On 23-09-14 01:05, Paul Wouters wrote:
On Mon, 22 Sep 2014, Paul Wouters wrote:

Looking around I saw:

[root@ns0 log]# ods-ksmutil key list --verbose |grep  "NOT IN"
SQLite database set to: /var/opendnssec/kasp.db
libreswan.org                   ZSK           active    2014-09-25
05:44:55 (retire)   2048    8
e9fa25e8214d2920c9489069bdfe61e6 SoftHSM NOT IN repository
libreswan.net                   ZSK           active    2014-09-25
05:44:55 (retire)   2048    8
635cc83526dfafc2c76605ae7db96ea3 SoftHSM NOT IN repository
libreswan.com                   ZSK           active    2014-09-25
05:44:55 (retire)   2048    8
cd09e7a69e890ee7ad41a30e9a323b73 SoftHSM NOT IN repository
httpca.org                      ZSK           active    2014-09-23
03:44:15 (retire)   2048    8
f11737ffedb1723031545fe488c89bad SoftHSM NOT IN repository

It is possible that testing with softhsm-2 and then reverting to
softhsm-1 caused these to happen, if these keys were generated during
the 2 days of running softhsm-v2.

Running ods-ksmutil key delete --cka_id <id> --force seemed to have
killed it and forced it to generate new ones

And for unknown reasons it is now only creating a single RRSIG record
for the DNSKEY set (by the KSK) and none of the RRSIG records by the
ZSK, turning these 4 zones into bogus :(

Deleting all files in /var/opendnssec/tmp/ and /var/opendnssec/signed/
and even /var/opendnssec/signconf/ and running ods-ksmutil update all
did not resolve this issue:

If you need such recovery, you also want to restart the signer after removing these files, as the data is now retained in memory.

Best regards,
  Matthijs



Sep 22 14:51:51 ns0 ods-signerd: [STATS] libreswan.org 2014092200
RR[count=60 time=0(sec)] NSEC3[count=38 time=0(sec)] RRSIG[new=1
reused=0 time=4(sec) avg=0(sig/sec)] TOTAL[time=4(sec)] Sep 22 15:11:31
ns0 ods-signerd: [STATS] libreswan.org 2014092201 RR[count=1
time=0(sec)] NSEC3[count=0 time=0(sec)] RRSIG[new=0 reused=1 time=2(sec)
avg=0(sig/sec)] TOTAL[time=2(sec)] Sep 22 15:14:34 ns0 ods-signerd:
[worker[2]] CRITICAL: failed to sign zone libreswan.org: General error
Sep 22 15:14:34 ns0 ods-signerd: [worker[2]] backoff task [configure]
for zone libreswan.org with 60 seconds
Sep 22 15:14:58 ns0 ods-enforcerd: Zone libreswan.org found.
Sep 22 15:14:58 ns0 ods-enforcerd: Policy for libreswan.org set to default.
Sep 22 15:14:58 ns0 ods-enforcerd: Config will be output to
/var/opendnssec/signconf/libreswan.org.xml.
Sep 22 15:14:58 ns0 ods-enforcerd: WARNING: ZSK rollover for zone
'libreswan.org' not completed as there are no keys in the 'ready' state;
ods-enforcerd will try again when it runs next
Sep 22 15:14:58 ns0 ods-enforcerd: Called signer engine:
/usr/sbin/ods-signer update libreswan.org
Sep 22 15:15:54 ns0 ods-signerd: [signconf] zone libreswan.org signconf:
RESIGN[PT7200S] REFRESH[PT604800S] VALIDITY[PT1209600S]
DENIAL[PT1209600S] JITTER[PT43200S] OFFSET[PT3600S] NSEC[50]
DNSKEYTTL[PT3600S] SOATTL[PT3600S] MINIMUM[PT3600S] SERIAL[datecounter]
Sep 22 15:16:03 ns0 ods-signerd: [STATS] libreswan.org 2014092200
RR[count=60 time=0(sec)] NSEC3[count=38 time=0(sec)] RRSIG[new=1
reused=0 time=3(sec) avg=0(sig/sec)] TOTAL[time=3(sec)]

[two hours later]

I ended up using dnssec-keygen to generate a new key, and import it
manually into softhsm and then importing it as ZSK using ods-ksmutil.

Not an easy recovery. What should have happened was that opendnssec
should have signed with the only existing ZSK there was, instead
of skipping all ZSK RRSIGs and producing a signed zone with only
a single RRSIG over the DNSKEY from the KSK :(

Paul
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