While Waton's statement is correct - it does not address the core problem with any credential that comes with an ID.
All reusable IDs enable tracking. Full Stop. All government issued ID enable tracking. Just like social insurance number or any other cred. So - if you want privacy - don't release the ID number. Peace ..tom jones On Tue, Dec 24, 2024 at 6:34 AM Watson Ladd <watsonbl...@gmail.com> wrote: > I see that people are uncomfortable with making any mandates, and so I've > tried to be purely descriptive in this proposal. I leave it to the WG to > decide where to put it, but I see it as a wholesale replacement for some > sections to emphasize clarity. > > "SD-JWT conceals only the values that aren't revealed. It does not meet > standard security notations for anonymous credentials. In particular > Verifiers and Issuers can know when they have seen the same credential no > matter what fields have been opened, even none of them. This behavior may > not accord with what users naively expect or are lead to expect from UX > interactions and lead to them make choices they would not otherwise make. > Workarounds such as issuing multiple credentials at once and using them > only one time can help for keeping Verifiers from linking different > showing, but cannot work for Issuers. This issue applies to all selective > disclosure based approaches, including mdoc. " > > Sincerely, > Watson > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list -- oauth@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to oauth-le...@ietf.org >
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