> I see the value of client discovery for registered clients as well as for > registering clients. For example, the client may be registered at a number of > ASes, and a discovery document lets the client update its information once at > its discovery endpoint rather than having to manually update the information > at each AS.
Can you elaborate more on what you mean by "for registered clients as well as for registering clients". IMO this is where the language around client registration in OAuth2 starts to break down. For example if a clients first interaction with an AS is via an authz request using a client_id that is a URL, and that AS is able to resolve the clients metadata in real time and elects to proceed with the request based on that information alone, would you consider that client registration has taken place? Because I would not, an AS in this model may choose to capture some state about the client or transaction (e.g that a transaction has taken place with that client) but that doesn't constitute registration IMO. > A key example of this (pun intended) is client key rotation. => I'd suggest > updating the introduction to not be focussed on registration, but as a way > for the AS to learn about a client. Agreed, what part of the introduction do you feel doesn't communicate that? Really most of the introduction is about trying to distance somewhat from the concept of "client registration" as I don't believe that is actually what is occurring in a client discovery style model. > 2. I'm strongly opposed to JSON-LD as an optional format. Extra complexity > for an AS to support with no added value since JSON is already being > supported so would not be able to take advantage of any JSON-LD features. I somewhat agree with this, I don't see the value of making the metadata document JSON-LD compatible either, but given the metadata document itself is JSON and is extensible, I dont see a problem with implementations wishing to include JSON-LD processing directives (e.g @context) in their metadata if they wish? > This proposal presumes the client provides the same redirect_urs to each AS. > In the clients that I have deployed, I have unique redirect URIs for each AS > to assist in knowing which AS has sent back the redirect. For example, I > append an AS specific slug to the redirect URI. How would that be handled in > this proposal? One path would be for me to provide an AS specific URI for the > client to each AS. This is a good call out and something I intend to elaborate on further, beyond just different redirect_uris I think there are instances where a client may have slightly different metadata based upon the AS it is interacting with and the way this can be supported is via unique client ID's e.g Client ID for AS1 => https://client.example.com/as1 Client ID for AS2 => https://client.example.com/as2 Which I believe is what you were suggesting? So in short, the draft does not presume the client has the same redirect_uris for each AS, because the client could have multiple client IDs. > I did not see URIs for the standard terms (ToS) of service and privacy policy > (PP) URIs Currently the draft is not aiming to define new metadata elements instead it refers to RFC 7591 and there you will find permitted registered elements like tos_uri and policy_uri which I believe serves the purpose you are referring to? > I prefer the other proposal I saw where 'client_uri` was used to signal that > client info was at a URI rather than using 'client_id', and client_id and > client_uri would be mutually exclusive. Doing this for both the authorization > and token endpoints would be what I would propose. Note that we are > deprecating the redirect_uri to be in the token request in OAuth 2.1. Just to clarify which proposal are you talking about? This is the current editors draft of Client discovery (https://mattrglobal.github.io/draft-looker-oauth-client-discovery/draft-looker-oauth-client-discovery.html), the subject of this email thread? R.e your comment about making client_id and client_uri mutually exclusive I agree, that is the direction taken with client discovery. What I'm sure is probably already obvious, we can't omit the client_id from OAuth2 requests so the question is if this isn't where the client describes itself with a URL, where does it? And what do you put in the client_id for the request instead? > With client discovery, we can more easily move to the client authenticating > with a signed request rather than a client secret, so a jwks_uri would be a > great addition Agree, but just to clarify RFC 7591 already defines a metadata element for JWKS URI, so the question is, what does the client discovery I-D need to define this method of client authentication fully? > 10. The string comparison in section (6) is confusing. My understanding is > that we have gone with byte comparisons with no transformations. What am I > missing? This language was lifted directly from RFC 8414 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414#section-4) it is primarily there to ensure complete definition around how an implementation should check the client_uri value returned in the resolved JSON metadata document matches the client_id/client_uri used to perform the resolution. This check is conceptually the same to what we require implementations to do when performing authorization server (openid provider) discovery in checking the issuer field. Thanks, [Mattr website]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1WeN4boYw%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fmattr.global%252f&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076709977%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=tKqCMzLUQNCeORd908YqfqZoT7tCy%2FMVwXdjpch1sDY%3D&reserved=0> Tobias Looker MATTR CTO +64 (0) 27 378 0461 tobias.looker@mattr.global<mailto:tobias.looker@mattr.global> [Mattr website]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1WeN4boYw%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fmattr.global%252f&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076709977%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=tKqCMzLUQNCeORd908YqfqZoT7tCy%2FMVwXdjpch1sDY%3D&reserved=0> [Mattr on LinkedIn]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1SbN9fvNg%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fwww.linkedin.com%252fcompany%252fmattrglobal&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076719975%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=t%2BidOI32oaKuTJf1AkcG%2B%2FirIJwbrgzXVZnjOAC52Hs%3D&reserved=0> [Mattr on Twitter]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1WdMte6ZA%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252ftwitter.com%252fmattrglobal&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076729970%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=BD9WWyXEjVGlbpbCja93yW%2FzLJZpe%2Ff8lGooe8V6i7w%3D&reserved=0> [Mattr on Github]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiWwGdMoDtMw%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fgithub.com%252fmattrglobal&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076729970%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=4AhRuXZCnU5i3hcngo4H3UiNayYUtXpRcImV4slS1mw%3D&reserved=0> This communication, including any attachments, is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you should not read it - please contact me immediately, destroy it, and do not copy or use any part of this communication or disclose anything about it. Thank you. Please note that this communication does not designate an information system for the purposes of the Electronic Transactions Act 2002. ________________________________ From: Dick Hardt <dick.ha...@gmail.com> Sent: 15 December 2022 09:03 To: Dmitry Telegin <dmit...@backbase.com> Cc: Tobias Looker <tobias.looker@mattr.global>; oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth2 Client Discovery EXTERNAL EMAIL: This email originated outside of our organisation. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. 1. I see the value of client discovery for registered clients as well as for registering clients. For example, the client may be registered at a number of ASes, and a discovery document lets the client update its information once at its discovery endpoint rather than having to manually update the information at each AS. A key example of this (pun intended) is client key rotation. => I'd suggest updating the introduction to not be focussed on registration, but as a way for the AS to learn about a client. 2. I'm strongly opposed to JSON-LD as an optional format. Extra complexity for an AS to support with no added value since JSON is already being supported so would not be able to take advantage of any JSON-LD features. 3. I agree with using .well-known for discovery. It has become pretty common now, and that pattern helps prevent there being a conflict with any existing content / routes that are at the client endpoint. 4. This proposal presumes the client provides the same redirect_urs to each AS. In the clients that I have deployed, I have unique redirect URIs for each AS to assist in knowing which AS has sent back the redirect. For example, I append an AS specific slug to the redirect URI. How would that be handled in this proposal? One path would be for me to provide an AS specific URI for the client to each AS. 5. In HellÅ -- we offer developers the option to include a logo to be used for dark themed experiences in addition to the standard light themed experience. 6. I did not see URIs for the standard terms (ToS) of service and privacy policy (PP) URIs 7. on the ToS and PP topics, we could include version info so that it is easier for the AS to detect if the ToS and PP have been updated since the last time the user provided consent 8. I prefer the other proposal I saw where 'client_uri` was used to signal that client info was at a URI rather than using 'client_id', and client_id and client_uri would be mutually exclusive. Doing this for both the authorization and token endpoints would be what I would propose. Note that we are deprecating the redirect_uri to be in the token request in OAuth 2.1. 9. With client discovery, we can more easily move to the client authenticating with a signed request rather than a client secret, so a jwks_uri would be a great addition 10. The string comparison in section (6) is confusing. My understanding is that we have gone with byte comparisons with no transformations. What am I missing? /Dick 10. On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 5:14 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=40backbase....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40backbase....@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote: Hi Tobias, On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 2:49 AM Tobias Looker <tobias.looker=40mattr.glo...@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40mattr.glo...@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote: There are certainly things we could explore here, one such option could be to continue to only return application/json but for the document to include an element like "@context" in the response if its desired that the metadata be processable as a JSON-LD document. I'd generally agree; my only concern about the Content-type is that it could be set by the web server rather than the developer, and developers might have no control over the web server configuration. If, for example, the metadata is deployed as a static JSON-LD file, and the web server uses MIME DB, then it will serve the resource as application/ld+json rather than application/json (unless reconfigured to do so). Yes I've had similar thoughts about this, I think RFC 9111 could be a good basis. What remains a little unclear to me is what normative requirements we might impose on implementers in regards to caching, for instance I think requiring clients hosting their metadata to implement HTT request caching would be too strict, but if they are to implement it, RFC 9111 is recommended and if you do here is how it must be implemented? I agree that requiring clients to implement caching (i.e. to guarantee Age and Cache-Control headers) might be excessively strict. But in the case where the headers are not present, I think we should recommend the ASes to implement some opinionated defaults (e.g., default TTL for client metadata = 1 hour etc.) Dmitry Thanks, [Mattr website]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1WeN4boYw%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fmattr.global%252f&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076709977%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=tKqCMzLUQNCeORd908YqfqZoT7tCy%2FMVwXdjpch1sDY%3D&reserved=0> Tobias Looker MATTR CTO +64 (0) 27 378 0461 tobias.looker@mattr.global<mailto:tobias.looker@mattr.global> [Mattr website]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1WeN4boYw%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fmattr.global%252f&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076709977%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=tKqCMzLUQNCeORd908YqfqZoT7tCy%2FMVwXdjpch1sDY%3D&reserved=0> [Mattr on LinkedIn]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1SbN9fvNg%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fwww.linkedin.com%252fcompany%252fmattrglobal&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076719975%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=t%2BidOI32oaKuTJf1AkcG%2B%2FirIJwbrgzXVZnjOAC52Hs%3D&reserved=0> [Mattr on Twitter]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1WdMte6ZA%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252ftwitter.com%252fmattrglobal&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076729970%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=BD9WWyXEjVGlbpbCja93yW%2FzLJZpe%2Ff8lGooe8V6i7w%3D&reserved=0> [Mattr on Github]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiWwGdMoDtMw%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fgithub.com%252fmattrglobal&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076729970%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=4AhRuXZCnU5i3hcngo4H3UiNayYUtXpRcImV4slS1mw%3D&reserved=0> This communication, including any attachments, is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you should not read it - please contact me immediately, destroy it, and do not copy or use any part of this communication or disclose anything about it. Thank you. Please note that this communication does not designate an information system for the purposes of the Electronic Transactions Act 2002. ________________________________ From: Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=40backbase....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40backbase....@dmarc.ietf.org>> Sent: 14 December 2022 06:30 To: Tobias Looker <tobias.looker@mattr.global> Cc: Ben Schwartz <bem...@google.com<mailto:bem...@google.com>>; oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org> <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth2 Client Discovery EXTERNAL EMAIL: This email originated outside of our organisation. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Hello Tobias, thanks for the draft! In regards to prior art, I'd like to mention Solid Project and their OIDC flavor, Solid-OIDC: https://solid.github.io/solid-oidc/#clientids-document They're using a similar approach (and have been for years), though with some differences: - client_id points to a URL that must resolve to the client metadata document directly (no .well-known/* used); - the document's format is JSON-LD, a superset of JSON. In order to maintain compatibility with Solid and similar existing technologies, would it make sense to mention that: - while retrieving client metadata, AS should recognize not only application/json, but application/ld+json (or maybe even application/*+json, as per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6839#section-3-1)? - any unknown fields (like JSON-LD "@context") must be ignored? On an unrelated note, it would be nice to cover the issue of caching the client metadata on the AS side. Obviously, we wouldn't want to re-request the metadata upon every request to the authorization endpoint. Would RFC 9111 suffice here? If so, which subset should be guaranteed to be supported by the AS? Thanks, Dmitry On Wed, Nov 9, 2022 at 8:36 PM Tobias Looker <tobias.looker=40mattr.glo...@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40mattr.glo...@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote: Hi Ben, See below for some thoughts. > I'm having trouble understanding the precise URL structures that are used > here. Can client_uri include a nontrivial path? Why is it necessary to > repeat client_uri in the response JSON? The intent here is to follow how "OAuth 2.0 authorization metadata" works (RFC 8414) which requires the client resolving the authorization server metadata to check that the issuer in the resolved document matches the issuer URL they started the resolution with, see below for the relevant extract from RFC 8414. " The "issuer" value returned MUST be identical to the authorization server's issuer identifier value into which the well-known URI string was inserted to create the URL used to retrieve the metadata. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used. " So the equivalent with our draft is to require the authorization server to validate that the client_uri returned in the clients metadata response matches the URL that was used to retrieve the metadata. > The use of .well-known is a bit unusual. Why not just host the JSON at the > client_uri? Just to clarify it is, just under a well-known path? e.g if the client uri is https://client.example.com then the metadata would be published at https://client.example.com/.well-known/oauth-client > Finally, I note that the section on Impersonation Attacks doesn't mention the > client_name or logo_uri. If these are to be shown to the user, they present > a very serious impersonation risk that ought to be discussed. (The > client_name also might need to be localized, which could be done by fetching > the JSON document with an appropriate Accept-Language request header.) Yes absolutely agree this is an important security consideration to highlight, I will capture an issue. Thanks, [Mattr website]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1WeN4boYw%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fmattr.global%252f&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076709977%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=tKqCMzLUQNCeORd908YqfqZoT7tCy%2FMVwXdjpch1sDY%3D&reserved=0> Tobias Looker MATTR CTO +64 (0) 27 378 0461 tobias.looker@mattr.global<mailto:tobias.looker@mattr.global> [Mattr website]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1WeN4boYw%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fmattr.global%252f&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076709977%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=tKqCMzLUQNCeORd908YqfqZoT7tCy%2FMVwXdjpch1sDY%3D&reserved=0> [Mattr on LinkedIn]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1SbN9fvNg%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fwww.linkedin.com%252fcompany%252fmattrglobal&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076719975%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=t%2BidOI32oaKuTJf1AkcG%2B%2FirIJwbrgzXVZnjOAC52Hs%3D&reserved=0> [Mattr on Twitter]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiW1WdMte6ZA%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252ftwitter.com%252fmattrglobal&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076729970%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=BD9WWyXEjVGlbpbCja93yW%2FzLJZpe%2Ff8lGooe8V6i7w%3D&reserved=0> [Mattr on Github]<https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fscanmail.trustwave.com%2F%3Fc%3D15517%26d%3Dw46s4eMXULV_ns1ZfAKYLbVKcqey_PHiWwGdMoDtMw%26u%3Dhttps%253a%252f%252fgithub.com%252fmattrglobal&data=04%7C01%7CSteve.Lowes%40mbie.govt.nz%7C5a65fe33c70b41fd8ba908d976f3a2f1%7C78b2bd11e42b47eab0112e04c3af5ec1%7C0%7C0%7C637671611076729970%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=4AhRuXZCnU5i3hcngo4H3UiNayYUtXpRcImV4slS1mw%3D&reserved=0> This communication, including any attachments, is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you should not read it - please contact me immediately, destroy it, and do not copy or use any part of this communication or disclose anything about it. Thank you. Please note that this communication does not designate an information system for the purposes of the Electronic Transactions Act 2002. ________________________________ From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40google....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40google....@dmarc.ietf.org>> Sent: 10 November 2022 07:04 To: Tobias Looker <tobias.looker@mattr.global> Cc: oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org> <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth2 Client Discovery EXTERNAL EMAIL: This email originated outside of our organisation. 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