Hi Team, Any update for this patch?
Thanks & Regards, Vijay On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 2:42 PM <vanus...@mvista.com> wrote: > From: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com> > > Upstream-Status: Backport from > https://github.com/git/git/commit/58325b93c5b6212697b088371809e9948fee8052 > & > <https://github.com/git/git/commit/58325b93c5b6212697b088371809e9948fee8052&;> > https://github.com/git/git/commit/cf8f6ce02a13f4d1979a53241afbee15a293fce9 > & > <https://github.com/git/git/commit/cf8f6ce02a13f4d1979a53241afbee15a293fce9&;> > https://github.com/git/git/commit/bffc762f87ae8d18c6001bf0044a76004245754c > > Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com> > --- > .../git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch | 179 +++++++++++++++++ > .../git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch | 122 ++++++++++++ > .../git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch | 154 +++++++++++++++ > .../git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch | 184 ++++++++++++++++++ > meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc | 4 + > 5 files changed, 643 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch > create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch > create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch > create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch > b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..cc9b448c5c > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-1.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ > +From 58325b93c5b6212697b088371809e9948fee8052 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Taylor Blau <m...@ttaylorr.com> > +Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 19:43:45 -0500 > +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] t5619: demonstrate clone_local() with ambiguous > transport > + > +When cloning a repository, Git must determine (a) what transport > +mechanism to use, and (b) whether or not the clone is local. > + > +Since f38aa83 (use local cloning if insteadOf makes a local URL, > +2014-07-17), the latter check happens after the remote has been > +initialized, and references the remote's URL instead of the local path. > +This is done to make it possible for a `url.<base>.insteadOf` rule to > +convert a remote URL into a local one, in which case the `clone_local()` > +mechanism should be used. > + > +However, with a specially crafted repository, Git can be tricked into > +using a non-local transport while still setting `is_local` to "1" and > +using the `clone_local()` optimization. The below test case > +demonstrates such an instance, and shows that it can be used to include > +arbitrary (known) paths in the working copy of a cloned repository on a > +victim's machine[^1], even if local file clones are forbidden by > +`protocol.file.allow`. > + > +This happens in a few parts: > + > + 1. We first call `get_repo_path()` to see if the remote is a local > + path. If it is, we replace the repo name with its absolute path. > + > + 2. We then call `transport_get()` on the repo name and decide how to > + access it. If it was turned into an absolute path in the previous > + step, then we should always treat it like a file. > + > + 3. We use `get_repo_path()` again, and set `is_local` as appropriate. > + But it's already too late to rewrite the repo name as an absolute > + path, since we've already fed it to the transport code. > + > +The attack works by including a submodule whose URL corresponds to a > +path on disk. In the below example, the repository "sub" is reachable > +via the dumb HTTP protocol at (something like): > + > + http://127.0.0.1:NNNN/dumb/sub.git > + > +However, the path "http:/127.0.0.1:NNNN/dumb" (that is, a top-level > +directory called "http:", then nested directories "127.0.0.1:NNNN", and > +"dumb") exists within the repository, too. > + > +To determine this, it first picks the appropriate transport, which is > +dumb HTTP. It then uses the remote's URL in order to determine whether > +the repository exists locally on disk. However, the malicious repository > +also contains an embedded stub repository which is the target of a > +symbolic link at the local path corresponding to the "sub" repository on > +disk (i.e., there is a symbolic link at "http:/127.0.0.1/dumb/sub.git", > +pointing to the stub repository via ".git/modules/sub/../../../repo"). > + > +This stub repository fools Git into thinking that a local repository > +exists at that URL and thus can be cloned locally. The affected call is > +in `get_repo_path()`, which in turn calls `get_repo_path_1()`, which > +locates a valid repository at that target. > + > +This then causes Git to set the `is_local` variable to "1", and in turn > +instructs Git to clone the repository using its local clone optimization > +via the `clone_local()` function. > + > +The exploit comes into play because the stub repository's top-level > +"$GIT_DIR/objects" directory is a symbolic link which can point to an > +arbitrary path on the victim's machine. `clone_local()` resolves the > +top-level "objects" directory through a `stat(2)` call, meaning that we > +read through the symbolic link and copy or hardlink the directory > +contents at the destination of the link. > + > +In other words, we can get steps (1) and (3) to disagree by leveraging > +the dangling symlink to pick a non-local transport in the first step, > +and then set is_local to "1" in the third step when cloning with > +`--separate-git-dir`, which makes the symlink non-dangling. > + > +This can result in data-exfiltration on the victim's machine when > +sensitive data is at a known path (e.g., "/home/$USER/.ssh"). > + > +The appropriate fix is two-fold: > + > + - Resolve the transport later on (to avoid using the local > + clone optimization with a non-local transport). > + > + - Avoid reading through the top-level "objects" directory when > + (correctly) using the clone_local() optimization. > + > +This patch merely demonstrates the issue. The following two patches will > +implement each part of the above fix, respectively. > + > +[^1]: Provided that any target directory does not contain symbolic > + links, in which case the changes from 6f054f9 (builtin/clone.c: > + disallow `--local` clones with symlinks, 2022-07-28) will abort the > + clone. > + > +Reported-by: yvvdwf <yvv...@gmail.com> > +Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <m...@ttaylorr.com> > +Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gits...@pobox.com> > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > +[ > https://github.com/git/git/commit/58325b93c5b6212697b088371809e9948fee8052 > ] > +CVE: CVE-2023-22490 > +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com> > +--- > + t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > + 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+) > + create mode 100644 t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh > + > +diff --git a/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh > b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh > +new file mode 100644 > +index 0000000..7ebd31a > +--- /dev/null > ++++ b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh > +@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ > ++#!/bin/sh > ++ > ++test_description='test local clone with ambiguous transport' > ++ > ++. ./test-lib.sh > ++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-httpd.sh" > ++ > ++if ! test_have_prereq SYMLINKS > ++then > ++ skip_all='skipping test, symlink support unavailable' > ++ test_done > ++fi > ++ > ++start_httpd > ++ > ++REPO="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/sub.git" > ++URI="$HTTPD_URL/dumb/sub.git" > ++ > ++test_expect_success 'setup' ' > ++ mkdir -p sensitive && > ++ echo "secret" >sensitive/secret && > ++ > ++ git init --bare "$REPO" && > ++ test_commit_bulk -C "$REPO" --ref=main 1 && > ++ > ++ git -C "$REPO" update-ref HEAD main && > ++ git -C "$REPO" update-server-info && > ++ > ++ git init malicious && > ++ ( > ++ cd malicious && > ++ > ++ git submodule add "$URI" && > ++ > ++ mkdir -p repo/refs && > ++ touch repo/refs/.gitkeep && > ++ printf "ref: refs/heads/a" >repo/HEAD && > ++ ln -s "$(cd .. && pwd)/sensitive" repo/objects && > ++ > ++ mkdir -p "$HTTPD_URL/dumb" && > ++ ln -s "../../../.git/modules/sub/../../../repo/" "$URI" && > ++ > ++ git add . && > ++ git commit -m "initial commit" > ++ ) && > ++ > ++ # Delete all of the references in our malicious submodule to > ++ # avoid the client attempting to checkout any objects (which > ++ # will be missing, and thus will cause the clone to fail before > ++ # we can trigger the exploit). > ++ git -C "$REPO" for-each-ref --format="delete %(refname)" >in && > ++ git -C "$REPO" update-ref --stdin <in && > ++ git -C "$REPO" update-server-info > ++' > ++ > ++test_expect_failure 'ambiguous transport does not lead to arbitrary > file-inclusion' ' > ++ git clone malicious clone && > ++ git -C clone submodule update --init && > ++ > ++ test_path_is_missing clone/.git/modules/sub/objects/secret > ++' > ++ > ++test_done > +-- > +2.25.1 > + > diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch > b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..0b5b40f827 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-2.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ > +From cf8f6ce02a13f4d1979a53241afbee15a293fce9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Taylor Blau <m...@ttaylorr.com> > +Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 19:43:48 -0500 > +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] clone: delay picking a transport until after > get_repo_path() > + > +In the previous commit, t5619 demonstrates an issue where two calls to > +`get_repo_path()` could trick Git into using its local clone mechanism > +in conjunction with a non-local transport. > + > +That sequence is: > + > + - the starting state is that the local path https:/example.com/foo is a > + symlink that points to ../../../.git/modules/foo. So it's dangling. > + > + - get_repo_path() sees that no such path exists (because it's > + dangling), and thus we do not canonicalize it into an absolute path > + > + - because we're using --separate-git-dir, we create .git/modules/foo. > + Now our symlink is no longer dangling! > + > + - we pass the url to transport_get(), which sees it as an https URL. > + > + - we call get_repo_path() again, on the url. This second call was > + introduced by f38aa83 (use local cloning if insteadOf makes a > + local URL, 2014-07-17). The idea is that we want to pull the url > + fresh from the remote.c API, because it will apply any aliases. > + > +And of course now it sees that there is a local file, which is a > +mismatch with the transport we already selected. > + > +The issue in the above sequence is calling `transport_get()` before > +deciding whether or not the repository is indeed local, and not passing > +in an absolute path if it is local. > + > +This is reminiscent of a similar bug report in [1], where it was > +suggested to perform the `insteadOf` lookup earlier. Taking that > +approach may not be as straightforward, since the intent is to store the > +original URL in the config, but to actually fetch from the insteadOf > +one, so conflating the two early on is a non-starter. > + > +Note: we pass the path returned by `get_repo_path(remote->url[0])`, > +which should be the same as `repo_name` (aside from any `insteadOf` > +rewrites). > + > +We *could* pass `absolute_pathdup()` of the same argument, which > +86521ac (Bring local clone's origin URL in line with that of a remote > +clone, 2008-09-01) indicates may differ depending on the presence of > +".git/" for a non-bare repo. That matters for forming relative submodule > +paths, but doesn't matter for the second call, since we're just feeding > +it to the transport code, which is fine either way. > + > +[1]: > https://lore.kernel.org/git/CAMoD=bi41mb3qrn3jdzl-fghs4w3c2jgpnjb-cqsndo7fmt...@mail.gmail.com/ > + > +Signed-off-by: Jeff King <p...@peff.net> > +Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <m...@ttaylorr.com> > +Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gits...@pobox.com> > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > +[ > https://github.com/git/git/commit/cf8f6ce02a13f4d1979a53241afbee15a293fce9 > ] > +CVE: CVE-2023-22490 > +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com> > +--- > + builtin/clone.c | 8 ++++---- > + t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh | 15 +++++++++++---- > + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/builtin/clone.c b/builtin/clone.c > +index 53e04b1..b57e703 100644 > +--- a/builtin/clone.c > ++++ b/builtin/clone.c > +@@ -1112,10 +1112,6 @@ int cmd_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const > char *prefix) > + branch_top.buf); > + refspec_append(&remote->fetch, default_refspec.buf); > + > +- transport = transport_get(remote, remote->url[0]); > +- transport_set_verbosity(transport, option_verbosity, > option_progress); > +- transport->family = family; > +- > + path = get_repo_path(remote->url[0], &is_bundle); > + is_local = option_local != 0 && path && !is_bundle; > + if (is_local) { > +@@ -1135,6 +1131,10 @@ int cmd_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const > char *prefix) > + } > + if (option_local > 0 && !is_local) > + warning(_("--local is ignored")); > ++ > ++ transport = transport_get(remote, path ? path : remote->url[0]); > ++ transport_set_verbosity(transport, option_verbosity, > option_progress); > ++ transport->family = family; > + transport->cloning = 1; > + > + transport_set_option(transport, TRANS_OPT_KEEP, "yes"); > +diff --git a/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh > b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh > +index 7ebd31a..cce62bf 100644 > +--- a/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh > ++++ b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh > +@@ -53,11 +53,18 @@ test_expect_success 'setup' ' > + git -C "$REPO" update-server-info > + ' > + > +-test_expect_failure 'ambiguous transport does not lead to arbitrary > file-inclusion' ' > ++test_expect_success 'ambiguous transport does not lead to arbitrary > file-inclusion' ' > + git clone malicious clone && > +- git -C clone submodule update --init && > +- > +- test_path_is_missing clone/.git/modules/sub/objects/secret > ++ test_must_fail git -C clone submodule update --init 2>err && > ++ > ++ test_path_is_missing clone/.git/modules/sub/objects/secret && > ++ # We would actually expect "transport .file. not allowed" here, > ++ # but due to quirks of the URL detection in Git, we mis-parse > ++ # the absolute path as a bogus URL and die before that step. > ++ # > ++ # This works for now, and if we ever fix the URL detection, it > ++ # is OK to change this to detect the transport error. > ++ grep "protocol .* is not supported" err > + ' > + > + test_done > +-- > +2.25.1 > + > diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch > b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..08fb7f840b > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-22490-3.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ > +From bffc762f87ae8d18c6001bf0044a76004245754c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Taylor Blau <m...@ttaylorr.com> > +Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 19:43:51 -0500 > +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] dir-iterator: prevent top-level symlinks without > FOLLOW_SYMLINKS > + > +When using the dir_iterator API, we first stat(2) the base path, and > +then use that as a starting point to enumerate the directory's contents. > + > +If the directory contains symbolic links, we will immediately die() upon > +encountering them without the `FOLLOW_SYMLINKS` flag. The same is not > +true when resolving the top-level directory, though. > + > +As explained in a previous commit, this oversight in 6f054f9 > +(builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks, 2022-07-28) > +can be used as an attack vector to include arbitrary files on a victim's > +filesystem from outside of the repository. > + > +Prevent resolving top-level symlinks unless the FOLLOW_SYMLINKS flag is > +given, which will cause clones of a repository with a symlink'd > +"$GIT_DIR/objects" directory to fail. > + > +Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <m...@ttaylorr.com> > +Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gits...@pobox.com> > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > +[ > https://github.com/git/git/commit/bffc762f87ae8d18c6001bf0044a76004245754c > ] > +CVE: CVE-2023-22490 > +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com> > +--- > + dir-iterator.c | 13 +++++++++---- > + dir-iterator.h | 5 +++++ > + t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > + t/t5604-clone-reference.sh | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > + 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/dir-iterator.c b/dir-iterator.c > +index b17e9f9..3764dd8 100644 > +--- a/dir-iterator.c > ++++ b/dir-iterator.c > +@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ struct dir_iterator *dir_iterator_begin(const char > *path, unsigned int flags) > + { > + struct dir_iterator_int *iter = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*iter)); > + struct dir_iterator *dir_iterator = &iter->base; > +- int saved_errno; > ++ int saved_errno, err; > + > + strbuf_init(&iter->base.path, PATH_MAX); > + strbuf_addstr(&iter->base.path, path); > +@@ -213,10 +213,15 @@ struct dir_iterator *dir_iterator_begin(const char > *path, unsigned int flags) > + iter->flags = flags; > + > + /* > +- * Note: stat already checks for NULL or empty strings and > +- * inexistent paths. > ++ * Note: stat/lstat already checks for NULL or empty strings and > ++ * nonexistent paths. > + */ > +- if (stat(iter->base.path.buf, &iter->base.st) < 0) { > ++ if (iter->flags & DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS) > ++ err = stat(iter->base.path.buf, &iter->base.st); > ++ else > ++ err = lstat(iter->base.path.buf, &iter->base.st); > ++ > ++ if (err < 0) { > + saved_errno = errno; > + goto error_out; > + } > +diff --git a/dir-iterator.h b/dir-iterator.h > +index 0822915..e3b6ff2 100644 > +--- a/dir-iterator.h > ++++ b/dir-iterator.h > +@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ > + * not the symlinks themselves, which is the default behavior. Broken > + * symlinks are ignored. > + * > ++ * Note: setting DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS affects resolving the > ++ * starting path as well (e.g., attempting to iterate starting at a > ++ * symbolic link pointing to a directory without FOLLOW_SYMLINKS will > ++ * result in an error). > ++ * > + * Warning: circular symlinks are also followed when > + * DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS is set. The iteration may end up with > + * an ELOOP if they happen and DIR_ITERATOR_PEDANTIC is set. > +diff --git a/t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh b/t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh > +index 92910e4..c826f60 100755 > +--- a/t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh > ++++ b/t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh > +@@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'setup dirs with > symlinks' ' > + mkdir -p dir5/a/c && > + ln -s ../c dir5/a/b/d && > + ln -s ../ dir5/a/b/e && > +- ln -s ../../ dir5/a/b/f > ++ ln -s ../../ dir5/a/b/f && > ++ > ++ ln -s dir4 dir6 > + ' > + > + test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator should not follow symlinks by > default' ' > +@@ -145,4 +147,27 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator should > follow symlinks w/ follow flag > + test_cmp expected-follow-sorted-output actual-follow-sorted-output > + ' > + > ++test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator does not resolve top-level > symlinks' ' > ++ test_must_fail test-tool dir-iterator ./dir6 >out && > ++ > ++ grep "ENOTDIR" out > ++' > ++ > ++test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator resolves top-level symlinks > w/ follow flag' ' > ++ cat >expected-follow-sorted-output <<-EOF && > ++ [d] (a) [a] ./dir6/a > ++ [d] (a/f) [f] ./dir6/a/f > ++ [d] (a/f/c) [c] ./dir6/a/f/c > ++ [d] (b) [b] ./dir6/b > ++ [d] (b/c) [c] ./dir6/b/c > ++ [f] (a/d) [d] ./dir6/a/d > ++ [f] (a/e) [e] ./dir6/a/e > ++ EOF > ++ > ++ test-tool dir-iterator --follow-symlinks ./dir6 >out && > ++ sort out >actual-follow-sorted-output && > ++ > ++ test_cmp expected-follow-sorted-output actual-follow-sorted-output > ++' > ++ > + test_done > +diff --git a/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh b/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh > +index 4894237..615b981 100755 > +--- a/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh > ++++ b/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh > +@@ -354,4 +354,20 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with > symlinked or unknown files at obje > + test_must_be_empty T--shared.objects-symlinks.raw > + ' > + > ++test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with symlinked objects > directory' ' > ++ test_when_finished "rm -fr sensitive malicious" && > ++ > ++ mkdir -p sensitive && > ++ echo "secret" >sensitive/file && > ++ > ++ git init malicious && > ++ rm -fr malicious/.git/objects && > ++ ln -s "$(pwd)/sensitive" ./malicious/.git/objects && > ++ > ++ test_must_fail git clone --local malicious clone 2>err && > ++ > ++ test_path_is_missing clone && > ++ grep "failed to start iterator over" err > ++' > ++ > + test_done > +-- > +2.25.1 > + > diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch > b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..3629ff57b2 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2023-23946.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ > +From fade728df1221598f42d391cf377e9e84a32053f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Patrick Steinhardt <p...@pks.im> > +Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2023 11:54:34 +0100 > +Subject: [PATCH] apply: fix writing behind newly created symbolic links > + > +When writing files git-apply(1) initially makes sure that none of the > +files it is about to create are behind a symlink: > + > +``` > + $ git init repo > + Initialized empty Git repository in /tmp/repo/.git/ > + $ cd repo/ > + $ ln -s dir symlink > + $ git apply - <<EOF > + diff --git a/symlink/file b/symlink/file > + new file mode 100644 > + index 0000000..e69de29 > + EOF > + error: affected file 'symlink/file' is beyond a symbolic link > +``` > + > +This safety mechanism is crucial to ensure that we don't write outside > +of the repository's working directory. It can be fooled though when the > +patch that is being applied creates the symbolic link in the first > +place, which can lead to writing files in arbitrary locations. > + > +Fix this by checking whether the path we're about to create is > +beyond a symlink or not. Tightening these checks like this should be > +fine as we already have these precautions in Git as explained > +above. Ideally, we should update the check we do up-front before > +starting to reflect the computed changes to the working tree so that > +we catch this case as well, but as part of embargoed security work, > +adding an equivalent check just before we try to write out a file > +should serve us well as a reasonable first step. > + > +Digging back into history shows that this vulnerability has existed > +since at least Git v2.9.0. As Git v2.8.0 and older don't build on my > +system anymore I cannot tell whether older versions are affected, as > +well. > + > +Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneewe...@gitlab.com> > +Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <p...@pks.im> > +Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gits...@pobox.com> > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > +[ > https://github.com/git/git/commit/fade728df1221598f42d391cf377e9e84a32053f > ] > +CVE: CVE-2023-23946 > +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanus...@mvista.com> > +--- > + apply.c | 27 ++++++++++++++ > + t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > + 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+) > + > +diff --git a/apply.c b/apply.c > +index f8a046a..4f303bf 100644 > +--- a/apply.c > ++++ b/apply.c > +@@ -4373,6 +4373,33 @@ static int create_one_file(struct apply_state > *state, > + if (state->cached) > + return 0; > + > ++ /* > ++ * We already try to detect whether files are beyond a symlink in > our > ++ * up-front checks. But in the case where symlinks are created by > any > ++ * of the intermediate hunks it can happen that our up-front checks > ++ * didn't yet see the symlink, but at the point of arriving here > there > ++ * in fact is one. We thus repeat the check for symlinks here. > ++ * > ++ * Note that this does not make the up-front check obsolete as the > ++ * failure mode is different: > ++ * > ++ * - The up-front checks cause us to abort before we have written > ++ * anything into the working directory. So when we exit this way > the > ++ * working directory remains clean. > ++ * > ++ * - The checks here happen in the middle of the action where we > have > ++ * already started to apply the patch. The end result will be a > dirty > ++ * working directory. > ++ * > ++ * Ideally, we should update the up-front checks to catch what > would > ++ * happen when we apply the patch before we damage the working > tree. > ++ * We have all the information necessary to do so. But for now, > as a > ++ * part of embargoed security work, having this check would serve > as a > ++ * reasonable first step. > ++ */ > ++ if (path_is_beyond_symlink(state, path)) > ++ return error(_("affected file '%s' is beyond a symbolic > link"), path); > ++ > + res = try_create_file(state, path, mode, buf, size); > + if (res < 0) > + return -1; > +diff --git a/t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh b/t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh > +index 872fcda..1acb7b2 100755 > +--- a/t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh > ++++ b/t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh > +@@ -44,4 +44,85 @@ test_expect_success 'apply --index symlink patch' ' > + > + ' > + > ++test_expect_success 'symlink setup' ' > ++ ln -s .git symlink && > ++ git add symlink && > ++ git commit -m "add symlink" > ++' > ++ > ++test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape when creating new files' ' > ++ test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git clean -dfx" && > ++ > ++ cat >patch <<-EOF && > ++ diff --git a/symlink b/renamed-symlink > ++ similarity index 100% > ++ rename from symlink > ++ rename to renamed-symlink > ++ -- > ++ diff --git /dev/null b/renamed-symlink/create-me > ++ new file mode 100644 > ++ index 0000000..039727e > ++ --- /dev/null > ++ +++ b/renamed-symlink/create-me > ++ @@ -0,0 +1,1 @@ > ++ +busted > ++ EOF > ++ > ++ test_must_fail git apply patch 2>stderr && > ++ cat >expected_stderr <<-EOF && > ++ error: affected file ${SQ}renamed-symlink/create-me${SQ} is beyond > a symbolic link > ++ EOF > ++ test_cmp expected_stderr stderr && > ++ ! test_path_exists .git/create-me > ++' > ++ > ++test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape when modifying file' ' > ++ test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git clean -dfx" && > ++ touch .git/modify-me && > ++ > ++ cat >patch <<-EOF && > ++ diff --git a/symlink b/renamed-symlink > ++ similarity index 100% > ++ rename from symlink > ++ rename to renamed-symlink > ++ -- > ++ diff --git a/renamed-symlink/modify-me b/renamed-symlink/modify-me > ++ index 1111111..2222222 100644 > ++ --- a/renamed-symlink/modify-me > ++ +++ b/renamed-symlink/modify-me > ++ @@ -0,0 +1,1 @@ > ++ +busted > ++ EOF > ++ > ++ test_must_fail git apply patch 2>stderr && > ++ cat >expected_stderr <<-EOF && > ++ error: renamed-symlink/modify-me: No such file or directory > ++ EOF > ++ test_cmp expected_stderr stderr && > ++ test_must_be_empty .git/modify-me > ++' > ++ > ++test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape when deleting file' ' > ++ test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git clean -dfx && rm > .git/delete-me" && > ++ touch .git/delete-me && > ++ > ++ cat >patch <<-EOF && > ++ diff --git a/symlink b/renamed-symlink > ++ similarity index 100% > ++ rename from symlink > ++ rename to renamed-symlink > ++ -- > ++ diff --git a/renamed-symlink/delete-me b/renamed-symlink/delete-me > ++ deleted file mode 100644 > ++ index 1111111..0000000 100644 > ++ EOF > ++ > ++ test_must_fail git apply patch 2>stderr && > ++ cat >expected_stderr <<-EOF && > ++ error: renamed-symlink/delete-me: No such file or directory > ++ EOF > ++ test_cmp expected_stderr stderr && > ++ test_path_is_file .git/delete-me > ++' > ++ > + test_done > +-- > +2.25.1 > + > diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc > b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc > index 3c4c0fd37b..5eca2e21bf 100644 > --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc > +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc > @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ SRC_URI = > "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/software/scm/git/git-${PV}.tar.gz;name=tarball \ > file://CVE-2022-41903-10.patch \ > file://CVE-2022-41903-11.patch \ > file://CVE-2022-41903-12.patch \ > + file://CVE-2023-22490-1.patch \ > + file://CVE-2023-22490-2.patch \ > + file://CVE-2023-22490-3.patch \ > + file://CVE-2023-23946.patch \ > " > S = "${WORKDIR}/git-${PV}" > > -- > 2.25.1 > >
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#179257): https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/179257 Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/97727285/21656 Group Owner: openembedded-core+ow...@lists.openembedded.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/unsub [arch...@mail-archive.com] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
