yang jelas, Wiranto pada waktu itu membiarkan kerusuhan terjadi. di TV, wartawan datang di press conference dengan Wiranto. Wartawan: "bagaimana situasi Jakarta?" wiranto: "AMAN dan TERKENDALI. kalau tidak aman, bagaimana anda anda bisa sampai kemari? (dengan penuh percaya diri dan tersenyum)."
Dari jawaban tsb. silahkan menilai sendiri. --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, Bet Funk <bet.f...@...> wrote: > > kurang lebih sih isinya bahwa ada rencana coup oleh Prabowo klik dan Wiranto > klik pada saat mei dg dasar kerusuhan mei, jakarta kosong melompong atau > dibiarkan rusuh gitu kira - kira ... eh tau tau Pak Arief dr AL yg mengirim > pasukan dr surabaya utk menyelamatkan jakarta tetapi akhirnya malah dicopot > krn mengganggu jlnnya coup .... bener ngak inti cerita nya begitu ? > > > > > ________________________________ > From: Peter Alimin <captiva...@...> > To: OB <obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com> > Sent: Saturday, June 27, 2009 10:22:41 PM > Subject: Re: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot > > Ad terjemahannya ga pak? > Sent from my BlackBerry® > powered by Sinyal Kuat INDOSAT > > -----Original Message----- > From: Vic <victor_speran...@...> > > Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2009 14:42:47 > To: <obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com> > Subject: [ob] The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot > > > mumpung belum cut-off-time hehehe. > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > The Marines: Real Story Behind May 1998 Riot > > Anonymous > 03 June 2004 > Back in May 98, when Jakarta was literally burning, the Chief of Staff of the > Indonesian Navy, Chief Admiral Arief Kushariadi, was on his way for some > pre-scheduled trip using the Navy helicopter. As he was flying over Jakarta, > he could not help noticing the movement of rioters on the ground and the > fires they started. He was amazed that he could not see any sizeable force of > security personnel to oppose the rampaging rioters. He assessed the situation > that strategic places such as the presidential palace had not been completely > secured by sizeable military units visible from the air. > > Being in a separate chain of command (thus he had no control of any Army or > Police units), and thinking that Jakarta was in danger, he immediately > contacted the Commanding Officer of Marines 2nd Infantry Brigade based in > Cilandak, Southern Jakarta. Adm. Kushariadi inquired of available forces that > the 2nd Marines Brigade could move at that instant. To his surprise, the > Brigade commander replied that he had none. All of his available forces had > been BKO-ed to Jakarta Military Garrison (Komando Garnizun Jakarta) and they > were already fielded when Adm. Kushariadi reached him over the radio. This > even include all combat support (Banpur) personnel, artilery and cavalry. The > marines had a battalion of cavalry (amphibious PT-76 tanks and BTR-50 > amphibious Armored Personnel Vehicle) in Cilandak. However, those armored > cars remained in their base with nobody left to operate them. > > Unbeknownst to the Admiral, the Marines based in Cilandak Jakarta had been > involved in a plot engineered by Commander of the Army Strategic Reserves > (Kostrad), Lieut. Gen. Prabowo and his clicks. Prabowo had realized that the > Marines was the only military unit that was able to contest his Army Special > Forces (Kopassus) in combat. He happens to be a good friend of Maj. Gen. > Suharto, the Marines Corps Commanding General at the time, when they shared > quarters during their days at the Integrated Staf and Command College > (Seskogab) in Bandung a few years before. When Prabowo was in charge of the > Kopassus, he tried to bring the two corps closer together. Having almost > unlimited source of funding (thanks to the support he enjoyed from Cendana), > Prabowo not only beefed up his Kopassus but he also sent some contributions > to the Marines, commanded then by this old roommate of his. After living as a > step son for more than three decades, the Marines received Prabowo > contribution with a warm feeling. However, Suharto was aware of some moves > from Prabowo that might follow the contributions. > > It did come in 1997, when Prabowo proposed "to better integrate" Kopassus and > the Marines. How? By interchanging personnel between the two corps. He wanted > to have some Kopassus men in every Marines unit and to be part of the unit > during the operation. Suharto flatly refused this proposal. Politely, he > explained to Prabowo that the Marines has a different doctrine from its > counterparts in Kopassus. The Indonesian Marines (owing to much similarities > to the USMC) follow the doctrine as a professional combat unit. They never > did nor wish to ever raise their weapons against their own countrymen. The > marines subscribes to a frontal type combat style where the objective is as > clearly defined as the identity of the enemy. When the Marines are landing on > the beach, they must assume that the beach was part of Indonesian soil > invaded by some foreign enemies. So "mendarat dan menang" just simply does > not apply to the Indonesian Army doctrines. > > Knowing that he could not influence the neutrality and professionalism of the > Marines, Prabowo decided that he should at least tied up all available > Marines units in Jakarta area when his troops were to secure power from then > defunct government of President Soeharto. He was able to do this because Maj. > Gen. Sjafrie Samsoeddin, the Commanding General of Jakarta Military Area > Command (Kodam Jaya),, ex officio the Jakarta Garrison Commander, was his old > friend from the Military Academy days and part of his click. Samsoeddin > cleverly ordered the Marines to stand guard at some less important locations > far away from the area being destroyed by rampaging rioters. > > Now, back to Adm. Kushariadi. Realizing that there was no effective military > unit to protect Jakarta, the prudent Admiral immediately raised the > Commanding Officer of the Marines 1st Infantry Brigade based in Karang > Pilang, Surabaya, East Java. Kushariadi ordered Surabaya to get ready one > full infantry battalion equipped for combat deployment (they did not have > extensive anti-riot (PHH) equipments). He also ordered Surabaya to get ready > all available tank and armored car (panser) crews. Using all available planes > belonging to the Navy fleet air arm (including the Nomad & CASA 212), the > Admiral instructed the Marines battalion and its combat equipment to be flown > in to Jakarta at all possible speed. As you may have suspected, the Navy did > not possess planes with heavy load capacity, it took the small navy planes > several sorties between Jakarta-Surabaya to finally air lifted the entire > Marine battalion to Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base in Jakarta. > > As soon as the Surabaya Marines battalion landed in Jakarta, Adm. Kushariadi > ordered the infantrymen to secure strategic locations including the > Presidential Palace area. The cavalry crew from Surabaya immediately started > and manned all available tanks and armored cars still sitting in their > hangars in Cilandak. These tanks were then rolling into Jakarta street to > join the Marines infantrymen already in locations. > > Adm. Kushariadi thought he had saved the city from total mayhem. Well, he > did, but unbeknownst to him, his action also foiled two opposing groups that > were just getting ready to launch a coup: Commander in Chief of the Armed > Forces, Gen. Wiranto's group facing Prabowo's group. Both Wiranto and Prabowo > were cooking their own coup scenario. The situation in Jakarta was > intentionally brewed to allow the deployment of combat troops in Jakarta > using the riots as an excuse. While Wiranto and Prabowo were cooking up > strategy to beat their opponents, they forgot to take into account the > x-factor such as Adm. Kushariadi, who was totally outside the plot and > unaware of the coup plans from either side. > > So, now Jakarta is in chaos, the army troops from both factions are ready. > But the arrival of a marine battalion from Surabaya, now supported with > tanks, (note that the Marines tanks are better armored and more heavily armed > than those wheeled cavalry units fielded by Kodam Jaya) had rendered both > Wiranto and Prabowo's plan unexecutable without serious consequences. If > either Wiranto or Prabowo kept pressing forward with their coup plan, then > they will not only face the other army faction but also a battalion of > Marines from Surabaya. Also, as soon as the three Marines infantry battalions > from Cilandak, which were BKO-ed to Kodam Jaya, realized that their brothers > from Surabaya were here and there is a coup attempt in progress, then the > full Infantry Brigades would retract themselves from under the control of > Kodam Jaya and rejoined their original unit. Even under BKO, all Marines > field commanders would certainly put the order coming from their Chief of > Staff (Adm. Kushariadi) and their own Brigade Commanding Officer much higher > than orders coming from Kodam Commander, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Samsoeddin. > Therefore, whoever wanted to press forward with their coup plan, they will > have to face the entire Marines 2nd Infantry Brigade with an additional extra > battalion from Surabaya. That is more than 4000 professional and very well > trained combat troops, complete with their artilery and cavalry which have no > match among the Army units in Jakarta. No to count the long range guns of the > Navy battle ships at the Tanjung Priok, Jakarta harbor, which at that time > were told to have been pin-pointed toward the directions of Merdeka Timur, > Cilangkap, Cijantung, and Cilodong. > > Some inside sources indicate that Wiranto replaced Adm. Kushariadi a few > months after the May Incidents because of what the Admiral did to save > Jakarta. Regardless of the outcome and consequences of his actions, Adm. > Kushariadi, the Marines, and the Indonesian Navy as a whole, had again made > their selfless contribution to the survival of the Republic. But as usual, > the Navy remained unnamed in the history pages of Indonesia. However, the > people of Indonesia had witnessed how their Marines display a true sense of > military professionalism in the handling on various public unrest which > culminated in the Semanggi Incident in November 1998. If only the people of > Indonesia could find out the truth about May 1998 and the unparalleled role > played by their Marines and Navy in the recent struggle of their country. > > http://www.perspekt > <http://www.perspektif.net/article/article.php?article_id=57> > if.net/article/article.php?article_id=57 > > --- In obrolan-bandar@ <mailto:obrolan-bandar%40yahoogroups.com> > yahoogroups.com, "jsx_consultant" <jsx-consultant@> wrote: > > > > NO MORE word Tolol or Kampanye after this Midnight > > > > > > Kata tolol dan kampanye sudah merajalela dimilis OB. > > > > Embah kasih peringatatan dengan batas waktu jam 24:00 untuk > > menghentikan debat yg sudah engga elegan lagi ini. > > > > Sesudah jam 24:00 sudah TIDAK ADA lagi kata tolol dan > > kampanye dimilis OB. > > > > Yg melanggar, statusnya akan dirubah menjadi MODERATED dan > > yg KETERLALUAN akan digrounded TANPA PERINGATAN... > > > > ... > > > > Moderator. > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > + + > + + + + + > Mohon saat meREPLY posting, text dari posting lama dihapus > kecuali diperlukan agar CONTEXTnya jelas. > + + + + + > + +Yahoo! 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