 92cebfbcc221c9ef3f6bbb78da3d7699c0ae56be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 14:03:45 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 02/12] upstream: Separate ssh-pkcs11-helpers for each p11 + module + +Make ssh-pkcs11-client start an independent helper for each provider, +providing better isolation between modules and reliability if a single +module misbehaves. + +This also implements reference counting of PKCS#11-hosted keys, +allowing ssh-pkcs11-helper subprocesses to be automatically reaped +when no remaining keys reference them. This fixes some bugs we have +that make PKCS11 keys unusable after they have been deleted, e.g. +https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3125 + +ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ce188b14fe271ab0568f4500070d96c5657244e + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/099cdf59ce1e72f55d421c8445bf6321b3004755] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-pkcs11-client.c | 372 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 282 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c +index 41114c7..4f3c6ed 100644 +--- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.16 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.18 2023/07/19 14:03:45 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved. +@@ -30,12 +30,11 @@ + #include <string.h> + #include <unistd.h> + #include <errno.h> ++#include <limits.h> + + #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + +-#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +- + #include "pathnames.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "sshbuf.h" +@@ -47,18 +46,140 @@ + #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" + #include "ssherr.h" + ++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" ++ + /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ + +-static int fd = -1; +-static pid_t pid = -1; ++/* ++ * Maintain a list of ssh-pkcs11-helper subprocesses. These may be looked up ++ * by provider path or their unique EC/RSA METHOD pointers. ++ */ ++struct helper { ++ char *path; ++ pid_t pid; ++ int fd; ++ RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth; ++ EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_meth; ++ int (*rsa_finish)(RSA *rsa); ++ void (*ec_finish)(EC_KEY *key); ++ size_t nrsa, nec; /* number of active keys of each type */ ++}; ++static struct helper **helpers; ++static size_t nhelpers; ++ ++static struct helper * ++helper_by_provider(const char *path) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++) { ++ if (helpers[i] == NULL || helpers[i]->path == NULL || ++ helpers[i]->fd == -1) ++ continue; ++ if (strcmp(helpers[i]->path, path) == 0) ++ return helpers[i]; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static struct helper * ++helper_by_rsa(const RSA *rsa) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ const RSA_METHOD *meth; ++ ++ if ((meth = RSA_get_method(rsa)) == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++) { ++ if (helpers[i] != NULL && helpers[i]->rsa_meth == meth) ++ return helpers[i]; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++ ++} ++ ++static struct helper * ++helper_by_ec(const EC_KEY *ec) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth; ++ ++ if ((meth = EC_KEY_get_method(ec)) == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++) { ++ if (helpers[i] != NULL && helpers[i]->ec_meth == meth) ++ return helpers[i]; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++ ++} ++ ++static void ++helper_free(struct helper *helper) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ int found = 0; ++ ++ if (helper == NULL) ++ return; ++ if (helper->path == NULL || helper->ec_meth == NULL || ++ helper->rsa_meth == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: inconsistent helper", __func__); ++ debug3("%s: free helper for provider %s", __func__ , helper->path); ++ for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++) { ++ if (helpers[i] == helper) { ++ if (found) ++ fatal("%s: helper recorded more than once", __func__); ++ found = 1; ++ } ++ else if (found) ++ helpers[i - 1] = helpers[i]; ++ } ++ if (found) { ++ helpers = xrecallocarray(helpers, nhelpers, ++ nhelpers - 1, sizeof(*helpers)); ++ nhelpers--; ++ } ++ free(helper->path); ++ EC_KEY_METHOD_free(helper->ec_meth); ++ RSA_meth_free(helper->rsa_meth); ++ free(helper); ++} ++ ++static void ++helper_terminate(struct helper *helper) ++{ ++ if (helper == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } else if (helper->fd == -1) { ++ debug3("%s: already terminated", __func__); ++ } else { ++ debug3("terminating helper for %s; " ++ "remaining %zu RSA %zu ECDSA", __func__, ++ helper->path, helper->nrsa, helper->nec); ++ close(helper->fd); ++ /* XXX waitpid() */ ++ helper->fd = -1; ++ helper->pid = -1; ++ } ++ /* ++ * Don't delete the helper entry until there are no remaining keys ++ * that reference it. Otherwise, any signing operation would call ++ * a free'd METHOD pointer and that would be bad. ++ */ ++ if (helper->nrsa == 0 && helper->nec == 0) ++ helper_free(helper); ++} + + static void +-send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) ++send_msg(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) + { + u_char buf[4]; + size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m); + int r; + ++ if (fd == -1) ++ return; + POKE_U32(buf, mlen); + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 || + atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), +@@ -69,12 +190,15 @@ send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) + } + + static int +-recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m) ++recv_msg(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) + { + u_int l, len; + u_char c, buf[1024]; + int r; + ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ if (fd == -1) ++ return 0; /* XXX */ + if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) { + error("read from helper failed: %u", len); + return (0); /* XXX */ +@@ -83,7 +207,6 @@ recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m) + if (len > 256 * 1024) + fatal("response too long: %u", len); + /* read len bytes into m */ +- sshbuf_reset(m); + while (len > 0) { + l = len; + if (l > sizeof(buf)) +@@ -104,14 +227,17 @@ recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m) + int + pkcs11_init(int interactive) + { +- return (0); ++ return 0; + } + + void + pkcs11_terminate(void) + { +- if (fd >= 0) +- close(fd); ++ size_t i; ++ ++ debug3("%s: terminating %zu helpers", __func__, nhelpers); ++ for (i = 0; i < nhelpers; i++) ++ helper_terminate(helpers[i]); + } + + static int +@@ -122,7 +248,11 @@ rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; + size_t blen, slen = 0; + int r, ret = -1; ++ struct helper *helper; + ++ if ((helper = helper_by_rsa(rsa)) == NULL || helper->fd == -1) ++ fatal("%s: no helper for PKCS11 key", __func__); ++ debug3("%s: signing with PKCS11 provider %s", __func__, helper->path); + if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) + goto fail; + key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); +@@ -144,10 +274,10 @@ rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, from, flen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +- send_msg(msg); ++ send_msg(helper->fd, msg); + sshbuf_reset(msg); + +- if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { ++ if (recv_msg(helper->fd, msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (slen <= (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) { +@@ -163,7 +293,26 @@ rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + return (ret); + } + +-#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) ++static int ++rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) ++{ ++ struct helper *helper; ++ ++ if ((helper = helper_by_rsa(rsa)) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: no helper for PKCS11 key", __func__); ++ debug3("%s: free PKCS11 RSA key for provider %s", __func__, helper->path); ++ if (helper->rsa_finish != NULL) ++ helper->rsa_finish(rsa); ++ if (helper->nrsa == 0) ++ fatal("%s: RSA refcount error", __func__); ++ helper->nrsa--; ++ debug3("%s: provider %s remaining keys: %zu RSA %zu ECDSA", __func__, ++ helper->path, helper->nrsa, helper->nec); ++ if (helper->nrsa == 0 && helper->nec == 0) ++ helper_terminate(helper); ++ return 1; ++} ++ + static ECDSA_SIG * + ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, + const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec) +@@ -175,7 +324,11 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, + u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; + size_t blen, slen = 0; + int r, nid; ++ struct helper *helper; + ++ if ((helper = helper_by_ec(ec)) == NULL || helper->fd == -1) ++ fatal("%s: no helper for PKCS11 key", __func__); ++ debug3("%s: signing with PKCS11 provider %s", __func__, helper->path); + nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec); + if (nid < 0) { + error("%s: couldn't get curve nid", __func__); +@@ -203,10 +356,10 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, dgst, dgst_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +- send_msg(msg); ++ send_msg(helper->fd, msg); + sshbuf_reset(msg); + +- if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { ++ if (recv_msg(helper->fd, msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + cp = signature; +@@ -220,75 +373,110 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, + sshbuf_free(msg); + return (ret); + } +-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + +-static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa; +-#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) +-static EC_KEY_METHOD *helper_ecdsa; +-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ ++static void ++ecdsa_do_finish(EC_KEY *ec) ++{ ++ struct helper *helper; ++ ++ if ((helper = helper_by_ec(ec)) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: no helper for PKCS11 key", __func__); ++ debug3("%s: free PKCS11 ECDSA key for provider %s", __func__, helper->path); ++ if (helper->ec_finish != NULL) ++ helper->ec_finish(ec); ++ if (helper->nec == 0) ++ fatal("%s: ECDSA refcount error", __func__); ++ helper->nec--; ++ debug3("%s: provider %s remaining keys: %zu RSA %zu ECDSA", __func__, ++ helper->path, helper->nrsa, helper->nec); ++ if (helper->nrsa == 0 && helper->nec == 0) ++ helper_terminate(helper); ++} + + /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ + static void +-wrap_key(struct sshkey *k) ++wrap_key(struct helper *helper, struct sshkey *k) + { +- if (k->type == KEY_RSA) +- RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper_rsa); +-#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) +- else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA) +- EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper_ecdsa); +-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ +- else ++ debug3("%s: wrap %s for provider %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k), helper->path); ++ if (k->type == KEY_RSA) { ++ RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper->rsa_meth); ++ if (helper->nrsa++ >= INT_MAX) ++ fatal("%s: RSA refcount error", __func__); ++ } else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA) { ++ EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper->ec_meth); ++ if (helper->nec++ >= INT_MAX) ++ fatal("%s: EC refcount error", __func__); ++ } else + fatal("%s: unknown key type", __func__); ++ k->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; ++ debug3("%s: provider %s remaining keys: %zu RSA %zu ECDSA", __func__, ++ helper->path, helper->nrsa, helper->nec); + } + + static int +-pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void) ++pkcs11_start_helper_methods(struct helper *helper) + { +- if (helper_rsa != NULL) +- return (0); +- +-#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) +- int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, ++ int (*ec_init)(EC_KEY *key); ++ int (*ec_copy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src); ++ int (*ec_set_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp); ++ int (*ec_set_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key); ++ int (*ec_set_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key); ++ int (*ec_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, + unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL; +- if (helper_ecdsa != NULL) +- return (0); +- helper_ecdsa = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL()); +- if (helper_ecdsa == NULL) +- return (-1); +- EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(helper_ecdsa, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL); +- EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign); +-#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ +- +- if ((helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL) ++ RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth; ++ EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_meth; ++ ++ if ((ec_meth = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL())) == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(ec_meth, &ec_sign, NULL, NULL); ++ EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(ec_meth, ec_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign); ++ EC_KEY_METHOD_get_init(ec_meth, &ec_init, &helper->ec_finish, ++ &ec_copy, &ec_set_group, &ec_set_private, &ec_set_public); ++ EC_KEY_METHOD_set_init(ec_meth, ec_init, ecdsa_do_finish, ++ ec_copy, ec_set_group, ec_set_private, ec_set_public); ++ ++ if ((rsa_meth = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL) + fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__); +- if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper") || +- !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, rsa_encrypt)) ++ helper->rsa_finish = RSA_meth_get_finish(rsa_meth); ++ if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(rsa_meth, "ssh-pkcs11-helper") || ++ !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(rsa_meth, rsa_encrypt) || ++ !RSA_meth_set_finish(rsa_meth, rsa_finish)) + fatal("%s: failed to prepare method", __func__); + +- return (0); ++ helper->ec_meth = ec_meth; ++ helper->rsa_meth = rsa_meth; ++ return 0; + } + +-static int +-pkcs11_start_helper(void) ++static struct helper * ++pkcs11_start_helper(const char *path) + { + int pair[2]; +- char *helper, *verbosity = NULL; +- +- if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1) +- verbosity = "-vvv"; +- +- if (pkcs11_start_helper_methods() == -1) { +- error("pkcs11_start_helper_methods failed"); +- return (-1); +- } ++ char *prog, *verbosity = NULL; ++ struct helper *helper; ++ pid_t pid; + ++ if (nhelpers >= INT_MAX) ++ fatal("%s: too many helpers", __func__); ++ debug3("%s: start helper for %s", __func__, path); + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) { + error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); +- return (-1); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ helper = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*helper)); ++ if (pkcs11_start_helper_methods(helper) == -1) { ++ error("pkcs11_start_helper_methods failed"); ++ goto fail; + } + if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { + error("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); +- return (-1); ++ fail: ++ close(pair[0]); ++ close(pair[1]); ++ RSA_meth_free(helper->rsa_meth); ++ EC_KEY_METHOD_free(helper->ec_meth); ++ free(helper); ++ return NULL; + } else if (pid == 0) { + if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || + (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { +@@ -297,18 +485,27 @@ pkcs11_start_helper(void) + } + close(pair[0]); + close(pair[1]); +- helper = getenv("SSH_PKCS11_HELPER"); +- if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0) +- helper = _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER; ++ prog = getenv("SSH_PKCS11_HELPER"); ++ if (prog == NULL || strlen(prog) == 0) ++ prog = _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER; ++ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1) ++ verbosity = "-vvv"; + debug("%s: starting %s %s", __func__, helper, + verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity); +- execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL); +- fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", helper, strerror(errno)); ++ execlp(prog, prog, verbosity, (char *)NULL); ++ fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", prog, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + close(pair[1]); +- fd = pair[0]; +- return (0); ++ helper->fd = pair[0]; ++ helper->path = xstrdup(path); ++ helper->pid = pid; ++ debug3("%s: helper %zu for \"%s\" on fd %d pid %ld", __func__, nhelpers, ++ helper->path, helper->fd, (long)helper->pid); ++ helpers = xrecallocarray(helpers, nhelpers, ++ nhelpers + 1, sizeof(*helpers)); ++ helpers[nhelpers++] = helper; ++ return helper; + } + + int +@@ -322,9 +519,11 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, + size_t blen; + u_int nkeys, i; + struct sshbuf *msg; ++ struct helper *helper; + +- if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0) +- return (-1); ++ if ((helper = helper_by_provider(name)) == NULL && ++ (helper = pkcs11_start_helper(name)) == NULL) ++ return -1; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); +@@ -332,10 +531,10 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +- send_msg(msg); ++ send_msg(helper->fd, msg); + sshbuf_reset(msg); + +- type = recv_msg(msg); ++ type = recv_msg(helper->fd, msg); + if (type == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +@@ -350,7 +549,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &k)) != 0) + fatal("%s: bad key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +- wrap_key(k); ++ wrap_key(helper, k); + (*keysp)[i] = k; + if (labelsp) + (*labelsp)[i] = label; +@@ -371,22 +570,15 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, + int + pkcs11_del_provider(char *name) + { +- int r, ret = -1; +- struct sshbuf *msg; +- +- if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) +- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); +- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0) +- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +- send_msg(msg); +- sshbuf_reset(msg); +- +- if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) +- ret = 0; +- sshbuf_free(msg); +- return (ret); ++ struct helper *helper; ++ ++ /* ++ * ssh-agent deletes keys before calling this, so the helper entry ++ * should be gone before we get here. ++ */ ++ debug3("%s: delete %s", __func__, name); ++ if ((helper = helper_by_provider(name)) != NULL) ++ helper_terminate(helper); ++ return 0; + } +- + #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-03.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-03.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e16e5e245e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-03.patch @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +From 2f1be98e83feb90665b9292eff8bb734537fd491 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 14:02:27 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 03/12] upstream: Ensure FIDO/PKCS11 libraries contain expected + symbols + +This checks via nlist(3) that candidate provider libraries contain one +of the symbols that we will require prior to dlopen(), which can cause +a number of side effects, including execution of constructors. + +Feedback deraadt; ok markus + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1508a5fbd74e329e69a55b56c453c292029aefbe + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/29ef8a04866ca14688d5b7fed7b8b9deab851f77] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + misc.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + misc.h | 1 + + ssh-pkcs11.c | 4 +++ + ssh-sk.c | 6 ++-- + 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c +index 3a31d5c..8a107e4 100644 +--- a/misc.c ++++ b/misc.c +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <sys/ioctl.h> ++#include <sys/mman.h> + #include <sys/socket.h> + #include <sys/stat.h> + #include <sys/time.h> +@@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ + #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H + #include <poll.h> + #endif ++#ifdef HAVE_NLIST_H ++#include <nlist.h> ++#endif + #include <signal.h> + #include <stdarg.h> + #include <stdio.h> +@@ -2266,3 +2270,76 @@ ssh_signal(int signum, sshsig_t handler) + } + return osa.sa_handler; + } ++ ++ ++/* ++ * Returns zero if the library at 'path' contains symbol 's', nonzero ++ * otherwise. ++ */ ++int ++lib_contains_symbol(const char *path, const char *s) ++{ ++#ifdef HAVE_NLIST_H ++ struct nlist nl[2]; ++ int ret = -1, r; ++ ++ memset(nl, 0, sizeof(nl)); ++ nl[0].n_name = xstrdup(s); ++ nl[1].n_name = NULL; ++ if ((r = nlist(path, nl)) == -1) { ++ error("%s: nlist failed for %s", __func__, path); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (r != 0 || nl[0].n_value == 0 || nl[0].n_type == 0) { ++ error("%s: library %s does not contain symbol %s", __func__, path, s); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* success */ ++ ret = 0; ++ out: ++ free(nl[0].n_name); ++ return ret; ++#else /* HAVE_NLIST_H */ ++ int fd, ret = -1; ++ struct stat st; ++ void *m = NULL; ++ size_t sz = 0; ++ ++ memset(&st, 0, sizeof(st)); ++ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { ++ error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, path, strerror(errno)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { ++ error("%s: fstat %s: %s", __func__, path, strerror(errno)); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { ++ error("%s: %s is not a regular file", __func__, path); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (st.st_size < 0 || ++ (size_t)st.st_size < strlen(s) || ++ st.st_size >= INT_MAX/2) { ++ error("%s: %s bad size %lld", __func__, path, (long long)st.st_size); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ sz = (size_t)st.st_size; ++ if ((m = mmap(NULL, sz, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0)) == MAP_FAILED || ++ m == NULL) { ++ error("%s: mmap %s: %s", __func__, path, strerror(errno)); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (memmem(m, sz, s, strlen(s)) == NULL) { ++ error("%s: %s does not contain expected string %s", __func__, path, s); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* success */ ++ ret = 0; ++ out: ++ if (m != NULL && m != MAP_FAILED) ++ munmap(m, sz); ++ close(fd); ++ return ret; ++#endif /* HAVE_NLIST_H */ ++} +diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h +index 4a05db2..3f9f4db 100644 +--- a/misc.h ++++ b/misc.h +@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ const char *atoi_err(const char *, int *); + int parse_absolute_time(const char *, uint64_t *); + void format_absolute_time(uint64_t, char *, size_t); + int path_absolute(const char *); ++int lib_contains_symbol(const char *, const char *); + + void sock_set_v6only(int); + +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c +index b56a41b..639a6f7 100644 +--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c +@@ -1499,6 +1499,10 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, + __func__, provider_id); + goto fail; + } ++ if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_id, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) { ++ error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_id); ++ goto fail; ++ } + /* open shared pkcs11-library */ + if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { + error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); +diff --git a/ssh-sk.c b/ssh-sk.c +index 5ff9381..9df12cc 100644 +--- a/ssh-sk.c ++++ b/ssh-sk.c +@@ -119,10 +119,12 @@ sshsk_open(const char *path) + #endif + return ret; + } +- if ((ret->dlhandle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { +- error("Provider \"%s\" dlopen failed: %s", path, dlerror()); ++ if (lib_contains_symbol(path, "sk_api_version") != 0) { ++ error("provider %s is not an OpenSSH FIDO library", path); + goto fail; + } ++ if ((ret->dlhandle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) ++ fatal("Provider \"%s\" dlopen failed: %s", path, dlerror()); + if ((ret->sk_api_version = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, + "sk_api_version")) == NULL) { + error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_api_version) failed: %s", +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-04.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-04.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5e8040c9bf --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-04.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 0862f338941bfdfb2cadee87de6d5fdca1b8f457 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 13:55:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 04/12] upstream: terminate process if requested to load a + PKCS#11 provider that isn't a PKCS#11 provider; from / ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39532cf18b115881bb4cfaee32084497aadfa05c + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/892506b13654301f69f9545f48213fc210e5c5cc] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-pkcs11.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c +index 639a6f7..7530acc 100644 +--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c +@@ -1508,10 +1508,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, + error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); + goto fail; + } +- if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { +- error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); +- goto fail; +- } ++ if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) ++ fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); + p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); + p->handle = handle; +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-05.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-05.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0ddbdc68d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-05.patch @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +From a6cee3905edf070c0de135d3f2ee5b74da1dbd28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 01:26:58 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 05/12] upstream: Restrict ssh-agent from signing web + challenges for FIDO + +keys. + +When signing messages in ssh-agent using a FIDO key that has an +application string that does not start with "ssh:", ensure that the +message being signed is one of the forms expected for the SSH protocol +(currently pubkey authentication and sshsig signatures). + +This prevents ssh-agent forwarding on a host that has FIDO keys +attached granting the ability for the remote side to sign challenges +for web authentication using those keys too. + +Note that the converse case of web browsers signing SSH challenges is +already precluded because no web RP can have the "ssh:" prefix in the +application string that we require. + +ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ab6012574ed0352d2f097d307f4a988222d1b19 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/0c111eb84efba7c2a38b2cc3278901a0123161b9] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-agent.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index ceb348c..1794f35 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.255 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.258 2020/05/26 01:26:58 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ + + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "ssh.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "authfd.h" +@@ -167,6 +168,9 @@ static long lifetime = 0; + + static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; + ++/* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */ ++static int restrict_websafe = 1; ++ + static void + close_socket(SocketEntry *e) + { +@@ -282,6 +286,80 @@ agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags) + return NULL; + } + ++/* ++ * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a ++ * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:". ++ * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations ++ * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges ++ * for the web. ++ */ ++static int ++check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, ++ const u_char *msg, size_t len) ++{ ++ int matched = 0; ++ struct sshbuf *b; ++ u_char m, n; ++ char *cp1 = NULL, *cp2 = NULL; ++ int r; ++ struct sshkey *mkey = NULL; ++ ++ if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); ++ ++ /* SSH userauth request */ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* sess_id */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &m)) == 0 && /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* server user */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp1, NULL)) == 0 && /* service */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp2, NULL)) == 0 && /* method */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &n)) == 0 && /* sig-follows */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* alg */ ++ (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) == 0 && /* key */ ++ sshbuf_len(b) == 0) { ++ debug("%s: parsed userauth", __func__); ++ if (m == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST && n == 1 && ++ strcmp(cp1, "ssh-connection") == 0 && ++ strcmp(cp2, "publickey") == 0 && ++ sshkey_equal(key, mkey)) { ++ debug("%s: well formed userauth", __func__); ++ matched = 1; ++ } ++ } ++ free(cp1); ++ free(cp2); ++ sshkey_free(mkey); ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ if (matched) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); ++ cp1 = cp2 = NULL; ++ mkey = NULL; ++ ++ /* SSHSIG */ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) == 0 && ++ (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) == 0 && ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* namespace */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* reserved */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* hashalg */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* H(msg) */ ++ sshbuf_len(b) == 0) { ++ debug("%s: parsed sshsig", __func__); ++ matched = 1; ++ } ++ ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ if (matched) ++ return 1; ++ ++ /* XXX CA signature operation */ ++ ++ error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message"); ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* ssh2 only */ + static void + process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) +@@ -314,14 +392,20 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__); + goto send; + } +- if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key) && +- (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { +- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, +- SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) +- fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__); +- notifier = notify_start(0, +- "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", +- sshkey_type(id->key), fp); ++ if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) { ++ if (strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 && ++ !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data, dlen)) { ++ /* error already logged */ ++ goto send; ++ } ++ if ((id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { ++ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, ++ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__); ++ notifier = notify_start(0, ++ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", ++ sshkey_type(id->key), fp); ++ } + } + if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, + data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags), +@@ -1214,7 +1298,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); + seed_rng(); + +- while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) { ++ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:O:P:t:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'E': + fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); +@@ -1229,6 +1313,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + case 'k': + k_flag++; + break; ++ case 'O': ++ if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0) ++ restrict_websafe = 0; ++ else ++ fatal("Unknown -O option"); ++ break; + case 'P': + if (provider_whitelist != NULL) + fatal("-P option already specified"); +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-06.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-06.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac494aab0b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-06.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From a5d845b7b42861d18f43e83de9f24c7374d1b458 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 08:16:38 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 06/12] upstream: handle multiple messages in a single read() + +PR#183 by Dennis Kaarsemaker; feedback and ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8570bb4d02d00cf70b98590716ea6a7d1cce68d1 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/52a03e9fca2d74eef953ddd4709250f365ca3975] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-agent.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 1794f35..78f7268 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.258 2020/05/26 01:26:58 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.264 2020/09/18 08:16:38 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -853,8 +853,10 @@ send: + } + #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + +-/* dispatch incoming messages */ +- ++/* ++ * dispatch incoming message. ++ * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error. ++ */ + static int + process_message(u_int socknum) + { +@@ -908,7 +910,7 @@ process_message(u_int socknum) + /* send a fail message for all other request types */ + send_status(e, 0); + } +- return 0; ++ return 1; + } + + switch (type) { +@@ -952,7 +954,7 @@ process_message(u_int socknum) + send_status(e, 0); + break; + } +- return 0; ++ return 1; + } + + static void +@@ -1043,7 +1045,12 @@ handle_conn_read(u_int socknum) + if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); +- process_message(socknum); ++ for (;;) { ++ if ((r = process_message(socknum)) == -1) ++ return -1; ++ else if (r == 0) ++ break; ++ } + return 0; + } + +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-07.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-07.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0dcf23ae17 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-07.patch @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +From 653cc18c922fc387b3d3aa1b081c5e5283cce28a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 00:47:47 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 07/12] upstream: use recallocarray to allocate the agent + sockets table; + +also clear socket entries that are being marked as unused. + +spinkle in some debug2() spam to make it easier to watch an agent +do its thing. + +ok markus + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74582c8e82e96afea46f6c7b6813a429cbc75922 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1fe16fd61bb53944ec510882acc0491abd66ff76] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-agent.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 78f7268..2635bc5 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.264 2020/09/18 08:16:38 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.269 2021/01/26 00:47:47 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -175,11 +175,12 @@ static void + close_socket(SocketEntry *e) + { + close(e->fd); +- e->fd = -1; +- e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; + sshbuf_free(e->input); + sshbuf_free(e->output); + sshbuf_free(e->request); ++ memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e)); ++ e->fd = -1; ++ e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; + } + + static void +@@ -249,6 +250,8 @@ process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e) + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + ++ debug2("%s: entering", __func__); ++ + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || +@@ -441,6 +444,7 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e) + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + Identity *id; + ++ debug2("%s: entering", __func__); + if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: get key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto done; +@@ -467,6 +471,7 @@ process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e) + { + Identity *id; + ++ debug2("%s: entering", __func__); + /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; + id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) { +@@ -520,6 +525,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e) + u_char ctype; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + ++ debug2("%s: entering", __func__); + if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 || + k == NULL || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) { +@@ -667,6 +673,7 @@ process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) + static u_int fail_count = 0; + size_t pwlen; + ++ debug2("%s: entering", __func__); + /* + * This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock, + * but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to +@@ -738,6 +745,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k; + Identity *id; + ++ debug2("%s: entering", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +@@ -818,6 +826,7 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + int r, success = 0; + Identity *id, *nxt; + ++ debug2("%s: entering", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +@@ -962,6 +971,8 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) + { + u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc; + ++ debug("%s: type = %s", __func__, type == AUTH_CONNECTION ? "CONNECTION" : ++ (type == AUTH_SOCKET ? "SOCKET" : "UNKNOWN")); + set_nonblock(fd); + + if (fd > max_fd) +@@ -981,7 +992,8 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) + } + old_alloc = sockets_alloc; + new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10; +- sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); ++ sockets = xrecallocarray(sockets, old_alloc, new_alloc, ++ sizeof(sockets[0])); + for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++) + sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; + sockets_alloc = new_alloc; +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-08.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-08.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..141c8113bf --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-08.patch @@ -0,0 +1,315 @@ +From c30158ea225cf8ad67c3dcc88fa9e4afbf8959a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 00:53:31 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 08/12] upstream: more ssh-agent refactoring + +Allow confirm_key() to accept an additional reason suffix + +Factor publickey userauth parsing out into its own function and allow +it to optionally return things it parsed out of the message to its +caller. + +feedback/ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29006515617d1aa2d8b85cd2bf667e849146477e + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e0e8bee8024fa9e31974244d14f03d799e5c0775] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-agent.c | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + 1 file changed, 130 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 2635bc5..7ad323c 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.269 2021/01/26 00:47:47 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.270 2021/01/26 00:53:31 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -216,15 +216,16 @@ lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key) + + /* Check confirmation of keysign request */ + static int +-confirm_key(Identity *id) ++confirm_key(Identity *id, const char *extra) + { + char *p; + int ret = -1; + + p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + if (p != NULL && +- ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", +- id->comment, p)) ++ ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.%s%s", ++ id->comment, p, ++ extra == NULL ? "" : "\n", extra == NULL ? "" : extra)) + ret = 0; + free(p); + +@@ -290,74 +291,133 @@ agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags) + } + + /* +- * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a +- * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:". +- * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations +- * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges +- * for the web. ++ * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSH publickey userauth ++ * request, checking its contents for consistency and matching the embedded ++ * key against the one that is being used for signing. ++ * Note: does not modify msg buffer. ++ * Optionally extract the username and session ID from the request. + */ + static int +-check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, +- const u_char *msg, size_t len) ++parse_userauth_request(struct sshbuf *msg, const struct sshkey *expected_key, ++ char **userp, struct sshbuf **sess_idp) + { +- int matched = 0; +- struct sshbuf *b; +- u_char m, n; +- char *cp1 = NULL, *cp2 = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sess_id = NULL; ++ char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *pkalg = NULL; + int r; ++ u_char t, sig_follows; + struct sshkey *mkey = NULL; + +- if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL) +- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); ++ if (userp != NULL) ++ *userp = NULL; ++ if (sess_idp != NULL) ++ *sess_idp = NULL; ++ if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb", __func__); + + /* SSH userauth request */ +- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* sess_id */ +- (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &m)) == 0 && /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ +- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* server user */ +- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp1, NULL)) == 0 && /* service */ +- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp2, NULL)) == 0 && /* method */ +- (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &n)) == 0 && /* sig-follows */ +- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* alg */ +- (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) == 0 && /* key */ +- sshbuf_len(b) == 0) { +- debug("%s: parsed userauth", __func__); +- if (m == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST && n == 1 && +- strcmp(cp1, "ssh-connection") == 0 && +- strcmp(cp2, "publickey") == 0 && +- sshkey_equal(key, mkey)) { +- debug("%s: well formed userauth", __func__); +- matched = 1; +- } ++ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(b, &sess_id)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ if (sshbuf_len(sess_id) == 0) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ goto out; + } +- free(cp1); +- free(cp2); +- sshkey_free(mkey); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &t)) != 0 || /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0 || /* server user */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &service, NULL)) != 0 || /* service */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &method, NULL)) != 0 || /* method */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_follows)) != 0 || /* sig-follows */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */ ++ (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) != 0) /* key */ ++ goto out; ++ if (t != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST || ++ sig_follows != 1 || ++ strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0 || ++ !sshkey_equal(expected_key, mkey) || ++ sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg) != expected_key->type) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (strcmp(method, "publickey") != 0) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* success */ ++ r = 0; ++ debug("%s: well formed userauth", __func__); ++ if (userp != NULL) { ++ *userp = user; ++ user = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sess_idp != NULL) { ++ *sess_idp = sess_id; ++ sess_id = NULL; ++ } ++ out: + sshbuf_free(b); +- if (matched) +- return 1; ++ sshbuf_free(sess_id); ++ free(user); ++ free(service); ++ free(method); ++ free(pkalg); ++ sshkey_free(mkey); ++ return r; ++} + +- if ((b = sshbuf_from(msg, len)) == NULL) +- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); +- cp1 = cp2 = NULL; +- mkey = NULL; +- +- /* SSHSIG */ +- if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) == 0 && +- (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) == 0 && +- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* namespace */ +- (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* reserved */ +- (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* hashalg */ +- (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) == 0 && /* H(msg) */ +- sshbuf_len(b) == 0) { +- debug("%s: parsed sshsig", __func__); +- matched = 1; +- } ++/* ++ * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSHSIG signature request. ++ * Note: does not modify buffer. ++ */ ++static int ++parse_sshsig_request(struct sshbuf *msg) ++{ ++ int r; ++ struct sshbuf *b; + ++ if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb", __func__); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* namespace */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* hashalg */ ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) /* H(msg) */ ++ goto out; ++ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* success */ ++ r = 0; ++ out: + sshbuf_free(b); +- if (matched) ++ return r; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a ++ * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:". ++ * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations ++ * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges ++ * for the web. ++ */ ++static int ++check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data) ++{ ++ if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, NULL, NULL) == 0) { ++ debug("%s: signed data matches public key userauth request", __func__); + return 1; ++ } ++ if (parse_sshsig_request(data) == 0) { ++ debug("%s: signed data matches SSHSIG signature request", __func__); ++ return 1; ++ } + +- /* XXX CA signature operation */ ++ /* XXX check CA signature operation */ + + error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message"); + return 0; +@@ -367,21 +427,22 @@ check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, + static void + process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + { +- const u_char *data; + u_char *signature = NULL; +- size_t dlen, slen = 0; ++ size_t i, slen = 0; + u_int compat = 0, flags; + int r, ok = -1; + char *fp = NULL; +- struct sshbuf *msg; ++ struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + struct identity *id; + struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; + +- if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ debug("%s: entering", __func__); ++ ++ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL | (data = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->request, data)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't parse request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto send; +@@ -391,13 +452,13 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); + goto send; + } +- if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) { ++ if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, NULL) != 0) { + verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__); + goto send; + } + if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) { + if (strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 && +- !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data, dlen)) { ++ !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data)) { + /* error already logged */ + goto send; + } +@@ -411,7 +472,7 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + } + } + if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, +- data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags), ++ sshbuf_ptr(data), sshbuf_len(data), agent_decode_alg(key, flags), + id->sk_provider, compat)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto send; +@@ -420,8 +481,7 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + ok = 0; + send: + notify_complete(notifier); +- sshkey_free(key); +- free(fp); ++ + if (ok == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0) +@@ -432,7 +492,10 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ++ sshbuf_free(data); + sshbuf_free(msg); ++ sshkey_free(key); ++ free(fp); + free(signature); + } + +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-09.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-09.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b519ccce42 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-09.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 7adba46611e5d076d7d12d9f4162dd4cabd5ff50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 06:28:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 09/12] upstream: give typedef'd struct a struct name; makes + the fuzzer I'm + +writing a bit easier + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1052ab521505a4d8384d67acb3974ef81b8896cb + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8afaa7d7918419d3da6c0477b83db2159879cb33] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-agent.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 7ad323c..c99927c 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.270 2021/01/26 00:53:31 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.274 2021/01/29 06:28:10 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ typedef enum { + AUTH_CONNECTION + } sock_type; + +-typedef struct { ++typedef struct socket_entry { + int fd; + sock_type type; + struct sshbuf *input; +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-10.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-10.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27b2eadfae --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-10.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 343e2a2c0ef754a7a86118016b248f7a73f8d510 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 06:29:46 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 10/12] upstream: fix the values of enum sock_type + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18d048f4dbfbb159ff500cfc2700b8fb1407facd + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1a4b92758690faa12f49079dd3b72567f909466d] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-agent.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index c99927c..7f1e14b 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.274 2021/01/29 06:28:10 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.275 2021/01/29 06:29:46 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ + #define AGENT_RBUF_LEN (4096) + + typedef enum { +- AUTH_UNUSED, +- AUTH_SOCKET, +- AUTH_CONNECTION ++ AUTH_UNUSED = 0, ++ AUTH_SOCKET = 1, ++ AUTH_CONNECTION = 2, + } sock_type; + + typedef struct socket_entry { +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-11.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-11.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c300393ebf --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-11.patch @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +From 2b3b369c8cf71f9ef5942a5e074e6f86e7ca1e0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2021 22:09:23 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 11/12] upstream: ssh-agent side of binding + +record session ID/hostkey/forwarding status for each active socket. + +Attempt to parse data-to-be-signed at signature request time and extract +session ID from the blob if it is a pubkey userauth request. + +ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80fd41e292b18b67508362129e9fed549abd318 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/4c1e3ce85e183a9d0c955c88589fed18e4d6a058] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + authfd.h | 3 + + ssh-agent.c | 175 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 2 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h +index c3bf625..9cc9807 100644 +--- a/authfd.h ++++ b/authfd.h +@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, + #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 + #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26 + ++/* generic extension mechanism */ ++#define SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION 27 ++ + #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 + #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 + #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN 3 +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 7f1e14b..01c7f2b 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.275 2021/01/29 06:29:46 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.280 2021/12/19 22:09:23 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -98,9 +98,15 @@ + #endif + + /* Maximum accepted message length */ +-#define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024) ++#define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024) + /* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */ +-#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN (4096) ++#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN (4096) ++/* Maximum number of recorded session IDs/hostkeys per connection */ ++#define AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS 16 ++/* Maximum size of session ID */ ++#define AGENT_MAX_SID_LEN 128 ++ ++/* XXX store hostkey_sid in a refcounted tree */ + + typedef enum { + AUTH_UNUSED = 0, +@@ -108,12 +114,20 @@ typedef enum { + AUTH_CONNECTION = 2, + } sock_type; + ++struct hostkey_sid { ++ struct sshkey *key; ++ struct sshbuf *sid; ++ int forwarded; ++}; ++ + typedef struct socket_entry { + int fd; + sock_type type; + struct sshbuf *input; + struct sshbuf *output; + struct sshbuf *request; ++ size_t nsession_ids; ++ struct hostkey_sid *session_ids; + } SocketEntry; + + u_int sockets_alloc = 0; +@@ -174,10 +188,17 @@ static int restrict_websafe = 1; + static void + close_socket(SocketEntry *e) + { ++ size_t i; ++ + close(e->fd); + sshbuf_free(e->input); + sshbuf_free(e->output); + sshbuf_free(e->request); ++ for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) { ++ sshkey_free(e->session_ids[i].key); ++ sshbuf_free(e->session_ids[i].sid); ++ } ++ free(e->session_ids); + memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e)); + e->fd = -1; + e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; +@@ -423,6 +444,18 @@ check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data) + return 0; + } + ++static int ++buf_equal(const struct sshbuf *a, const struct sshbuf *b) ++{ ++ if (sshbuf_ptr(a) == NULL || sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL) ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ if (sshbuf_len(a) != sshbuf_len(b)) ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a), sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(a)) != 0) ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* ssh2 only */ + static void + process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) +@@ -431,8 +464,8 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + size_t i, slen = 0; + u_int compat = 0, flags; + int r, ok = -1; +- char *fp = NULL; +- struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL; ++ char *fp = NULL, *user = NULL, *sig_dest = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL, *sid = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + struct identity *id; + struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; +@@ -452,7 +485,33 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); + goto send; + } +- if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, NULL) != 0) { ++ /* ++ * If session IDs were recorded for this socket, then use them to ++ * annotate the confirmation messages with the host keys. ++ */ ++ if (e->nsession_ids > 0 && ++ parse_userauth_request(data, key, &user, &sid) == 0) { ++ /* ++ * session ID from userauth request should match the final ++ * ID in the list recorded in the socket, unless the ssh ++ * client at that point lacks the binding extension (or if ++ * an attacker is trying to steal use of the agent). ++ */ ++ i = e->nsession_ids - 1; ++ if (buf_equal(sid, e->session_ids[i].sid) == 0) { ++ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(e->session_ids[i].key, ++ SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__); ++ debug3("%s: destination %s %s (slot %zu)", __func__, ++ sshkey_type(e->session_ids[i].key), fp, i); ++ xasprintf(&sig_dest, "public key request for " ++ "target user \"%s\" to %s %s", user, ++ sshkey_type(e->session_ids[i].key), fp); ++ free(fp); ++ fp = NULL; ++ } ++ }// ++ if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, sig_dest) != 0) { + verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__); + goto send; + } +@@ -467,8 +526,10 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__); + notifier = notify_start(0, +- "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", +- sshkey_type(id->key), fp); ++ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s%s%s", ++ sshkey_type(id->key), fp, ++ sig_dest == NULL ? "" : "\n", ++ sig_dest == NULL ? "" : sig_dest); + } + } + if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, +@@ -492,11 +553,14 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ++ sshbuf_free(sid); + sshbuf_free(data); + sshbuf_free(msg); + sshkey_free(key); + free(fp); + free(signature); ++ free(sig_dest); ++ free(user); + } + + /* shared */ +@@ -925,6 +989,98 @@ send: + } + #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + ++static int ++process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e) ++{ ++ int r, sid_match, key_match; ++ struct sshkey *key = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *sid = NULL, *sig = NULL; ++ char *fp = NULL; ++ u_char fwd; ++ size_t i; ++ ++ debug2("%s: entering", __func__); ++ if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sid)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sig)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &fwd)) != 0) { ++ error("%s: parse: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, ++ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__); ++ /* check signature with hostkey on session ID */ ++ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig), ++ sshbuf_ptr(sid), sshbuf_len(sid), NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) { ++ error("%s: sshkey_verify for %s %s: %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp, ssh_err(r)); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* check whether sid/key already recorded */ ++ for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) { ++ sid_match = buf_equal(sid, e->session_ids[i].sid) == 0; ++ key_match = sshkey_equal(key, e->session_ids[i].key); ++ if (sid_match && key_match) { ++ debug("%s: session ID already recorded for %s %s", __func__, ++ sshkey_type(key), fp); ++ r = 0; ++ goto out; ++ } else if (sid_match) { ++ error("%s: session ID recorded against different key " ++ "for %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); ++ r = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* ++ * new sid with previously-seen key can happen, e.g. multiple ++ * connections to the same host. ++ */ ++ } ++ /* record new key/sid */ ++ if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) { ++ error("%s: too many session IDs recorded", __func__); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids, ++ e->nsession_ids + 1, sizeof(*e->session_ids)); ++ i = e->nsession_ids++; ++ debug("%s: recorded %s %s (slot %zu of %d)", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp, i, ++ AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS); ++ e->session_ids[i].key = key; ++ e->session_ids[i].forwarded = fwd != 0; ++ key = NULL; /* transferred */ ++ /* can't transfer sid; it's refcounted and scoped to request's life */ ++ if ((e->session_ids[i].sid = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_putb(e->session_ids[i].sid, sid)) != 0) ++ fatal("%s: sshbuf_putb session ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ /* success */ ++ r = 0; ++ out: ++ sshkey_free(key); ++ sshbuf_free(sid); ++ sshbuf_free(sig); ++ return r == 0 ? 1 : 0; ++} ++ ++static void ++process_extension(SocketEntry *e) ++{ ++ int r, success = 0; ++ char *name; ++ ++ debug2("%s: entering", __func__); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &name, NULL)) != 0) { ++ error("%s: parse: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ goto send; ++ } ++ if (strcmp(name, "session-b...@openssh.com") == 0) ++ success = process_ext_session_bind(e); ++ else ++ debug("%s: unsupported extension \"%s\"", __func__, name); ++send: ++ send_status(e, success); ++} + /* + * dispatch incoming message. + * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error. +@@ -1019,6 +1175,9 @@ process_message(u_int socknum) + process_remove_smartcard_key(e); + break; + #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ ++ case SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION: ++ process_extension(e); ++ break; + default: + /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ + error("Unknown message %d", type); +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-12.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-12.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..934775bdec --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-38408-12.patch @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +From 4fe3d0fbd3d6dc1f19354e0d73a3231c461ed044 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 13:56:33 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 12/12] upstream: Disallow remote addition of FIDO/PKCS11 + provider libraries to ssh-agent by default. + +The old behaviour of allowing remote clients from loading providers +can be restored using `ssh-agent -O allow-remote-pkcs11`. + +Detection of local/remote clients requires a ssh(1) that supports +the `session-b...@openssh.com` extension. Forwarding access to a +ssh-agent socket using non-OpenSSH tools may circumvent this control. + +ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c2bdf79b214ae7e60cc8c39a45501344fa7bd7c + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1f2731f5d7a8f8a8385c6031667ed29072c0d92a] +CVE: CVE-2023-38408 +Signed-off-by: Shubham Kulkarni <skulka...@mvista.com> +--- + ssh-agent.1 | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + ssh-agent.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1 +index fff0db6..a0f1e21 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.1 ++++ b/ssh-agent.1 +@@ -97,6 +97,26 @@ The default is + Kill the current agent (given by the + .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID + environment variable). ++Currently two options are supported: ++.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11 ++and ++.Pp ++The ++.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11 ++option allows clients of a forwarded ++.Nm ++to load PKCS#11 or FIDO provider libraries. ++By default only local clients may perform this operation. ++Note that signalling that a ++.Nm ++client remote is performed by ++.Xr ssh 1 , ++and use of other tools to forward access to the agent socket may circumvent ++this restriction. ++.Pp ++The ++.Cm no-restrict-websafe , ++instructs + .It Fl P Ar provider_whitelist + Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 and FIDO authenticator + shared libraries that may be used with the +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 01c7f2b..40c1b6b 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.280 2021/12/19 22:09:23 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.300 2023/07/19 13:56:33 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -167,6 +167,12 @@ char socket_dir[PATH_MAX]; + /* PKCS#11/Security key path whitelist */ + static char *provider_whitelist; + ++/* ++ * Allows PKCS11 providers or SK keys that use non-internal providers to ++ * be added over a remote connection (identified by session-b...@openssh.com). ++ */ ++static int remote_add_provider; ++ + /* locking */ + #define LOCK_SIZE 32 + #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16 +@@ -736,6 +742,15 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e) + if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) { + debug("%s: internal provider", __func__); + } else { ++ if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) { ++ verbose("failed add of SK provider \"%.100s\": " ++ "remote addition of providers is disabled", ++ sk_provider); ++ free(sk_provider); ++ free(comment); ++ sshkey_free(k); ++ goto send; ++ } + if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { + verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": " + "realpath: %s", sk_provider, +@@ -901,6 +916,11 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + goto send; + } + } ++ if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) { ++ verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": remote addition of " ++ "providers is disabled", provider); ++ goto send; ++ } + if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { + verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", + provider, strerror(errno)); +@@ -1556,7 +1576,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + break; + case 'O': + if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0) +- restrict_websafe = 0; ++ restrict_websafe = 0; ++ else if (strcmp(optarg, "allow-remote-pkcs11") == 0) ++ remote_add_provider = 1; + else + fatal("Unknown -O option"); + break; +-- +2.41.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb index 79dba121ff..bc4b922301 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb @@ -27,6 +27,18 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2020-14145.patch \ file://CVE-2021-28041.patch \ file://CVE-2021-41617.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-02.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-03.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-04.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-05.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-06.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-07.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-08.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-09.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-10.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-11.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-38408-12.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671" -- 2.34.1
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