On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 9:39 PM Martin Jansa <martin.ja...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 8:18 AM Martin Jansa via lists.openembedded.org 
> <Martin.Jansa=gmail....@lists.openembedded.org> wrote:
>>
>> I haven't checked yet in dunfell, but in kirkstone this commit merged last 
>> week breaks nativesdk-qemu builds.
>
>
> I can confirm it fails the same with this commit from Hitendra in dunfell:
>
> nativesdk-qemu/4.2.0-r0/qemu-4.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c:1508:67: error: 'size' 
> undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'gsize'?
> |  1508 |         if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, 
> size)) {
> |       |                                                                   
> ^~~~
> |       |                                                                   
> gsize
>
> as well as the same backport from Bhabu in kirkstone (already merged):
> https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit/?h=kirkstone&id=4cb3874abf4fdeb04337a48a14c765ba9b2269d4
>
> To reproduce this just enable "spice" PACKAGECONFIG in nativesdk-qemu.
>
> Hitendra, Bhabu: please have a look.

Yes, please do!  Unless I get a fix for the spice regression sometime
soon I will revert the patch in kirkstone and of course won't take the
dunfell version.

Steve

>> This chunk:
>> +@@ -1486,7 +1505,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL 
>> pqxl, int group_id)
>> +         offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff;
>> +         return (void *)(intptr_t)offset;
>> +     case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST:
>> +-        if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) {
>> ++        if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) {
>> +             return NULL;
>> +         }
>> +         ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr);
>>
>> Uses size parameter which was added in previous commit (which wasn't 
>> backported):
>> https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/8efec0ef8bbc1e75a7ebf6e325a35806ece9b39f
>>
>> So either both commits need to be backported or this one reworked not to use 
>> undeclared size as it leads to:
>>
>> | ../qemu-6.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c: In function 'qxl_phys2virt':
>> | ../qemu-6.2.0/hw/display/qxl.c:1477:67: error: 'size' undeclared (first 
>> use in this function); did you mean 'gsize'?
>> |  1477 |         if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, 
>> size)) {
>> |       |                                                                   
>> ^~~~
>> |       |                                                                   
>> gsize
>>
>> I'm surprised this wasn't caught on autobuilder already, maybe it's 
>> triggered only with extra PACKAGECONFIG options we have enabled:
>> PACKAGECONFIG:append:class-nativesdk = " virglrenderer epoxy spice libusb 
>> usb-redir"
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 3:42 PM Steve Sakoman <st...@sakoman.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajap...@mvista.com>
>>>
>>> Upstream-Status: Backport from 
>>> https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajap...@mvista.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <st...@sakoman.com>
>>> ---
>>>  meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc           |   1 +
>>>  .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch             | 103 ++++++++++++++++++
>>>  2 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
>>>  create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch
>>>
>>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc 
>>> b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
>>> index fff2c87780..898fa1a8d8 100644
>>> --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
>>> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
>>> @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ SRC_URI = 
>>> "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
>>>            file://CVE-2021-3638.patch \
>>>            file://CVE-2021-20196.patch \
>>>            file://CVE-2021-3507.patch \
>>> +          file://CVE-2022-4144.patch \
>>>             "
>>>  UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
>>>
>>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch 
>>> b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000000..3f0d5fbd5c
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
>>> +From 6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <phi...@linaro.org>
>>> +Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 21:27:40 +0100
>>> +Subject: [PATCH] hw/display/qxl: Avoid buffer overrun in qxl_phys2virt
>>> + (CVE-2022-4144)
>>> +MIME-Version: 1.0
>>> +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>>> +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
>>> +
>>> +Have qxl_get_check_slot_offset() return false if the requested
>>> +buffer size does not fit within the slot memory region.
>>> +
>>> +Similarly qxl_phys2virt() now returns NULL in such case, and
>>> +qxl_dirty_one_surface() aborts.
>>> +
>>> +This avoids buffer overrun in the host pointer returned by
>>> +memory_region_get_ram_ptr().
>>> +
>>> +Fixes: CVE-2022-4144 (out-of-bounds read)
>>> +Reported-by: Wenxu Yin (@awxylitol)
>>> +Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1336
>>> +
>>> +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <phi...@linaro.org>
>>> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefa...@redhat.com>
>>> +Message-Id: <20221128202741.4945-5-phi...@linaro.org>
>>> +
>>> +Upstream-Status: Backport 
>>> [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622]
>>> +CVE: CVE-2022-4144
>>> +Comments: Deleted patch hunk in qxl.h,as it contains change
>>> +in comments which is not present in current version of qemu.
>>> +
>>> +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajap...@mvista.com>
>>> +---
>>> + hw/display/qxl.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>> + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>> +
>>> +diff --git a/hw/display/qxl.c b/hw/display/qxl.c
>>> +index cd7eb39d..6bc8385b 100644
>>> +--- a/hw/display/qxl.c
>>> ++++ b/hw/display/qxl.c
>>> +@@ -1440,11 +1440,13 @@ static void qxl_reset_surfaces(PCIQXLDevice *d)
>>> +
>>> + /* can be also called from spice server thread context */
>>> + static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl,
>>> +-                                      uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o)
>>> ++                                      uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o,
>>> ++                                      size_t size_requested)
>>> + {
>>> +     uint64_t phys   = le64_to_cpu(pqxl);
>>> +     uint32_t slot   = (phys >> (64 -  8)) & 0xff;
>>> +     uint64_t offset = phys & 0xffffffffffff;
>>> ++    uint64_t size_available;
>>> +
>>> +     if (slot >= NUM_MEMSLOTS) {
>>> +         qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, "slot too large %d >= %d", slot,
>>> +@@ -1468,6 +1470,23 @@ static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice 
>>> *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl,
>>> +                           slot, offset, qxl->guest_slots[slot].size);
>>> +         return false;
>>> +     }
>>> ++    size_available = memory_region_size(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr);
>>> ++    if (qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset >= size_available) {
>>> ++        qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl,
>>> ++                          "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" > region size 
>>> %"PRIu64"\n",
>>> ++                          slot, qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset,
>>> ++                          size_available);
>>> ++        return false;
>>> ++    }
>>> ++    size_available -= qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset;
>>> ++    if (size_requested > size_available) {
>>> ++        qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl,
>>> ++                          "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" size %zu: "
>>> ++                          "overrun by %"PRIu64" bytes\n",
>>> ++                          slot, offset, size_requested,
>>> ++                          size_requested - size_available);
>>> ++        return false;
>>> ++    }
>>> +
>>> +     *s = slot;
>>> +     *o = offset;
>>> +@@ -1486,7 +1505,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL 
>>> pqxl, int group_id)
>>> +         offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff;
>>> +         return (void *)(intptr_t)offset;
>>> +     case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST:
>>> +-        if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) {
>>> ++        if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) {
>>> +             return NULL;
>>> +         }
>>> +         ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr);
>>> +@@ -1944,9 +1963,9 @@ static void qxl_dirty_one_surface(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, 
>>> QXLPHYSICAL pqxl,
>>> +     uint32_t slot;
>>> +     bool rc;
>>> +
>>> +-    rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset);
>>> +-    assert(rc == true);
>>> +     size = (uint64_t)height * abs(stride);
>>> ++    rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size);
>>> ++    assert(rc == true);
>>> +     trace_qxl_surfaces_dirty(qxl->id, offset, size);
>>> +     qxl_set_dirty(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr,
>>> +                   qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset,
>>> +--
>>> +2.25.1
>>> +
>>> --
>>> 2.25.1
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> 
>
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