Hi Roman,

Thanks for getting back to me - I'm somewhat out of my depth here, but really I 
think that I find this sentence to be somewhat ambiguous:  "the use and 
verification of the iss parameter is not necessary and MAY be omitted."

I read this as allowing both:
 (i) a send can choose to not include the iss parameter (under the given 
scenarios).
 (ii) a receiver can choose to not verify the iss parameter (under the given 
scenarios).

>From you comments below, I think that the text is only intended to mean (i). 
>If so, perhaps the sentence would be clearer as just "the iss parameter is not 
>necessary and MAY be omitted"?

But if you feel the that text is sufficiently clear that is also okay with me.

Thanks,
Rob


> -----Original Message-----
> From: iesg <iesg-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Roman Danyliw
> Sent: 05 January 2022 15:13
> To: Rob Wilton (rwilton) <rwil...@cisco.com>; The IESG <i...@ietf.org>
> Cc: oauth-cha...@ietf.org; oauth@ietf.org; draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-
> r...@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [OAUTH-WG] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-
> iss-auth-resp-03: (with COMMENT)
> 
> Hi Rob!
> 
> Thanks for your review. I wanted to close the loop on your COMMENT.  See
> below.
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Robert Wilton via
> > Datatracker
> > Sent: Tuesday, November 30, 2021 5:31 AM
> > To: The IESG <i...@ietf.org>
> > Cc: oauth@ietf.org; draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-r...@ietf.org; oauth-
> > cha...@ietf.org
> > Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-
> > auth-resp-03: (with COMMENT)
> >
> > Robert Wilton has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-03: No Objection
> >
> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email
> > addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this 
> > introductory
> > paragraph, however.)
> >
> >
> > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/blog/handling-iesg-ballot-positions/
> > for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT
> positions.
> >
> >
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
> >
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > Thanks for this document, just one comment on a couple of sentences in
> the
> > security section that I found unclear in this paragraph:
> >
> >    There are also alternative countermeasures to mix-up attacks.  When
> >    an authorization response already includes an authorization server's
> >    issuer identifier by other means, and this identifier is checked as
> >    laid out in Section 2.4, the use and verification of the iss
> >    parameter is not necessary and MAY be omitted.  This is the case when
> >    OpenID Connect response types that return an ID token from the
> >    authorization endpoint (e.g., response_type=code id_token) or JARM
> >    response mode are used, for example.  However, if a client receives
> >    an authorization response that contains multiple issuer identifiers,
> >    the client MUST reject the response if these issuer identifiers do
> >    not match.  The details of alternative countermeasures are outside of
> >    the scope of this specification.
> >
> > I'm probably missing something but this seems to suggest both:
> >  - the use and verification of the iss parameter is not necessary and MAY be
> > omitted. - if a client receives an authorization response that contains
> multiple
> > issuer identifiers,
> >    the client MUST reject the response if these issuer identifiers do not
> match.
> 
> Indeed, both are suggested courses of action, but across three scenarios:
> 
> (a) one iss which gets compared against the server's metadata document
> (paragraph 2 of Section 2.4)
> (b) no iss is present because there is a OpenIDConnect ID token or JARM JWT
> (both mechanisms provide a nearly equivalent mitigation to "iss", see last
> three paragraphs of Section 2.4)
> (c) multiple iss where the above behavior applies for rejection if they don't
> match; and also checks per (a) (this text)
> 
> Regards,
> Roman

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