Yes, this I agree with. This is why I think we should probably have:
Authorization: Bearer foo...
Authorization: DPoP foo...
Authorization: HTTPSig foo...
Authorization: MTLS foo…
And so on. If you’ve got a middle box that’s adding its own attestations to the
request, that’s not adding additional presentations to the access token.
— Justin
> On Nov 16, 2021, at 6:05 PM, 乗松隆志 / NORIMATSU，TAKASHI
> <takashi.norimatsu...@hitachi.com> wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
> Considering that several technologies has emerged for realizing sender
> constrained tokens (e.g. holder-of-key bound : certificate bound by MTLS,
> DPoP, etc ... in the future), it might be good to show which kind of
> technology is used for sender constraint token explicitly with Authentication
> header value if there is a chance that RS allows several technologies for
> sender constrained access token.
>
> Regards,
> Takashi Norimatsu
> Hitachi, Ltd.
>
> From: Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu>
> Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2021 1:18 AM
> To: Dmitry Telegin <dmit...@backbase.com>
> Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>; 乗松隆志 / NORIMATSU，TAKASHI
> <takashi.norimatsu...@hitachi.com>
> Subject: [!]Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error code for missing
> client certificate
>
> On Nov 12, 2021, at 8:30 AM, Dmitry Telegin <dmit...@backbase.com
> <mailto:dmit...@backbase.com>> wrote:
>
> Just to make sure I understand the process, is it going to be something like
> draft-XXXXXX-oauth-mtls-rfc8705-bis -> draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-rfc8705-bis ->
> new RFC that will obsolete the current one? CCing my colleague Takashi
> Norimatsu who worked on MTLS holder-of-key for Keycloak, perhaps he has more
> ideas for improvements.
>
>
> That’s the most likely path if it happens, yes. And that’s if the WG wants to
> make that change, which would break things.
>
>
> As for this stance:
> The MTLS draft also re-uses “Bearer” as a token header, which is also a
> mistake in my opinion.
>
> Did you mean the re-use of the "Bearer" scheme for the Authorization header
> and WWW-Authenticate challenge? If so, and if we decide to introduce a new
> scheme, I think this would imply a new value for the "token_type" token
> response attribute as well.
>
>
> I actually meant the use in the “Authorization: Bearer <token>” header, as
> well as the token type. In my opinion both of those should be something other
> than “bearer” because it’s not a bearer token, it’s TLS bound. The argument
> in the WG at the time was that it would allow easier upgrades from existing
> implementations. I personally hold that this decision allows for more
> dangerous downgrades instead. 🤷♀️
>
>
> — Justin
>
>
>
> Of particular interest to me is the question whether different binding
> mechanisms (DPoP, MTLS) could co-exist, or should they be mutually exclusive;
> this deserves a separate thread though.
>
> - Dmitry
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 10:22 AM Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu
> <mailto:jric...@mit.edu>> wrote:
> Only if this working group wanted to take up the work of making a new
> revision of the standard, but I haven't seen any indication of desire to do
> that here. One possibility is for you to propose an update as an individual
> draft to the group here.
>
> -Justin
> ________________________________________
> From: Dmitry Telegin [dmit...@backbase.com <mailto:dmit...@backbase.com>]
> Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2021 1:34 PM
> To: Justin Richer
> Cc: oauth
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 8705 (oauth-mtls): RS error code for missing
> client certificate
>
> Thanks for the reply. That makes sense.
>
> Given that MTLS is not a draft but rather a proposed standard (RFC 8705), do
> you think there is a chance the changes you proposed could land in MTLS one
> day?
>
> On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 6:24 PM Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu
> <mailto:jric...@mit.edu><mailto:jric...@mit.edu <mailto:jric...@mit.edu>>>
> wrote:
> This is just my interpretation, but this feels more like invalid token,
> because you’re not presenting all of the material required for the token
> itself. The DPoP draft has added “invalid_dpop_proof” as an error code, which
> I think is even better, but the MTLS draft is missing such an element and
> that is arguably a mistake in the document. The MTLS draft also re-uses
> “Bearer” as a token header, which is also a mistake in my opinion.
>
> But given the codes available, “invalid_token” seems to fit better because
> you aren’t messing up the request _to the resource_ itself, you’re messing up
> the token presentation.
>
> — Justin
>
> On Nov 10, 2021, at 10:17 AM, Dmitry Telegin
> <dmitryt=40backbase....@dmarc.ietf.org
> <mailto:40backbase....@dmarc.ietf.org><mailto:dmitryt
> <mailto:dmitryt>=40backbase....@dmarc.ietf.org
> <mailto:40backbase....@dmarc.ietf.org>>> wrote:
>
> Any updates on this one? The missing certificate case looks more like
> "invalid_request" to me:
>
>
> invalid_request
> The request is missing a required parameter, includes an
> unsupported parameter or parameter value, repeats the same
> parameter, uses more than one method for including an access
> token, or is otherwise malformed. The resource server SHOULD
> respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 2:23 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmit...@backbase.com
> <mailto:dmit...@backbase.com><mailto:dmit...@backbase.com
> <mailto:dmit...@backbase.com>>> wrote:
> From the document:
>
>
> The protected resource MUST obtain, from its TLS implementation
> layer, the client certificate used for mutual TLS and MUST verify
> that the certificate matches the certificate associated with the
> access token. If they do not match, the resource access attempt MUST
> be rejected with an error, per
> [RFC6750<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6750
> <https://secure-web.cisco.com/1o_2s-Gspt8sfupLKDuTsMUX0mq2oJBpOmhZGA15-xGMgZFiTepx6JeXQohQQs-Glnj09iZyh6bzIPoQDrizWlLZBsH-6nxwkLrjVuMHBrgVmb0xqFr2O9pc9oRLu2KFZ2VqpLc7Pkf_IxyVbW0CW5OI_dBUr_LFaRcZPhnfQbeXcYZHRMzwtikk1ositkwgcSYqfKsn8uZWaYQipspFXiyB4xgg891fgojvsQuvMi5ZWKELavcBAjh8KQzxhSIHLk0q4XdaUWI325xXswKFR8DW2eFWf2G_LHg2fVEbDayTFBmjpLpm_nuhESWkdHuDH/https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc6750>>],
> using an HTTP 401 status
> code and the "invalid_token" error code.
>
> Should the same error code be used in the case when the resource failed to
> obtain a certificate from the TLS layer? This could happen, for example, if
> the TLS stack has been misconfigured (e.g. verify-client="REQUESTED" instead
> of "REQUIRED" for Undertow), and the user agent provided no certificate.
>
> Thanks,
> Dmitry
>
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