Hi Brian,
The text states:
Also recall that OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] assumes access tokens are
treated as
opaque by clients. So, during the course of any token caching
strategy, a client *cannot* inspect the content of the access token to
determine the associated authentication information or other details.
The token format might be unreadable to the client or might change at
any time to become unreadable.
A client *can *inspect the content of the access token.
A better wording would be:
... a client *should not *inspect the content of the access token ...
It would be worthwhile to add a Privacy Considerations section:
10. Privacy Considerations
Since access tokens are presumed to be opaque to clients, clients
(and hence users) are not supposed to inspect the content of the
access tokens.
Authorizations Servers are able to disclose more information than
strictly necessary about the authenticated user without the end user
being
able to know it. Such additional information may endanger the
privacy of the user.
Denis
I've published an -04. It has that very minor change. There was also
an off-list discussion during WGLC that resulted in thinking it'd be
worthwhile
*_to add a reminder that access tokens are opaque to clients_*. So I
took that as LC feedback and -04 adds a brief note towards that end.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge/
On Mon, Oct 10, 2022 at 1:22 PM Vittorio Bertocci
<vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
Thanks Dima for the comment. Some thoughts:
> (editorial)...
Good point. "statically" would characterize the simplest of the
scenarios, but in fact any case where the AS is the only arbiter
of the authn level works for the point we are trying to make.
We'll drop "statically". Thanks!
> Apart from...
This spec focuses on empowering an RS to communicate its ACR and
freshness requirements, regardless of the reasons leading the RS
to make that determination: the logic by which that happens is
explicitly out of scope, and in many real life cases it might
simply be unknowable (eg anomaly detection engines based on ML are
often back boxes). The mechanism described here can be used
alongside other mechanisms that might require the client to get
the user to interact with the AS, as it is the case for
insufficient_scope, but those remain distinct cases (eg
insufficient _scope might not require any step up but simply
explicit user consent, and if it does require a stepup, that's
entirely determined by the AS without any communication with
client or RS required).
On Fri, Oct 7, 2022 at 17:43 Dima Postnikov <d...@postnikov.net>
wrote:
*This message originated outside your organization.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Couple of quick comments from me:
1) (Editorial) >In simple API authorization scenarios, an
authorization server will statically determine what
authentication technique
In many scenarios, authorization servers will use *dynamic*
decisioning to determine authentication techniques; it's just
not exposed to the client in a way to make it actionable
(which is why this specification's intent makes perfect sense).
2) Apart from authentication level, there might be other
reasons why users might be forced to go through the
authorization flow, for example, insufficient authorization /
scopes / claims / etc.
If there is a mechanism to let the client know, as a
practitioner, i'd rather have the same approach for both
authentication and authorization. There are a range of
authorization policy engines in the market that could return
"STEP UP is required" after looking at authentication,
authorisation and many other real-time signals. It's just not
standardized...
On Sat, Oct 8, 2022 at 7:30 AM Pieter Kasselman
<pieter.kasselman=40microsoft....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
I am very supportive of this work and have been working
through different use cases to see whether it can satisfy
the requirements that arise from them.
One observation from working through these uses cases is
that as customers move to Zero Trust architectures, we are
seeing customers adopting finer grained policy
segmentation. Consequently customers are planning to
deploy segmented access control by data or action
sensitivity, within a service. This approach to policy
design makes it more common for a single service to depend
on multiple authentication context values or combinations
of authentication context values.
An example of this is a policy that has multiple acr
values (e.g. acr1=password, acr2=FIDO, acr3=selfie check,
acr4=trusted network). A customer may define a policy that
requires different combinations of these acr values, for
example, a file server may requires password for general
access (e.g. acr1), FIDO authentication (acr2) or password
access and being on a trusted network to read sensitive
data (acr 2 of (acr1 + acr 4), FIDO authentication and
password (acr1 + acr2) for accessing editing sensitive
documents and a real-time selfie check on top of FIDO and
presence on a trusted network (acr1 + acr2 + acr3 + acr4)
to initiate a sensitive workflow (e.g. check-in code).
Other variations of this includes database access with
different types of access requirement for certain rows
(row-level permissions) or columns (column level
permissions) with different combinations of acr values.
I was curious if this type of scenario where multiple
authentication contexts and combinations of contexts are
required is something others see (or are beginning to see)
as well?
Cheers
Pieter
*From:*OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of
*Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
*Sent:* Thursday, September 22, 2022 3:02 PM
*To:* oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
*Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC for Step-up Authentication
*Correction:*
Please, review the document and provide your feedback on
the mailing list by *Oct 7th, 2022*.
On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 9:52 AM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
<rifaat.s.i...@gmail.com> wrote:
All,
This is to start a *WG Last Call *for the *Step-up
Authentication *document:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-03.html
<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https*3A*2F*2Fwww.ietf.org*2Farchive*2Fid*2Fdraft-ietf-oauth-step-up-authn-challenge-03.html&data=05*7C01*7Cpieter.kasselman*40microsoft.com*7C0078f809101147bc978308da9ca32020*7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47*7C1*7C0*7C637994521713812011*7CUnknown*7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0*3D*7C3000*7C*7C*7C&sdata=18sfemyWqYb06PvUA9eTLaq0ccDY14*2F6ETo58JpE*2FJQ*3D&reserved=0__;JSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUlJSUl!!PwKahg!537tJQfGj3Z_Yi2waywl1VPGyDs9818JE-M-KNFgPtoB0O26a7ksRvAYrPyzfKKXsMKCVblAomtRXj8$>
Please, review the document and provide your feedback
on the mailing list by *Sep 30th, 2022*.
Regards,
Rifaat & Hannes
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