Sure, Tim.

I think there is no need to send the patch again to upgrade apr-util to 1.6.3 
since, Steve Sakoman has already sent review request for some set of patches 
for kirkstone and these also include the patch for apr-util: update 1.6.1 -> 
1.6.3 version. These patches are currently available at “stable/kirkstone-nut” 
branch.

http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/commit/?h=stable/kirkstone-nut&id=e24b38a14b3520648ec418783fb74fcf61df7ff2

Please let me know if my above understanding is correct or not.

Best Regards,
Narpat


From: Tim Orling<mailto:ticot...@gmail.com>
Sent: 22 February 2023 07:37
To: Mali, Narpat<mailto:narpat.m...@windriver.com>
Cc: Polampalli, Archana<mailto:archana.polampa...@windriver.com>; G Pillai, 
Hari<mailto:hari.gpil...@windriver.com>; 
openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org<mailto:openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org>
Subject: Re: [OE-core][kirkstone][PATCH 1/1] apr-util: fix for CVE-2022-25147

CAUTION: This email comes from a non Wind River email account!
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On Tue, Feb 21, 2023 at 5:20 AM Narpat Mali 
<narpat.m...@windriver.com<mailto:narpat.m...@windriver.com>> wrote:
Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in apr_base64 functions
of Apache Portable Runtime Utility (APR-util) allows an attacker to
write beyond bounds of a buffer. This issue affects Apache Portable
Runtime Utility (APR-util) 1.6.1 and prior versions.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25147<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25147__;!!AjveYdw8EvQ!esmjxUfJK-k9hsO2YirQJFIQnxsXzCV4RtEx_M__yeayUk40QbNFQWJtPzT-sS5xElVB-xSOU2N6XH58ssc0$>

It might make more sense to upgrade to 1.6.3, as it appears to include some 
additional fixes and no new features.

https://downloads.apache.org/apr/CHANGES-APR-UTIL-1.6<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/downloads.apache.org/apr/CHANGES-APR-UTIL-1.6__;!!AjveYdw8EvQ!esmjxUfJK-k9hsO2YirQJFIQnxsXzCV4RtEx_M__yeayUk40QbNFQWJtPzT-sS5xElVB-xSOU2N6XNKeh7pM$>


Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali 
<narpat.m...@windriver.com<mailto:narpat.m...@windriver.com>>
---
 .../apr/apr-util/CVE-2022-25147.patch         | 180 ++++++++++++++++++
 
meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.1.bb<https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/apr-util_1.6.1.bb__;!!AjveYdw8EvQ!esmjxUfJK-k9hsO2YirQJFIQnxsXzCV4RtEx_M__yeayUk40QbNFQWJtPzT-sS5xElVB-xSOU2N6XIvEEi5T$>
    |   3 +-
 2 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2022-25147.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2022-25147.patch 
b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2022-25147.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e85785aca0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2022-25147.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+From 3f5257075c7eb601aed6333e9bb5d9eb0e11254b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yann Ylavic <yla...@apache.org<mailto:yla...@apache.org>>
+Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 09:38:34 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] apr_base64: Make sure encoding/decoding lengths fit in an int
+ >= 0.
+
+The (old) API of apr_base64 functions has always used int for representing
+lengths and it does not return errors. Make sure to abort() if the provided
+data don't fit.
+
+* encoding/apr_base64.c():
+  #define APR_BASE64_ENCODE_MAX and APR_BASE64_DECODE_MAX as the hard length
+  limits for encoding and decoding respectively.
+
+* encoding/apr_base64.c(apr_base64_encode_len, apr_base64_encode,
+                        apr_base64_encode_binary, apr_pbase64_encode):
+  abort() if the given length is above APR_BASE64_ENCODE_MAX.
+
+* encoding/apr_base64.c(apr_base64_decode_len, apr_base64_decode,
+                        apr_base64_decode_binary, apr_pbase64_decode):
+  abort() if the given plain buffer length is above APR_BASE64_DECODE_MAX.
+
+
+apr_base64: Follow up to r1902206: Cap to APR_BASE64_ENCODE_MAX in 
apr_pbase64_encode().
+
+
+Merges r1902206[, r1904666] from trunk.
+Merges r1904727 from 1.7.x.
+
+
+git-svn-id: 
https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1904728<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1904728__;!!AjveYdw8EvQ!esmjxUfJK-k9hsO2YirQJFIQnxsXzCV4RtEx_M__yeayUk40QbNFQWJtPzT-sS5xElVB-xSOU2N6XIcUV_A5$>
 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-25147
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport 
[https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/3f5257075c7eb601aed6333e9bb5d9eb0e11254b<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/3f5257075c7eb601aed6333e9bb5d9eb0e11254b__;!!AjveYdw8EvQ!esmjxUfJK-k9hsO2YirQJFIQnxsXzCV4RtEx_M__yeayUk40QbNFQWJtPzT-sS5xElVB-xSOU2N6XFWd2o7a$>]
+
+Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali 
<narpat.m...@windriver.com<mailto:narpat.m...@windriver.com>>
+---
+ encoding/apr_base64.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/encoding/apr_base64.c b/encoding/apr_base64.c
+index e9b75e3d..ac9f2816 100644
+--- a/encoding/apr_base64.c
++++ b/encoding/apr_base64.c
+@@ -20,11 +20,20 @@
+  * ugly 'len' functions, which is quite a nasty cost.
+  */
+
++#undef NDEBUG /* always abort() on assert()ion failure */
++#include <assert.h>
++
+ #include "apr_base64.h"
+ #if APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ #include "apr_xlate.h"
+ #endif                                /* APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+
++/* Above APR_BASE64_ENCODE_MAX length the encoding can't fit in an int >= 0 */
++#define APR_BASE64_ENCODE_MAX 1610612733
++
++/* Above APR_BASE64_DECODE_MAX length the decoding can't fit in an int >= 0 */
++#define APR_BASE64_DECODE_MAX 2863311524u
++
+ /* aaaack but it's fast and const should make it shared text page. */
+ static const unsigned char pr2six[256] =
+ {
+@@ -109,24 +118,22 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) 
apr_base64init_ebcdic(apr_xlate_t *to_ascii,
+
+ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_decode_len(const char *bufcoded)
+ {
+-    int nbytesdecoded;
+     register const unsigned char *bufin;
+     register apr_size_t nprbytes;
+
+     bufin = (const unsigned char *) bufcoded;
+     while (pr2six[*(bufin++)] <= 63);
+-
+     nprbytes = (bufin - (const unsigned char *) bufcoded) - 1;
+-    nbytesdecoded = (((int)nprbytes + 3) / 4) * 3;
++    assert(nprbytes <= APR_BASE64_DECODE_MAX);
+
+-    return nbytesdecoded + 1;
++    return (int)(((nprbytes + 3u) / 4u) * 3u + 1u);
+ }
+
+ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_decode(char *bufplain, const char *bufcoded)
+ {
+ #if APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC
+     apr_size_t inbytes_left, outbytes_left;
+-#endif                                /* APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC */
++#endif /* APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+     int len;
+
+     len = apr_base64_decode_binary((unsigned char *) bufplain, bufcoded);
+@@ -143,7 +150,7 @@ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_decode(char *bufplain, const 
char *bufcoded)
+  * the conversion of the output to ebcdic is left out.
+  */
+ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_decode_binary(unsigned char *bufplain,
+-                                 const char *bufcoded)
++                                          const char *bufcoded)
+ {
+     int nbytesdecoded;
+     register const unsigned char *bufin;
+@@ -153,12 +160,13 @@ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_decode_binary(unsigned char 
*bufplain,
+     bufin = (const unsigned char *) bufcoded;
+     while (pr2six[*(bufin++)] <= 63);
+     nprbytes = (bufin - (const unsigned char *) bufcoded) - 1;
+-    nbytesdecoded = (((int)nprbytes + 3) / 4) * 3;
++    assert(nprbytes <= APR_BASE64_DECODE_MAX);
++    nbytesdecoded = (int)(((nprbytes + 3u) / 4u) * 3u);
+
+     bufout = (unsigned char *) bufplain;
+     bufin = (const unsigned char *) bufcoded;
+
+-    while (nprbytes > 4) {
++    while (nprbytes >= 4) {
+       *(bufout++) =
+           (unsigned char) (pr2six[*bufin] << 2 | pr2six[bufin[1]] >> 4);
+       *(bufout++) =
+@@ -178,13 +186,8 @@ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_decode_binary(unsigned char 
*bufplain,
+       *(bufout++) =
+           (unsigned char) (pr2six[bufin[1]] << 4 | pr2six[bufin[2]] >> 2);
+     }
+-    if (nprbytes > 3) {
+-      *(bufout++) =
+-          (unsigned char) (pr2six[bufin[2]] << 6 | pr2six[bufin[3]]);
+-    }
+
+-    nbytesdecoded -= (4 - (int)nprbytes) & 3;
+-    return nbytesdecoded;
++    return nbytesdecoded - (int)((4u - nprbytes) & 3u);
+ }
+
+ static const char basis_64[] =
+@@ -192,6 +195,8 @@ static const char basis_64[] =
+
+ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_encode_len(int len)
+ {
++    assert(len >= 0 && len <= APR_BASE64_ENCODE_MAX);
++
+     return ((len + 2) / 3 * 4) + 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -203,6 +208,8 @@ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_encode(char *encoded, const 
char *string, int len)
+     int i;
+     char *p;
+
++    assert(len >= 0 && len <= APR_BASE64_ENCODE_MAX);
++
+     p = encoded;
+     for (i = 0; i < len - 2; i += 3) {
+       *p++ = basis_64[(os_toascii[string[i]] >> 2) & 0x3F];
+@@ -227,7 +234,7 @@ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_encode(char *encoded, const 
char *string, int len)
+     }
+
+     *p++ = '\0';
+-    return p - encoded;
++    return (unsigned int)(p - encoded);
+ #endif                                /* APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC */
+ }
+
+@@ -240,6 +247,8 @@ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_encode_binary(char *encoded,
+     int i;
+     char *p;
+
++    assert(len >= 0 && len <= APR_BASE64_ENCODE_MAX);
++
+     p = encoded;
+     for (i = 0; i < len - 2; i += 3) {
+       *p++ = basis_64[(string[i] >> 2) & 0x3F];
+@@ -264,5 +273,5 @@ APU_DECLARE(int) apr_base64_encode_binary(char *encoded,
+     }
+
+     *p++ = '\0';
+-    return (int)(p - encoded);
++    return (unsigned int)(p - encoded);
+ }
+--
+2.32.0
+
diff --git 
a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.1.bb<https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/apr-util_1.6.1.bb__;!!AjveYdw8EvQ!esmjxUfJK-k9hsO2YirQJFIQnxsXzCV4RtEx_M__yeayUk40QbNFQWJtPzT-sS5xElVB-xSOU2N6XIvEEi5T$>
 
b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.1.bb<https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/apr-util_1.6.1.bb__;!!AjveYdw8EvQ!esmjxUfJK-k9hsO2YirQJFIQnxsXzCV4RtEx_M__yeayUk40QbNFQWJtPzT-sS5xElVB-xSOU2N6XIvEEi5T$>
index b851d46351..f5a2888016 100644
--- 
a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.1.bb<https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/apr-util_1.6.1.bb__;!!AjveYdw8EvQ!esmjxUfJK-k9hsO2YirQJFIQnxsXzCV4RtEx_M__yeayUk40QbNFQWJtPzT-sS5xElVB-xSOU2N6XIvEEi5T$>
+++ 
b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.1.bb<https://urldefense.com/v3/__http:/apr-util_1.6.1.bb__;!!AjveYdw8EvQ!esmjxUfJK-k9hsO2YirQJFIQnxsXzCV4RtEx_M__yeayUk40QbNFQWJtPzT-sS5xElVB-xSOU2N6XIvEEi5T$>
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://configure_fixes.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://0001-Fix-error-handling-in-gdbm.patch \
-"
+           file://CVE-2022-25147.patch \
+          "

 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "bd502b9a8670a8012c4d90c31a84955f"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = 
"b65e40713da57d004123b6319828be7f1273fbc6490e145874ee1177e112c459"
--
2.34.1




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