Sorry I ment "ath" was fine as a claim name for that. I added the extra u.

On 4/12/2021 11:28 AM, Justin Richer wrote:
> As mentioned, my own intention for using a new claim “ath” was to have
> a fixed hash size, not dependent on the surrounding JWS envelopes that
> “at_hash” is based on. I’ve implemented both approaches on several
> platforms now, and I greatly prefer the fixed hash. 
>
> It’s a new name because it is a new claim with new contents and new
> semantics.
>
>  — Justin
>
>> On Apr 9, 2021, at 11:20 AM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com
>> <mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com>> wrote:
>>
>> I think that using "auth" with the fixed full sha256 hash is fine.
>>
>> The original response size reasons for truncating the hash in the
>> definition of at_hash are no longer really neccicary in current
>> browsers and networks.
>>
>> A new claim is fine.
>>
>> On 4/9/2021 11:03 AM, Brian Campbell wrote:
>>> For a hash of the access token in the proof JWT, discussion about
>>> whether to use the existing 'at_hash' claim or define a new 'ath'
>>> claim using only SHA-256 have been floating around since last year
>>> (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/QKMHo6gGRAaANadsAWWlSuRDzXA/
>>> <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/QKMHo6gGRAaANadsAWWlSuRDzXA/>
>>> attempts to describe the tradeoffs) without a clear consensus
>>> emerging for one over the other. I've been on the fence myself
>>> seeing the merits and drawbacks in both. In the absence of clear
>>> preference or an obvious 'best' option, the PR from Justin
>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/C2G9cUetGSj6WnNcRdZE8wLR19I/
>>> <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/C2G9cUetGSj6WnNcRdZE8wLR19I/>
>>> with the SHA-256 only 'ath' claim was sufficient to make the decision.
>>>
>>> I'm not married to the 'ath' but don't want to change it back and
>>> forth. I would like to see something like consensus for making a
>>> change. And strong consensus has been elusive here.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 9, 2021 at 1:45 AM Filip Skokan <panva...@gmail.com
>>> <mailto:panva...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     I would support that too but only if the way it's calculated
>>>     would get aligned as well. If it remains being a fixed sha256 of
>>>     the whole token rather than what at_hash does, using a new claim
>>>     makes sense. 
>>>
>>>     Odesláno z iPhonu
>>>
>>>>     9. 4. 2021 v 5:38, Mike Jones
>>>>     <Michael.Jones=40microsoft....@dmarc.ietf.org
>>>>     <mailto:40microsoft....@dmarc.ietf.org>>:
>>>>
>>>>     
>>>>
>>>>     I had expected that we would use the existing member name
>>>>     “at_hash” for the access token hash value, rather than the new
>>>>     name “ath”, since there’s already precedent for using it. 
>>>>     Could we change to the standard name for this when we publish
>>>>     the next version?
>>>>
>>>>      
>>>>
>>>>                                                               Thanks,
>>>>
>>>>                                                               -- Mike
>>>>
>>>>      
>>>>
>>>>     *From:* OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org
>>>>     <mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>> *On Behalf Of * Brian Campbell
>>>>     *Sent:* Wednesday, April 7, 2021 1:30 PM
>>>>     *To:* oauth <oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>>
>>>>     *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for
>>>>     draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.txt
>>>>
>>>>      
>>>>
>>>>     A new revision of DPoP has been published. The doc history
>>>>     snippet is copied below. The main change here is the addition
>>>>     of an access token hash claim.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>        -03
>>>>
>>>>        *  Add an access token hash ("ath") claim to the DPoP proof
>>>>     when used
>>>>           in conjunction with the presentation of an access token for
>>>>           protected resource access
>>>>
>>>>        *  add Untrusted Code in the Client Context section to security
>>>>           considerations
>>>>
>>>>        *  Editorial updates and fixes
>>>>
>>>>      
>>>>
>>>>     ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>>>     From: <internet-dra...@ietf.org <mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>>
>>>>     Date: Wed, Apr 7, 2021 at 2:16 PM
>>>>     Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.txt
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.txt
>>>>     has been successfully submitted by Brian Campbell and posted to the
>>>>     IETF repository.
>>>>
>>>>     Name:           draft-ietf-oauth-dpop
>>>>     Revision:       03
>>>>     Title:          OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession at
>>>>     the Application Layer (DPoP)
>>>>     Document date:  2021-04-07
>>>>     Group:          oauth
>>>>     Pages:          32
>>>>     URL:           
>>>>     https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.txt
>>>>     <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.txt>
>>>>     Status:       
>>>>      https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop/
>>>>     <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop/>
>>>>     Html:         
>>>>      https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html
>>>>     <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html>
>>>>     Htmlized:     
>>>>      https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03
>>>>     <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03>
>>>>     Diff:         
>>>>      https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03
>>>>     <https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03>
>>>>
>>>>     Abstract:
>>>>        This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining
>>>>     OAuth 2.0
>>>>        tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the
>>>>     application level.
>>>>        This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks
>>>>     with access
>>>>        and refresh tokens.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time
>>>>     of submission
>>>>     until the htmlized version and diff are available at
>>>>     tools.ietf.org <http://tools.ietf.org/>.
>>>>
>>>>     The IETF Secretariat
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     */CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential
>>>>     and privileged material for the sole use of the intended
>>>>     recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by
>>>>     others is strictly prohibited.  If you have received this
>>>>     communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by
>>>>     e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from
>>>>     your computer. Thank you./*
>>>>
>>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>>     OAuth mailing list
>>>>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>>
>>>
>>> /CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
>>> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s).
>>> Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly
>>> prohibited.  If you have received this communication in error,
>>> please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the
>>> message and any file attachments from your computer. Thank you./
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

Reply via email to