As said I offer it as a starting point. There might be some value in
the existing text, but I found it distracted from clear presentation
of the problem. What's the problem with using MUST? We have to give
people who use these documents clear guidance.

I think the tautology is obvious: if SD-JWT doesn't offer the property
X that is required, it MUST NOT be used when X is required. and that's
exactly what should appear.

On Wed, Jul 31, 2024, 4:58 PM Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>
> I guess I had envisioned suggestions that didn't delete a bunch of existing 
> valuable and useful text. Rather I was expecting (or maybe just hoping) for 
> thoughtful suggestions adding to what's already written that, as I'd said, 
> better frame the risks and difficulties around Issuer/Verifier Unlinkability 
> (perhaps especially with respect to something like a government issuer 
> compelling collusion from verifiers). I'm also not a big fan of broad strokes 
> RFC 2119 language in privacy considerations.
>
> On Wed, Jul 31, 2024 at 11:31 AM Watson Ladd <watsonbl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> I've opened 
>> https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt/pull/448
>> as a step torwads this.
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 31, 2024 at 5:31 AM Brian Campbell
>> <bcampb...@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Tue, Jul 23, 2024 at 11:15 AM Leif Johansson <le...@mnt.se> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Mon, 2024-07-22 at 19:43 -0400, Richard Barnes wrote:
>> >> > I would observe that any solution based on garden-variety digital
>> >> > signature (not something zero-knowledge like BBS / JWP) will have
>> >> > problems with issuer/verifier collusion.  One-time tokens and batch
>> >> > issuance don't help.  There is no such thing as SD-JWT with
>> >> > issuer/verifier collusion resistance.  At best you could have SD-JWP.
>> >> >
>> >> > I don't think this needs to be a blocker on SD-JWT.  There are use
>> >> > cases that don't require issuer/verifier collusion resistance.  We
>> >> > should be clear on the security considerations and warn people away
>> >> > who care about issuer/verifier collusion resistance, and accelerate
>> >> > work on SD-JWP if that's an important property to folks.
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> +1 on this
>> >
>> >
>> > I'm generally a +1 on this too.  There is an attempt at a discussion 
>> > around unlinkablity in the privacy considerations at 
>> > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-10.html#name-unlinkability
>> >  currently. Concrete suggestions to that text about how to better frame 
>> > the risks and difficulties around Issuer/Verifier Unlinkability (perhaps 
>> > especially with respect to something like a government issuer compelling 
>> > collusion from verifiers) would be welcome for consideration.
>> >
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>>
>>
>> --
>> Astra mortemque praestare gradatim
>
>
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