Thanks for the information. Okay, will modify the patch accordingly. -Thanks, Vivek
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 11:17 PM Steve Sakoman <st...@sakoman.com> wrote: > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 1:55 AM vkumbhar <vkumb...@mvista.com> wrote: > > > > From: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumb...@mvista.com> > > > > Fixed Below CVE: > > CVE-2022-4283 > > CVE-2022-46340 > > CVE-2022-46341 > > CVE-2022-46342 > > CVE-2022-46343 > > CVE-2022-46344 > > > > Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumb...@mvista.com> > > --- > > .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-4283.patch | 39 +++++++++ > > .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46340.patch | 55 ++++++++++++ > > .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46341.patch | 86 +++++++++++++++++++ > > .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46342.patch | 78 +++++++++++++++++ > > .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46343.patch | 51 +++++++++++ > > .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46344.patch | 75 ++++++++++++++++ > > .../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.4.bb | 6 ++ > > We've done a version bump to 21.1.6 in kirkstone, so you'll need to > rework this patch (if it is still necessary) > > Thanks! > > Steve > > > 7 files changed, 390 insertions(+) > > create mode 100644 > meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-4283.patch > > create mode 100644 > meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46340.patch > > create mode 100644 > meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46341.patch > > create mode 100644 > meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46342.patch > > create mode 100644 > meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46343.patch > > create mode 100644 > meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46344.patch > > > > diff --git > a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-4283.patch > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-4283.patch > > new file mode 100644 > > index 0000000000..ce642843ab > > --- /dev/null > > +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-4283.patch > > @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ > > +From ccdd431cd8f1cabae9d744f0514b6533c438908c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000 > > +Subject: [PATCH] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after > freeing it > > + > > +Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not > > +reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access > > +already freed memory. > > + > > +CVE-2022-4283, ZDI-CAN-19530 > > + > > +This vulnerability was discovered by: > > +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative > > + > > +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofour...@redhat.com> > > + > > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/ccdd431cd8f1cabae9d744f0514b6533c438908c > ] > > +CVE: CVE-2022-4283 > > +Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumb...@mvista.com> > > +--- > > + xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 + > > + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) > > + > > +diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c > > +index dd089c204..3f5791a18 100644 > > +--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c > > ++++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c > > +@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst) > > + } > > + else { > > + free(dst->names->radio_groups); > > ++ dst->names->radio_groups = NULL; > > + } > > + dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg; > > + > > +-- > > +2.30.2 > > + > > diff --git > a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46340.patch > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46340.patch > > new file mode 100644 > > index 0000000000..9bdcdfa76e > > --- /dev/null > > +++ > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46340.patch > > @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ > > +From b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000 > > +Subject: [PATCH] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput > > + > > +XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are > > +sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments. > > +However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes, > > +so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be > > +misparsed. > > + > > +Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct > > +xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes, > > +swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast. > > + > > +Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent. > > +Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest > > +doesn't support GenericEvent. > > + > > +CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265 > > + > > +This vulnerability was discovered by: > > +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative > > + > > +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofour...@redhat.com> > > + > > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 > ] > > +CVE: CVE-2022-46340 > > +Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumb...@mvista.com> > > +--- > > + Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++-- > > + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > + > > +diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c > > +index bf27eb590..2985a4ce6 100644 > > +--- a/Xext/xtest.c > > ++++ b/Xext/xtest.c > > +@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req) > > + > > + nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent); > > + for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) { > > ++ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177; > > + /* Swap event */ > > +- proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177]; > > ++ proc = EventSwapVector[evtype]; > > + /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */ > > +- if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) { > > ++ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) > { > > + client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type; > > + return BadValue; > > + } > > +-- > > +2.30.2 > > + > > diff --git > a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46341.patch > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46341.patch > > new file mode 100644 > > index 0000000000..669792a5e7 > > --- /dev/null > > +++ > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46341.patch > > @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ > > +From 51eb63b0ee1509c6c6b8922b0e4aa037faa6f78b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000 > > +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255 > > + > > +The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above > > +255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche > > +to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero > > +anyway. > > + > > +This fixes an OOB write: > > + > > +ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a > > +temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = > stuff->detail. > > +For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the > > +stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit > > +representing stuff->detail cleared. > > + > > +However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits, > > +thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write. > > + > > +CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381 > > + > > +This vulnerability was discovered by: > > +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative > > + > > +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofour...@redhat.com> > > + > > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/51eb63b0ee1509c6c6b8922b0e4aa037faa6f78b > ] > > +CVE: CVE-2022-46341 > > +Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumb...@mvista.com> > > +--- > > + Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- > > + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > + > > +diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c > > +index 2769fb7c9..c9ac2f855 100644 > > +--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c > > ++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c > > +@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) > > + return BadValue; > > + } > > + > > ++ /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never > > ++ * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that > > ++ * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */ > > ++ if (stuff->detail > 255) > > ++ return XIAlreadyGrabbed; > > ++ > > + if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1], > > + stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success) > > + return BadValue; > > +@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) > > + ¶m, XI2, &mask); > > + break; > > + case XIGrabtypeKeycode: > > +- /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can > never > > +- * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes > that > > +- * cannot work anyway */ > > +- if (stuff->detail > 255) > > +- status = XIAlreadyGrabbed; > > +- else > > +- status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, > > +- ¶m, XI2, &mask); > > ++ status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail, > > ++ ¶m, XI2, &mask); > > + break; > > + case XIGrabtypeEnter: > > + case XIGrabtypeFocusIn: > > +@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) > > + return BadValue; > > + } > > + > > ++ /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */ > > ++ if (stuff->detail > 255) { > > ++ client->errorValue = stuff->detail; > > ++ return BadValue; > > ++ } > > ++ > > + rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, > DixSetAttrAccess); > > + if (rc != Success) > > + return rc; > > +-- > > +2.30.2 > > + > > diff --git > a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46342.patch > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46342.patch > > new file mode 100644 > > index 0000000000..6c17b105a0 > > --- /dev/null > > +++ > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46342.patch > > @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ > > +From b79f32b57cc0c1186b2899bce7cf89f7b325161b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000 > > +Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off from > the same > > + client > > + > > +This fixes a use-after-free bug: > > + > > +When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a > > +TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct > > +is added twice to the resources: > > + - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per > > + drawable, subsequent calls append to this list. > > + - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client. > > + > > +The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a > > +client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can > remove > > +all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting > > +the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove > > +and free the whole list. > > + > > +However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the > > +same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the > > +existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the > > +client's resources. > > + > > +If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes > > +XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable > > +- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource > > +for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL. > > + > > +Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes > > +XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On > > +a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon. > > + > > +Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely > > +setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client > > +resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed > > +again when the client quits. > > + > > +Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the > > +XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for > > +clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify. > > + > > +CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400 > > + > > +This vulnerability was discovered by: > > +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative > > + > > +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofour...@redhat.com> > > + > > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/b79f32b57cc0c1186b2899bce7cf89f7b325161b > ] > > +CVE: CVE-2022-46342 > > +Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumb...@mvista.com> > > +--- > > + Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++- > > + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > + > > +diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c > > +index f62747193..2a08f8744 100644 > > +--- a/Xext/xvmain.c > > ++++ b/Xext/xvmain.c > > +@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, > DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff) > > + tpn = pn; > > + while (tpn) { > > + if (tpn->client == client) { > > +- if (!onoff) > > ++ if (!onoff) { > > + tpn->client = NULL; > > ++ FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify); > > ++ } > > + return Success; > > + } > > + if (!tpn->client) > > +-- > > +2.30.2 > > + > > diff --git > a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46343.patch > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46343.patch > > new file mode 100644 > > index 0000000000..11507c3247 > > --- /dev/null > > +++ > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46343.patch > > @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ > > +From 842ca3ccef100ce010d1d8f5f6d6cc1915055900 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000 > > +Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the screen saver resource when replacing it > > + > > +This fixes a use-after-free bug: > > + > > +When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct > > +ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's > > +resources. > > + > > +When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new > > +struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The > > +old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources. > > + > > +Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes > > +ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct. > > + > > +Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead. > > + > > +CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404 > > + > > +This vulnerability was discovered by: > > +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative > > + > > +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofour...@redhat.com> > > + > > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/842ca3ccef100ce010d1d8f5f6d6cc1915055900 > ] > > +CVE: CVE-2022-46343 > > +Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumb...@mvista.com> > > +--- > > + Xext/saver.c | 2 +- > > + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > + > > +diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c > > +index f813ba08d..fd6153c31 100644 > > +--- a/Xext/saver.c > > ++++ b/Xext/saver.c > > +@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client) > > + pVlist++; > > + } > > + if (pPriv->attr) > > +- FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr); > > ++ FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType); > > + pPriv->attr = pAttr; > > + pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index); > > + if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr)) > > +-- > > +2.30.2 > > + > > diff --git > a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46344.patch > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46344.patch > > new file mode 100644 > > index 0000000000..92f65569ef > > --- /dev/null > > +++ > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2022-46344.patch > > @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ > > +From 8f454b793e1f13c99872c15f0eed1d7f3b823fe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > +From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000 > > +Subject: [PATCH] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of > > + ProcXIChangeProperty > > + > > +This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. > > + > > +Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With > > +the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was > > +truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. > > + > > +The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes > > +(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it > > +finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least > > +stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB. > > + > > +The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty, > > +so let's fix that too. > > + > > +CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405 > > + > > +This vulnerability was discovered by: > > +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative > > + > > +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutte...@who-t.net> > > +Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofour...@redhat.com> > > + > > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/8f454b793e1f13c99872c15f0eed1d7f3b823fe8 > ] > > +CVE: CVE-2022-46344 > > +Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumb...@mvista.com> > > +--- > > + Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- > > + dix/property.c | 3 ++- > > + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > + > > +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c > > +index 68c362c62..066ba21fb 100644 > > +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c > > ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c > > +@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client) > > + REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); > > + DeviceIntPtr dev; > > + unsigned long len; > > +- int totalSize; > > ++ uint64_t totalSize; > > + int rc; > > + > > + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq); > > +@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) > > + { > > + int rc; > > + DeviceIntPtr dev; > > +- int totalSize; > > ++ uint64_t totalSize; > > + unsigned long len; > > + > > + REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq); > > +diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c > > +index 94ef5a0ec..acce94b2c 100644 > > +--- a/dix/property.c > > ++++ b/dix/property.c > > +@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client) > > + WindowPtr pWin; > > + char format, mode; > > + unsigned long len; > > +- int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err; > > ++ int sizeInBytes, err; > > ++ uint64_t totalSize; > > + > > + REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq); > > + > > +-- > > +2.30.2 > > + > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.4.bb > b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.4.bb > > index aba09afec3..744bd3e2aa 100644 > > --- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.4.bb > > +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.4.bb > > @@ -4,6 +4,12 @@ SRC_URI += > "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.pat > > file://0001-Avoid-duplicate-definitions-of-IOPortBase.patch \ > > > file://0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch \ > > > file://0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch \ > > + file://CVE-2022-4283.patch \ > > + file://CVE-2022-46340.patch \ > > + file://CVE-2022-46341.patch \ > > + file://CVE-2022-46342.patch \ > > + file://CVE-2022-46343.patch \ > > + file://CVE-2022-46344.patch \ > > " > > SRC_URI[sha256sum] = > "5cc4be8ee47edb58d4a90e603a59d56b40291ad38371b0bd2471fc3cbee1c587" > > > > -- > > 2.30.2 > > > > > > > > >
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