Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex.kana...@gmail.com>
---
.../openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch | 108 ------------------
.../openssl/0003-fix-CVE-2018-0735.patch | 50 --------
.../{openssl_1.1.1.bb => openssl_1.1.1a.bb} | 6 +-
3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch
delete mode 100644
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0003-fix-CVE-2018-0735.patch
rename meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_1.1.1.bb =>
openssl_1.1.1a.bb} (96%)
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a3e03fe2af..00000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-Backport patch to fix CVE-2018-0734. Remove a section which only remove a
-space. It can't be applied because the context is different.
-
-CVE: CVE-2018-0734
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.k...@windriver.com>
-
-From 8abfe72e8c1de1b95f50aa0d9134803b4d00070f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Pauli <paul.d...@oracle.com>
-Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 07:42:46 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
- (CVE-2018-0734).
-
-Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that
-triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs
-prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack.
-
-Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this.
-
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlin...@hotmail.de>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
-
-(cherry picked from commit a9cfb8c2aa7254a4aa6a1716909e3f8cb78049b6)
----
- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------------
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-index ca20811200..2dd2d7489a 100644
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
-
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/sha.h>
- #include "dsa_locl.h"
-@@ -180,9 +181,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- {
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
-- BIGNUM *l, *m;
-+ BIGNUM *l;
- int ret = 0;
-- int q_bits;
-+ int q_bits, q_words;
-
- if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-@@ -191,8 +192,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-
- k = BN_new();
- l = BN_new();
-- m = BN_new();
-- if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL)
-+ if (k == NULL || l == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (ctx_in == NULL) {
-@@ -203,9 +203,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
-
- /* Preallocate space */
- q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
-- if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits)
-- || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits)
-- || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits))
-+ q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q);
-+ if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2)
-+ || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2))
- goto err;
-
- /* Get random k */
-@@ -240,14 +240,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is
- * one bit longer than the modulus.
- *
-- * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
-- * conditional copy.
-+ * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More
-+ * specificly refer to the discussion starting with:
-+ * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705
-+ * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required.
- */
- if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q)
-- || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q)
-- || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m))
-+ || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q))
- goto err;
-
-+ BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2);
-+
- if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
- if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
- dsa->method_mont_p))
-@@ -275,7 +278,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(k);
- BN_clear_free(l);
-- BN_clear_free(m);
- return ret;
- }
-
---
-2.17.0
-
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0003-fix-CVE-2018-0735.patch
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0003-fix-CVE-2018-0735.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 736323f0ce6..00000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/0003-fix-CVE-2018-0735.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-CVE: CVE-2018-0735
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.k...@windriver.com>
-
-From b1d6d55ece1c26fa2829e2b819b038d7b6d692b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Pauli <paul.d...@oracle.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 10:54:58 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
- (CVE-2018-0735)
-
-Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation
-that can potentially provide a side channel.
-
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlin...@hotmail.de>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 99540ec79491f59ed8b46b4edf130e17dc907f52)
----
- crypto/ec/ec_mult.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-index 7e1b3650e7..0e0a5e1394 100644
---- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT
*r,
- */
- cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
- group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality);
-- if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL)
-- || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL)) {
-+ if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
-+ || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT
*r,
- * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
- */
- kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
-- BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1);
-+ BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
-
- group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
- if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
---
-2.17.0
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1.bb
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb
similarity index 96%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb
index 1234b64b864..be31e9f76ac 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1a.bb
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz
\
file://run-ptest \
file://openssl-c_rehash.sh \
file://0001-skip-test_symbol_presence.patch \
- file://0002-fix-CVE-2018-0734.patch \
- file://0003-fix-CVE-2018-0735.patch \
file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
"
@@ -24,8 +22,8 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
"
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7079eb017429e0ffb9efb42bf80ccb21"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
"2836875a0f89c03d0fdf483941512613a50cfb421d6fd94b9f41d7279d586a3d"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "963deb2272d6be7d4c2458afd2517b73"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
"fc20130f8b7cbd2fb918b2f14e2f429e109c31ddd0fb38fc5d71d9ffed3f9f41"
inherit lib_package multilib_header ptest
--
2.17.1
--
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