For example, Auth0 has not set any CSP on this endpoint:

https://securityheaders.com/?q=https%3A%2F%2Fauth0.openai.com

The CSP recommendations are buried in the BCP currently

On Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 11:28 AM Dick Hardt <dick.ha...@gmail.com> wrote:

> The cookie and header recommendations I am thinking of would be for the AS
> as well as the client.
>
> A number of XSS attacks can be thwarted by a modern browser and the right
> HTTP headers.
>
> My question is: Did the authors consider adding cookie and header
> recommendations, and decided it was too general?
>
> Cookie and header best security practices have been around for years --
> I'm not suggesting we make anything up -- I'm suggesting we raise
> awareness.
>
> I consider myself to be fairly security aware, and I was not aware of some
> of the HTTP headers that are best security practice.
>
> /Dick
>
>
> On Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 11:19 AM Aaron Parecki <aaron=
> 40parecki....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> I don't think it's necessary to say "do the right things with cookies" in
>> the Security BCP. The Browser Apps BCP has a much deeper discussion of how
>> different browser-based architectures work with cookies so that seems like
>> a better place to actually have a real discussion about it.
>>
>> Also +1 to what Daniel said about not continuing to add little things.
>> Plus I think it's too late anyway, publication has already been requested
>> for the Security BCP.
>>
>> Aaron
>>
>> On Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 11:14 AM Daniel Fett <fett=
>> 40danielfett...@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>>> I agree with Aaron!
>>>
>>> Also we should be very careful about any additions to the Security BCP
>>> at this point. It is very easy to re-start the "one more thing" loop we've
>>> been stuck in for the last years. There may be more useful things to say,
>>> but we should put them on the list for a future second version of the BCP.
>>>
>>> -Daniel
>>> Am 05.11.23 um 20:03 schrieb Aaron Parecki:
>>>
>>> I don't think the Security BCP should incorporate cookie best practices
>>> directly in the document. If anything, it sounds like possibly a candidate
>>> for inclusion in the Browser Apps BCP.
>>>
>>> There are already some mentions of these cookie properties mentioned in
>>> the Browser Apps BCP, though only in reference to specific architectures,
>>> not as a general best practice. For example:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-15.html#pattern-bff-cookie-security
>>>
>>> Aaron
>>>
>>> On Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 10:48 AM Dick Hardt <dick.ha...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hey
>>>>
>>>> I was reviewing security on some sites I managed and checked to see if
>>>> the recommendations were in the BCP.
>>>>
>>>> I don't see anything around cookies such as httpOnly, sameSite, secure.
>>>>
>>>> I saw some HTTP security header suggestions buried in 4.16
>>>> (X-Frame-Options, CSP), but not for Strict-Transport-Security,
>>>> Permissions-Policy, or X-Content-Type-Options, and the CSP guidance is
>>>> rather vague.
>>>>
>>>> I understand these are general web security best practices, and perhaps
>>>> I missed it, but I think it would be useful to call out that best security
>>>> practices around cookies and headers should also be followed in Section 2,
>>>> and either have the best practices included, or direct the reader where to
>>>> find them.
>>>>
>>>> /Dick
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

Reply via email to